The computer comprehension of systematic metaphor by Hutchings, Richard Charles
The Computer Comprehension of Systematic Metaphor 
Richard Charles Hutchings 
Trinity College 
A dissertation submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Cambridge 
August 1990 
Abstract 
This thesis presents a new approach to the interpretation of metaphors in natural language 
processing that is both demonstrably useful and computationally feasible. The remarkable 
ubiquity of metaphor in ordinary everyday English has been convincingly documented by 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their seminal book Metaphors We Live By, where they 
show that there are a number of large scale metaphor schemas, which can explain the 
systematic borrowing of large numbers of words and phrases from one conceptual domain to 
describe a second domain, a phenomenon that can be termed 'systematic metaphor'. This 
metaphorical talk is so familiar that it passes largely unnoticed in conversation, but is 
sufficiently non-literal that it would cause severe problems for a computer system not 
equipped to deal with it. 
The new computational approach to metaphor comprehensipn in this thesis is documented in 
three stages: 
First, there is an outline of the theory of Descriptional Analogy - a new and general theory 
of metaphor which is capable of explaining many empirical observations; in particular, it 
covers systematic metaphor and its role in lexical semantics. Descriptional Analogy sees 
metaphor as the linguistic consequence of underlying analogical reasoning; furthermore this 
analogical reasoning is seen as fundamental to language production, underlying 'literal' as 
well as metaphorical utterances. Thus metaphor is liberated from its conventional 
classification as linguistically deviant and can be seen as entirely 'normal', a view that is 
well represented in the philosophical literature. 
Next comes a presentation of DREP, a new, fully intensional, analogical semantic network 
formalism. DREP is a homogeneous formalism capable of representing both 'commonsense' 
knowledge and knowledge about systematic metaphors in precisely the same way. It is 
therefore particularly well suited to the requirements of Descriptional Analogy. This 
analogical representation is shown to offer a number of advantages over other, more 
conventional representation schemes. 
Finally, there is a presentation and discussion of the MINT system - a computational 
implementation of the principles of Descriptional Analogy built around the DREP formalism. 
MINT generates literal paraphrases of a range of metaphorical input utterances, given 
knowledge only of the literal senses of words and a few simple analogies underlying 
systematic metaphors. 
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1. Introduction 
Natural language understanding systems currently in existence can offer an impressive 
amount of grammatical coverage and vocabulary in specialized domains. Nevertheless, the 
input they can accept is still rather stilted and falls far short of true natural language. One 
area of natural language which currently lies outside the scope of most systems is figurative 
language and in particular, metaphor. 
The remarkably pervasive use of metaphor in ordinary everyday English has been 
convincingly documented by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their seminal book 
Metaphors We Live By [Lakoff and Johnson 80] . They show that there are a number of large 
scale metaphor schemas, (they identify some fifty of these) which can explain the systematic 
borrowing of large numbers of words and phrases from one conceptual domain to describe a 
second domain, a phenomenon that can be termed 'systematic metaphor'. This metaphorical 
talk is so familiar that it passes unnoticed in human contexts, but is sufficiently non-literal 
that it would cause severe problems for a computer system not equipped to deal with it. 
An example of a systematic metaphor is MORE rs UP,1 where increasing and decreasing 
quantities are seen as rising and falling objects. Particular 'manifestations' of this systematic 
metaphor include 
(1) Population is YI!.. I down I rising I falling I soaring I plummeting 
High fidelity, low resolution, peak performance 
A steep temperature gradient 
Prices have fallen through the floor 
Harry raised his bid 
House prices have risen out of reach of the first time buyer. 
Many more examples of systematic metaphors are given in Appendix B. 
This thesis describes the theory and practice of the MINT system - an original computer 
system capable of producing literal paraphrases of metaphorical input utterances, making use 
of commonsense knowledge and knowledge about systematic metaphors. Both kinds of 
knowledge are represented in the form of analogies. 
1.1 A computational approach to metaphor 
One's initial reaction to the idea of systematic metaphor might be that this is really ' dead' 
metaphor - are these not established literal word senses which can be looked up in 
dictionaries? This is a legitimate question to ask. There is an obvious intellectual challenge 
The names of these systematic metaphors are intended to be mnemonic, rather than accurate summaries. 
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in the long run to develop a way of dealing with novel metaphor in a computer system , but 
why bother with dead metaphor when all that is required is a sufficiently good dictionary? 
This section outlines the principal practical motivations for the computational study of 
systematic metaphor. Many of these reasons are explored in greater depth in subsequent 
chapters of this thesis. 
Systematic metaphor is not dead metaphor! 
The first point to make in defence of the study of systematic metaphor is that it is simply 
wrong to say that systematic metaphor is only manifested in 'dead' metaphors - it also 
includes many instances of novel metaphor, such as the following manifestations of TIME rs A 
MOVING OBJECT and ARGUMENT IS WAR (see Appendix B):2 
(2) The hours hurtled past 
(3) The big guns in the audience were ready to shell Professor X' s position. 
It is possible to envisage an extremely large lexicon in which a great many of these 
figurative word senses are listed, so obviating the need for special metaphorical processing 
in these cases, but it is unrealistic to expect this lexicon to be anything like complete. As a 
brief illustration, consider the example 
(4) The weeks passed I rolled I trailed I tramped I marched I drifted I slid I flew I 
crept I crawled I sped I pelted I streaked I flashed I shot I tore I slipped I rushed I 
whizzed I hurtled I trickled by. 
All the choices of verb in this sentence are manifestations of TIME IS A MOV]};G OBJECT, the 
systematic metaphor in which words which 'normally'3 indicate physical movement are used 
to denote a sort of temporal 'movement'. Not one of these verbs is given an appropriate 
literal sense in The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (COED) [Oxford 76] . COED does 
give temporal examples for fly and pass, but the corresponding senses are defined as 'go', as 
if 'go' were literally applicable to time.4 COED also gives a temporal example for trickle 
explicitly labelled as figurative. 
Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (Longman's) [Longman 78] fares slightly 
better in that if offers temporal examples for its spatial senses of pass, fly, and speed, an 
admitted figurative example for march, an archaic, but literal, sense of 'to happen ' for pass 
(as in 'it came to pass'), and senses ' (of time) to go by' given for both pass and the 
2 These examples are due to Searle [Searle 79] and Cooper [Cooper 86] respectively. 
This normality is discussed at length in subsequent chapters. 
As a matter of fact, COED does list go as valid in a temporal as well as a spatial sense; however, this 
introduces an ambiguity in any definition given in terms of go, such as that for pass. This ambiguity 
means that when looking up the definition of p~. the dictionary user must disambiguate 'go' according to 
context Thus it would seem that to store such dictionary definitions in a precompiled, unambiguous form 
for use by a computational system would entail multiplying the number of senses listed considerably. 
2 1.1 
collocation roll by. 
So apart from a few scattered temporal examples, the overwhelming strategy employed on 
the part of the lexicographers is to give only a limited number of 'literal' senses and let the 
dictionary user infer figurative senses for himself. The computational approach in this thesis 
goes along with this compromise - figurative senses of words are inferred from literal senses 
as and when required. 
Ubiquity of systematic metaphor 
As Lakoff and Johnson pointed out, everyday English is riddled with systematic metaphor, 
both of the sort which can be anticipated in a dictionary and the sort that cannot. Such 
language is to be expected by a computer system when its input comes from an untrained 
user, such as a member of the general public, or from sources originally intended for a 
human readership, such as newspapers, books, newswires, and so on. All of these are very 
likely candidates for input to an applied natural language system. 
For example, the following passages taken from the financial pages of newspapers and the 
radio5 exhibit manifestations of systematic metaphor that would be susceptible to such a 
treatment. 6 
(5) Mr. Steel was brought into Guiness two years ago ... to mastermind Guiness' s 
expansion in the drinks trade. 
(6) As oil prices fell, platinum led the general retreat of precious metals. 
(7) The City viewed the move as a grave blow to a bank whose morale was already at 
a low ebb, following the collapse of merger talks with Union Bank of Switzerland. 
(8) Government stocks fell sharply yesterday, fJJ!__Jzl_ the weakness of the US bond 
market and fears of higher. interest rates. The pound lost some of its earlier 
strength as the dollar steadied. 
(9) The education system has been stretched to breaking point. 
Realism 
A second point to make is that the aim of tackling general metaphor without any appeal to 
prior knowledge of suitable analogies (for it will be seen that analogies hold the key to the 
interpretation of metaphors) is extremely ambitious - research along these lines, such as in 
[Indurkhya 85, 86, 87], suggests that unrealistically large amounts · of world knowledge, 
appreciation of context, and sheer processing power would be required. Furthermore the 
analogies behind metaphors, especially manifestations of systematic metaphor often appear 
5 
. The Times, The Sun.day Times, and Radio 4. 
6 These examples display figurative language other than metaphor, particularly metonymy [see Glossary]. 
Personification can be seen as a particularly common form of systematic metaphor. 
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quite arbitrary: the analogy between, say, a person's emotionality and an object's 
temperature is hardly obvious, no more so than an alternative analogy with, for example, 
colour, and yet this analogy underlies the systematic metaphor EMOTIONALITY IS TEMPERATIJRE 
discussed in Chapter 2. It would therefore be asking a great deal of a computational theory 
to come up with such an analogy from first principles. 
It can be hoped that more rapid progress can be achieved by concentrating on systematic 
metaphor, since when interpreting such metaphors it is not necessary to start completely 
from scratch. Nevertheless, the fact that systematic metaphor does involve metaphorical 
processes means that its study can be expected to yield valuable experience when it comes 
to tackling more ambitious metaphors. 
Reducing the size of the lexicon 
Exploiting systematic metaphor means that the size of a system's lexicon can be reduced. 
This would be achieved by removing word senses that can be seen to be accounted for by 
systematic metaphor, leaving 'core' literal senses that can be used in conjunction with 
known analogies to reconstruct the required senses during processing. This is of course a 
trade-off between data space and processing complexity, and in practice , the right 
compromise would need to be reached; but in the light of previous comments, the 
processing machinery would need to be there in any case to deal with unanticipated cases of 
systematic metaphor. 
· There is , however, a danger associated with the removal of these metaphorical senses: many 
of them are sufficiently well established to have acquired an idiomatic meaning which 
cannot be recovered by treating them as instances of systematic metaphor. This would seem 
to argue that such senses should be left in the lexicon; if there are too many of them, 
however, it would be impossible to choose in advance which ones would be required. Since 
their idiomatic meaning is unlikely to be very far removed from the meaning which can be 
given them as fnstances of systematic metaphor, omitting idiomatic senses would mean 
treating them imperfectly, but nevertheless usefully. This attitude would allow a sort of 
graceful degradation in perfonnance of the system as a whole at the limits of its vocabulary. 
Technical word senses 
It has been pointed out that in a transportable natu ral language front end for, say, a database 
query system or an expert system, there can be a large investment in word definitions and 
world knowledge, which is likely to be rendered misleading or useless when ord inary words 
are used in technical , domain-dependent senses [Boguraev et al. 88], [Copestake and Sparck 
4 1.1 
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Jones 89]. In this case, there is a good possibility that these technical senses can usefully be 
considered as metaphorical senses of the common, domain-independent words; after all, the 
technical words are unlikely to have been chosen at random, but rather because of some 
perceived similarity in meaning. If the system treats this basic relationship between the 
common and technical . word senses as a systematic metaphor, then it is in a position to 
process extensions of that metaphor making use of its general, domain-independent 
knowledge. An example of this in operation would be a systematic metaphor which sees the 
functionality of a computer program as its metaphorical health. Thus a process, an editor 
say, can be spoken of as being unwell, ill, dead, dying, recovering, it can be killed or 
revived, or cured of its bugs. By giving the system knowledge of one 'core' analogy, it 
gains the wherewithal to handle all these technical word senses and still more which have 
not been anticipated in advance. 
In summary, then, it is essential in the long run that computational linguistics develops a 
way of dealing with metaphorical language. To tackle novel metaphor without appeal to 
knowledge of underlying analogies is rather too ambitious given the state of the art, but 
systematic metaphor seems much more feasible in the short term, offers real practical 
benefits, and can be expected to offer valuable insights into the processing of more difficult 
metaphors. 
These motivations have been born out in the MINT system described here. In MINT, 
systematic metaphors are encoded very concisely as analogies in the system's knowledge 
base, and a single such analogy enables MINT to interpret many different manifestations of 
the corresponding systematic metaphor, given only literal meanings for the words involved. 
For example, MORE rs UP is represented as a very simple analogy, but this single analogy 
enables MINT to interpret many different words metaphorically, words such as 'rising', 
'falling', 'soaring', 'plummeting', 'high', 'low', 'higher', and 'lower'. 
1.2 Aims and Methodology 
The overall aim of this work is to develop a computational system which is capable of 
'understanding' instances of systematic metaphor in a ~ay that is both computationally 
useful and feasible. This understanding of metaphor is not intended to cover the arresting 
sort of metaphor such as one might find in poetry or rhetoric, rather it is aimed at the more 
prosaic, everyday sort of metaphor which is ubiquitous in conversation, journals, commercial 
documents, and so on. · As argued above, this sort of metaphor is at once more tractable and 
more obviously useful in applications envisaged for natural language systems in the near 
fu ture. 
5 1.2 
The scope of systematic metaphor is still very wide in terms of the complexity of linguistic 
manifestations that can arise. In order to limit the requirements of the computational system 
to a realistic level, attention is focused principally on those manifestations in which a single 
word or collocation is used metaphoricallr; that is, where individual words are given 
metaphorical senses. This focusing on small scale lexical semantics is, however, to be done 
in a way that would readily admit extension to larger semantic units . 
A theory of metaphor 
This major goal can be broken down into various subgoals as follows. The first step is to 
develop a computationally useful theory of metaphor starting from existing theories from 
philosophy, linguistics, and computational linguistics. Such a theory should be sufficiently 
detailed and advanced that it can be used as a basis for a computational system capable of 
demonstrating some of the potential benefits of handling systematic metaphor. 
The particular existing philosophical and linguistic theories to be expanded upon are those of 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, who give an extensive account of systematic metaphor as 
a psychological phenomenon in [Lakoff and Johnson 80], and Max Black, whose 
'interaction' theory of metaphor [Black 62, 79] seems to offer the most promising 
framework on which to build a computational theory. The interaction theory as it stands 
lacks an account of systematic metaphor and it also lacks any detailed mechanism for 
interpreting metaphors - it is an aim of this work to incorporate both of these. 
An analogical knowledge representation 
The second step is to develop a knowledge representation which is well suited to 
representing systematic metaphors and supporting the analogical reasoning required by the 
theory. At the same time, it seems desirable, from the philosophical and linguistic evidence,7 
to accommodate 'literal' knowledge in a way that is not greatly different from 
'metaphorical' knowledge. As the representation is only intended to support an experimental 
demonstration system, it is preferable to keep it simple, rather than to try to cater for too 
many representational issues which are not directly concerned with metaphorical processing 
- the representation does not have to be, say, logically adequate: the extra burden of dealing 
with negation and quantification would only be a hindrance to the investigation of metaphor. 
It seems preferable to start with a new representation, rather than try to adapt an old one, as 
metaphorical reasoning appears to be qualitatively different from the sort of reasoning 
7 Detailed in Chapter 2. 
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supported by existing general knowledge representations, and there is a considerable danger 
that an attempt to force metaphorical knowledge into an old mould would tend to distort the 
processes at work beyond useful recognition. By devising a new and simple representation, 
in which metaphorical knowledge could be accommodated naturally, there is a substantially 
better chance of getting a clear view of what was happening and of being able to give the 
system a semantics which motivates processing. 
An experimental system 
The third and final step is to incorporate the knowledge representation into a larger system 
which actually performs the processing of metaphors. The system is to be capable of 
accepting input which might contain manifestations of systematic metaphor and produce 
from this input a literal paraphrase acceptable to a conventional, though hypothetical, 
application. The task of this system is described more fully later in this chapter. 
General methodological aims 
A general methodological aim of the work is to keep it as simple as possible as far as this is 
consistent with the aims outlined above. This simplicity has the twin advantages of making 
the task more tractable and of making it possible to see more of the wood and less of the 
trees. This is of major benefit when developing a theory in a relatively novel field - MINT 
.is not intended to form the basis of a large natural language system, rather it is to be a test-
bed system, a means to evaluate the theory of systematic metaphor by showing up any 
defects or inadequacies, thus providing feedback in a development cycle. 
This simplicity also means that it should be possible to concentrate on developing the 
theoretical issues without worrying about whether the system, and in particular the 
representation, would be adequate to deal with, say, anaphor resolution, negation, or 
quantification. The result should be a system that embodies the essence of the theory 
concerned, so while the system itself might not be easily extended to perform a greater 
range of NLP tasks, the lessons learned should be easier to see and to apply in other, more 
complex, systems. 
It should be pointed out that it is not an aim of this work to produce a psychological model 
of metaphor comprehension. The emphasis is very much on producing a computationally 
useful theory, though of course this does not mean to say that psychologically interesting 
ideas will not tum up, it is left to the reader to identify such ideas. 
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1.3 The research context 
There has been a great deal of work on metaphor in philosophy and linguistics, but rather 
little in computational linguistics until relatively recently. The lack of computational studies 
can perhaps be explained as due to an early attitude that metaphor is a relatively uncommon 
phenomenon, often regarded as deviant language, and so low on the list of priorities. There 
have, however, been a few attempts to analyze simple metaphors of the form 'A is [like] B' 
based on selective transfer of properties, for example [Winston 78], [Weiner 84]. 
More recently, however, and especially since the publication of Metaphors We Live By 
[Lakoff and Johnson 80], there has been a growing realization that metaphor is in fact 
extremely common in the sort of language that computational linguists are interested in 
dealing with. Consequently there have been a number of attempts to incorporate some 
metaphor handling capacity into existing systems, but without focusing on the theoretical 
issues. Isolated examples of metaphor are dealt with in [Wilks 77, 78], [Fass and Wilks 83], 
and simple treatments of systematic metaphor are given in [Hobbs 77, 79, 81], [Jacobs 87, 
88], [Martin 87, 88]. 
This current work, however, is best seen as following on from the more theoretical studies 
of metaphor made by Carbonell [Carbonell 80, 82], [Carbonell and Minton 85] and 
lndurkhya [lndurkhya 85, 86, 87]; these authors see analogical reasoning at the root of 
metaphorical interpretation. 
Lexical semantics 
This work may also be seen as part of a growing trend in lexical semantics to identify 
regularities in the way words form distinct but related senses, and to use this knowledge to 
reduce the superabundance of word senses that need to be listed in the lexicon of a 
computer system._ The observation behind this is that the harder one looks at the way a 
particular word is used, the more senses it appears to have. The usual reaction to this in 
computational linguistics is to list all these senses separately, but this consumes a great deal 
of space and requires a great deal of foresight. By exploiting regularities, though, it might 
well prove possible and beneficial to generate some of these word senses automatically 
(either 'on the fly' at run time or in advance at 'compile' time). This could be achieved by 
adding sufficiently to the semantic information in lexical entries and having a richer notion 
of compositionality, one that reflects the observed regularities in word sense derivation. 
The research presented here aims to exploit metaphorical regularities, James Pustejovsky has 
investigated how to exploit metonymical regularities [Pustejovsky 89], and Beth Levin has 
. sought to exploit syntactic regularities [Katz and Levin 88]. 
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1.3.1 Related work 
This research is aimed towards the development of a small demonstration system. A larger 
system would require greater depth in several areas, so this work can be seen as 
complementary to work in several closely related fields: 
Analogical reasoning 
Analogical reasoning has been studied intensively by many researchers, some, as mentioned 
above, in relation to metaphor, and many in the context of machine learning, see [Hall 89] 
for a survey. There have also been computational implementations of psychological models 
of analogical reasoning [Gentner 87, 89], [Falkenhainer et al. 86, 87, 89], [Holyoak and 
Thagard 89]. The analogical reasoning capabilities of the MINT system developed here are 
relatively simple, as more complex reasoning is not required for the task in hand. 
Nevertheless, a more comprehensive system that can handle more difficult metaphors would 
probably require a greater ability in this area. 
Metonymy 
Metonymy [see Glossary] is a figure of speech closely related to metaphor, and indeed 
sometimes reckoned to be a subclass of metaphor; Lakoff and Johnson found instances of 
systematic metonymy analogous to systematic metaphor [Lakoff and Johnson 80]. Certainly 
the two figures often occur together and ought to be handled together in a more realistic 
system. Computational accounts of metonymy are given in [Fass 85, 86, 88a, 88b], 
[Pustejovsky and Anick 88], [Pustejovsky 89]. 
Naive semantics 
The interpretation of metaphor depends crucially on a degree of commonsense knowledge, 
Lakoff and Johnson observed that this knowledge is very often of a physical nature, the sort 
of knowledge that has been dubbed ' nai"ve physics' in the computational literature [Hayes 
85], [Hobbs et al. 86], [Hobbs 87]. Consequently, the results of research into nai"ve physics 
would be highly relevant to a fuller implementation of this research. A rather more general 
semantic investigation, that of 'nai"ve semantics', based on psychological evidence has been 
given by Kathleen Dahlgren [Dahlgren et al. 89]. This concentrates on non-physical 
semantic knowledge of the sort that would be appropriate for use with the system outlined 
here. 
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1.4 The theory of descriptional analogy 
The theory of descriptional analogy developed in chapters 3 and 4 sees the linguistic 
phenomenon of metaphor as evidence of analogical reasoning - all metaphors are seen as 
being dependent on some 'underlying' analogy and a metaphor (that is, an actual utterance 
or piece of text) can be interpreted by reconstructing this analogy and reasoning with it. 
In a simple metaphor, according to the theory, one thing (the 'target') is 'viewed' 
analogically as another (the 'source'). For example, in the metaphor 
(10) John is a pig 
John is the target and the pig is the source. In more complex metaphors, more than one 
source and target are involved. 
This view is summed up in the Principle of Descriptional Analogy: 
A metaphor is the linguistic manifestation of an underlying analogy 
between its sources and targets. Moreover, given an analogy, any 
description of its sources can be applied metaphorically to the 
corresponding targets. 
For example, in (10), "is a pig" is a description of the pig in the analogy, and this 
description is applied metaphorically to John. 
The phenomenon of 'extended metaphor' is then seen to occur when the analogy underlying 
one metaphor is re-used and elaborated in subsequent metaphors in the same discourse or 
text. The phenomenon of 'systematic metaphor' is seen to rely on a common analogy 
underlying many individual metaphors which may come from entirely separate texts. Each 
such pattern of metaphors is called 'a systematic metaphor', and these are given mnemonic 
labels conventionally written in capitals. An example already seen is MORE IS UP and several 
more examples are given in Appendix B. 
A metaphor (i.e., an utterance or piece of text) that can be seen to come under the umbrella 
of one of these systematic metaphors is called a 'manifestation' of that systematic metaphor.8 
The common analogy underlying all manifestations of a particular systematic metaphor is 
called its 'core analogy'. 
The theory of descriptional analogy offers a number of significant advantages over other 
theories, principal among which (in the context of this work) is that it talks of descriptions 
of the source being inherited by the target, and not just properties. Such descriptions may 
themselves be metaphorical, and so metaphorical interpretation becomes a recursive 
procedure. This recursiveness is seen to be of central importance to the operation of 
systematic metaphor. 
A metaphor can be a manifestation of more than one systematic metaphor. 
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Literalness 
The notion of literalness proves to be very hard to define, for the simple reason that it seems 
impossible to provide a:n objective way of distinguishing between 'literal' and 'metaphorical' 
utterances. This difficulty spills over into the classification of metaphor, where authors have 
frequently tried to distinguish between 'novel metaphors' and 'dead metaphors' . Such 
authors have claimed that dead metaphors should be regarded as literal, but there is evidence 
to show that these metaphors continue to display much of their metaphorical nature long 
after death, and in particular can often be seen to be manifestations of systematic metaphors. 
The theory of descriptional analogy explains this observation by asserting that literalness is a 
relative notion, and so the distinction between 'novel' and 'dead' metaphors is only one of 
degree. Indeed, the processing of most 'literal' utterances is seen as using precisely the same 
analogical mechanisms as the processing of metaphors, literal utterances are seen as 
'metaphors' whose sources are 'definitive entities'. This is in line with the so-called 
'primacy' theory of metaphor outlined in chapter 2. 
1.5 A brief outline of DREP 
DREP is an original homogeneous semantic network formalism in which nodes are atomic 
but links are structured, linking more than two nodes at a time. In line with the theory of 
descriptional analogy, nodes correspond to intensional entities, and each of the structured 
links ('d-links') is seen as representing an analogy. All knowledge in the network is 
represented either in this way, or by direct links from collections of nodes into the lexicon -
there is no equivalent of the is-a link. 
The analogical nature of DREP means that it is possible to avoid completely the idea of 
'instantiation' and also rigid notions of frame and domain. This gives DREP significant 
advantages over rival representations in addition to its particular suitability fo r handling 
metaphor. 
The semantics given to DREP is a fully intensional semantics based on Castafieda's Guise-
Consubstantiation theory [Castafieda 77]. 
1.6 A brief outline of the MINT system 
Figure 1 shows how MINT fits into a full scale natural language processing system. It can 
be seen to be a sort of preprocessing component that accepts input from a narve parser, 
· input which retains the metaphoricality of the English, and generates from it a literal 
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paraphrase, which is then passed to an application program. 'Literal' in this context means 
that the paraphrase is directly 'meaningful' to the application program, i.e., all words (or 
more accurately, predicates) are used in their 'literal' senses. 
This literal paraphrase is in reality a loose collection of logical forms each of which lends a 
partial meaning to the input utterance. The paraphrase as a whole may only represent a 
partial account of the input, depending on how successful MINT is in identifying the 
metaphors involved, but this partial interpretation is presumed to be (much) better than 
nothing at all. 
iEnglish 
N a:ive Parser 
metaphorical 
~~nput 
MINT 
literal 
paraphrase 
~, 
Application 
Figure 1: The MINT system in context 
A simple example of the sort of utterance that MINT processes is 
(11) The price of gold is soaring 
which is paraphrased as9 
(12) The price of gold is increasing rapidly to a great level. 
Actually, the input and output of MINT is in log ical form, not English. 
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Here, 'soaring' is seen as a word that means 'rapid upwards physical movement to a great 
height', and so it is not considered literally applicable to prices. MINT achieves its 
paraphrases by appealing to its knowledge of the literal definitions of the words involved 
and its knowledge of the MORE rs UP systematic metaphor. It is a significant feature of the 
DREP representation that both types of knowledge can be represented in a uniform way. 
A rather more complex example processed · by MINT, a manifestation of the so-called 
'Conduit' metaphor [Reddy 79], is 
(13) John got his argument across to Bill, 
where the literal sense of 'get across' is taken to involve physical movement. This example 
is paraphrased, roughly, as 
(14) John communicated his argument to Bill. 
Appendix C shows MINT successfully producing literal paraphrases of about thirty examples 
involving systematic metaphor. 
1. 7 Thesis organization 
Chapter 2 is a brief survey of the occurrence of metaphor in English, outlining some of the 
linguistic and philosophical observations to be made and summarizing the major linguistic 
theories of metaphor. Also in chapter 2 is a survey of previous computational approaches to 
the interpretation of metaphor. This chapter gives a frame of reference for the rest of the 
thesis, defines and explains much of the terminology, outlines many observations which are 
to be explained by the theory of descriptional analogy, and gives the linguistic and 
philosophical starting points for the development of that theory. 
Chapters 3 and 4 pick up on the background of chapter 2 and develop the theory of 
descriptional analogy to a point where it is suitable for implementation in a computer 
system. 
Chapters 5 and 6 describe in detail DREP, the representation formalism at the heart of the 
implementation and how it is used in MINT, the overall system. 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with a discussion of the theory of descriptional analogy and 
its implementation, how they perform and how they relate back to the i.nitial observations on 
metaphor made in chapter 2. There is further discussion on how the theory and system 
might be extended and improved in further research. 
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2. The Phenomenon of Metaphor 
There has been a great deal written about metaphor; Shibles's annotated bibliography 
[Shibles 71] contains over 4000 titles, van Noppen's [Noppen 85] lists a similar number of 
works published between 1970 and 1985. This chapter is not intended to be a 
comprehensive survey of either the history or the theory of metaphor, rather it is to be a 
short tour around the subject area, showing some of the background to this thesis, 
identifying some of the terminology used, and providing the motivating observations behind 
the development of the computational theory of metaphor presented in chapters 3 and 4. 
These observations are reconsidered when assessing the results of this research in chapter 7. 
Overview 
The discussion in this chapter divides into five main parts. In 2.1 the general occurrence of 
metaphor in English is investigated to get an idea of just what a computational (or indeed 
any) theory of metaphor should seek to cover. In 2.2 the notion of systematic metaphor, 
which is the central concern of this thesis, is explored to see how it is manifested and how 
it relates to metaphor in general. In 2. 3 the issue of why metaphor is used at all is tackled, a 
question that leads to a number of important observations. In 2.4 there is an appraisal of 
some existing theories of metaphor, which gives a foundation for the theory of descriptional 
analogy to be developed in the next two chapters. Finally, in 2.5 there is a brief look at the 
major computational accounts of metaphor that have been developed to date. 
2.1 What is Metaphor? 
A successful definition of metaphor has proved elusive over the years since Aristotle's 
characterization of it as "giving a thing a name that belongs to something else". Authors 
have been divided about just which phenomena to include under the umbrella of metaphor, 
but there does seem to be a general acceptance that metaphor finds its place among the so-
called 'tropes' or 'figures of speech'. The tropes of particular interest in this work are 
metaphor, simile, metonymy, idiom, irony, hyperbole, and litotes [see Glossary] . 
An initial, but very loose characterization of metaphor is that it involves describing 
something as if it were something else - using words or phrases which do not apply 
literally. For example, in Shakespeare 's Richard II England is described as 
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(15) This nurse, this teeming womb of royal kings. 1 
The 'something' being described need not be a simple object, but could be an event, an 
activity, or just about anything. The following examples taken from the literature describe a 
wide variety of these 'somethings' : 
(16) Religion is the opium of the people 
(17) The government is sailing close to the wind 
(18) Mrs. Gandhi steamed ahead 
(19) The US/Russian arms negotiations are a high stakes poker game. 
This initial characterization of metaphor is rather too vague to be of much use in the 
computational context, and in particular, the notion of literalness needs pinning down. The 
next few pages will try to give a better indication of what is involved in metaphor by 
exploring its various manifestations. 
Some terminology 
But first, it will be useful to define a few terms . The term 'c-entity' ('c' for 'conversational') 
will be used to mean 'something that can be described'. C-entities already seen in the 
examples above include England, religion, the sailing of a ship close to the wind, and the 
government's pursuit of its policies. In particular it should be noted that a c-entity's identity 
is independent of the words used to describe it, it is a 'mental' object. In the conception of 
metaphor presented above, two c-entities are crucially involved: one c-entity, the 'target', is 
seen or described as if it were a second c-entity, the 'source' . Thus religion is the target of 
(16), and the opium of the people is its source. 
A c-entity may be said to belong to a 'conceptual domain' - thus the government's pursuit 
of its policies belongs to the domain of government, sailing close to the wind belongs to the 
domain of sailing. It should be emphasized that the idea of a conceptual domain is intended 
only as a very informal notion, as in general such domains are extremely difficult to 
delineate, nevertheless the notion of a domain is one that will prove useful in discussing the 
issues involved in metaphor. The conceptual domains of the source and target of a metaphor 
are termed the 'source domain' and the 'target domain' respectively. 
Using this terminology, a metaphor involves drawing descriptive terms from its source 
domain and applying them to its target. 2 
2 
Shakespeare's Richard /l, Act II, Scene 2 
The terminology is unfortunately not at all standard in the literature. Source and target are sometimes 
called 'frame' and 'focus', or 'secondary' and 'primary' subjects, or 'vehicle' and 'topic', or 'referent' and 
'subject'. The choice of the terms 'source' and 'target' here is intended to reflect the directionality of the 
transfer of descriptive terms in metaphor. 
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2.1.1 Classes of metaphor 
Metaphor comes in a variety of fonns. George Miller [Miller 79] provides a useful 
classification by dividing metaphor into nominal, predicative, and sentential metaphors. 
Nominal metaphor 
The simplest of these is the 'nominal metaphor', where the target is expressed or described 
by a metaphorical noun phrase, as in (16) and (19), and (20) - (22): 
(20) Man is a wolf 
(21) Inflation is a disease 
(22) John married a gem. 
Nominal metaphor can also be said to include metaphorical definite reference, as, for 
example, in (23): 
(23) The disease has lasted a long time [meaning inflation]. 
Predicative metaphor 
Miller's second class of metaphor is 'predicative metaphor', where a predicate, taken to be 
some verb, verb phrase, or adjective, is applied metaphorically to a target. This category 
covers (17) and (18), as well as examples such as 
(24) Mountain climbing is murderous. 
Sentential metaphor 
Miller's third and final class of metaphor is the 'sentential metaphor', which describes "an 
otherwise unobjectionable sentence in an incongruous context". Examples of sentential 
metaphor are 
(25) John has lost his marbles 
(26) Mrs . Thatcher bulldozed her way through the disser;.ting ranks (27) This disease is crippling us [meaning inflation] . 
Proverbs also tend to fit into this category: 
(28) A stitch in time saves nine 
(29) You can't make an omelet without breaking eggs. 
Sentential metaphor, and also the earlier observation about definite reference, shows that a 
particular sentence cannot in general be judged as metaphorical or literal without 
consideration of its context. Thus metaphor should not be regarded only as a problem in 
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semantics, but also as a problem in pragmatics - we should be talking about metaphorical 
utterances, rather than metaphorical sentences. 3 The pragmatic issues involved in metaphor 
are investigated further later in this chapter. 
Miller's three classes of metaphor can all be seen to fit in with the loose characterization of 
metaphor given earlier: all three of them describe their target as if it were something else.4 
This classification considers only metaphors occurring within a single sentence, but it is 
possible to see metaphor operating at a higher level: 
Extended metaphor 
There is another commonality between Miller's classes, and it is this: all three categories of 
metaphor seem to express a kind of similarity or analogy between their targets and their 
sources. Another way of saying that a target is described as though it were the source is to 
say that the target is seen, or viewed as the source. (This observation of similarity is what 
relates metaphor so strongly to simile, and what distinguishes metaphor from metonymy, 
more of which later). 
The term 'extended metaphor' is used for a series of individual metaphors in which such a 
similarity or analogy is re-used and elaborated over time. A good example of this sees 
England as a garden: 
(30) ... our sea walled garden, the whole land, 
Is full of weeds, her fairest flowers choked up, 
Her fruit trees all unpruned, her hedges ruined, 
Her knots disordered and her wholesome herbs 
Swarming with caterpillars? 5 
Indeed, whole texts can be classed as extended metaphors. Parables would be an example of 
this, as would allegories, such as John Bunyan's The Pilgrim's Progress and George 
Orwell's Animal Farm. 
These important observations, that analogy can be seen to underlie metaphor and that 
metaphor can be extended, are central to the computational approach to metaphor developed 
in this thesis. 
4 
I follow convention in using the terms 'speaker', ' hearer' , and 'utterance ' to include 'writer ', 'reader', and 
'text'. 
Note that it is not necessary for the target of a metaphor to be referred to explicitly by means of a noun phrase, in predicative and sentential metaphors especially, the source is often an event or action being described. 
A gardener's speech in Shakespeare's Richard II, Act ITT, Scene 4 
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2.1.2 Dead metaphor 
Many authors argue that the central quality of metaphor is its novelty, its life, its colour, its 
ability to conjure up images in the hearer's mind. After a while, a metaphor becomes tired 
and dull, it loses it's novelty and simply fades into ordinary language. To such authors, this 
corpse of a metaphor no longer merits the title 'metaphor' at all, its interpretation rests 
squarely in the realms of the literal, it becomes just another word sense or idiom, it becomes 
a 'dead metaphor'. Such a fate has befallen examples such as 
(31) Tom is a pig 
(32) The crime rate is rising 
(33) The jury must sift the evidence 
(34) They buried the hatchet. 
Dead metaphors are usually contrasted with 'novel metaphors', which are supposed to be 
new to the hearer, requiring full metaphorical processing to interpret. The distinction 
between dead and novel metaphor is, however, not at all easy to define, as will be seen, but 
the terminology is useful in more informal discussion. 
This supposed dichotomy between dead and novel metaphor reveals a key question for the 
computational linguist: is there a qualitative difference between processing dead metaphorical 
utterances and novel metaphorical utterances? 
Literalness 
It is not at all clear when a metaphor dies just when the transition between metaphorical and 
literal occurs. Where, for example, asks Levinson, does metaphorical processing take over 
from literal processing in the following sequence?6 
(35) John came hurriedly down the stairs 
John ran down the stairs 
John rushed down the stairs 
John hustled down the stairs 
John shot down the stairs 
John whistled down the stairs. 
Is it the case that there is a smooth transition between two ~istinct types of processing, or is 
it the same machinery in all cases, but with the more 'literal ' pathways being better oiled? 
The simplest test of literalness, and one that has been assumed by many authors, is one of 
whether a given word sense, or idiom, can be found in a dictionary _:__ if a word sense has 
made it into a dictionary, then it should be counted as part of 'literal ' language. This 
definition, however, presents an obvious problem: whose dictionary should be used, and is it 
6 [Levinson 83), p. 150 
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the same for all speakers and hearers? The equally obvious answer is that there is no 
standard dictionary, and so a better notion of literalness must be found . The search for such 
an improved notion is a theme of this chapter. 
Homonymy and polysemy 
In the search for a better notion of literalness, it is revealing to take a closer look at 
dictionary entries, and in particular the notions of 'homonymy' and 'polysemy'. 
For a given word-form (a simple combination of letters), there can be a number of different 
word senses defined in a dictionary. These senses are first divided into 'homonyms', which 
are unrelated in meaning, such as bank1 = 'side of a river' and bank2 = 'financial 
institution'. Homonyms are then subdivided into 'polysemes', which have separate, but 
related, meanings. For example mouthl(l) = 'facial orifice' and mouth1(2) = 'opening of 
bottle, cave, etc.' are polysemes. 
The notion of relatedness of meaning is unfortunately rather vague, and so it is difficult to 
draw a precise line between homonymy and polysemy. There are two plausible lines to take 
- the diachronic approach (based on etymology) and the synchronic approach (based on 
observations of the current usage of words). There is often, however, a conflict between the 
two approaches, and some sort of compromise has to be reached. 7 
Another problem for the lexicographer is the question of how far to split a homonym into 
polysemes - should there, for instance, be separate polysemes for 'mouth of a cave' and 
'mouth of a bottle', or should they be lumped under a single more general polyseme? 
Dead metaphors can be seen to give rise to polysemes of their 'parent' word senses, 
relatedness of meaning being assured by the similarity which the metaphor expressed.8 So, 
for example, attackl(l) = 'military assault' [parent sense] and attack1(2) = 'disputing of 
argument', are polysemes, as are rise10) = 'increase in height' [parent sense] and rise1(2) = 
'increase of a quantity'. In this way, a homonym can be seen to be typically divided into a 
parent polyseme and a number of derivative 'metaphorical' polysemes,9 although this 
distinction is not usually made in dictionaries. This idea of a 'parent sense' will be made 
more formal later and used as the basis of a computationally useful idea of literalness. 
7 
8 
See, for example, [Lyons 77] section 13.4. 
The identification of parent senses is not always uncontroversial. 
Derivative polysernes also arise through other tropes, such as metonymy and synecdoche. For instance, in [Longman 78], sail is given the following polysemous senses: 1 a piece of strong cloth fixed on a ship to catch wind [parent]; 2 a boat driven by these [synecdoche] 3 a short trip in a boat with these [metonymy] 4 distance at sea measured by the time a ship would take to travel it [metonymy] 5 any of the broad wind-
catching blades of a windmill [metaphor]. 
A detailed analysis of polysemous senses of run arising from metaphor, generalization and metonymy is given in [Bartsch 82]. 
19 2.1 
'Mere polysemy' 
It has been seen how lexicographers go to much trouble to distinguish homonyms and 
polysemes, but there does not seem to be any prima facie computational advantage in the 
distinction - polysemes are just word senses to be disambiguated in much the same way as 
homonyms. Indeed, the usual approach of computational linguistics has been to treat all 
these word senses as homonyms, independent words which just happen to have the same 
spelling. We might term this egalitarian attitude to word senses the 'mere polysemy' 
approach. It turns out, however, that there are definite advantages to be had from 
recognizing the distinction between homonymy and polysemy, and these advantages stem 
from the observation that, with a little prodding, dead metaphors show distinct signs of life, 
and with a wider perspective, their metaphorical nature can be seen to be hard at work, as 
we shall see in the next section.10 
2.2 Systematic metaphor 
On a sentential level, testing with the word 'literally' and the phenomenon of 'mixed 
metaphor' show that hearers are mindful of a dead metaphor's origins, and so a full 
transition to 'literal' meaning cannot have taken place. Consider our earlier examples of 
dead metaphor with the word 'literally' inserted: 
(36) ? Tom literally is a pig 
(37) ? The crime rate literally is rising 
(38) ? The jury must literally sift the evidence 
(39) ? They literally buried the hatchet. 
Fowler's example of mixed metaphor, or as he would call it, ' tasteless word choice ': 
(40) ? All the evidence must first be sifted with acid tests 
shows that 'sift' _cannot be regarded as a literal substitute for 'examine', neither can ' acid 
tests' be a literal substitute for 'definitive tests ' - the interaction of the two incompatible 
'dead' metaphors reveals their metaphorical roots. This phenomenon can even be seen to 
occur with words whose metaphoricality can only be trac~d in their etymological origins. 
Similarly, dead metaphors like to be used in metaphorically suitable collocations: one 
imposes a burden, applies a stimulus, jumps a hurdle, lifts a barrier. 11 
10 There are similarly good reasons for recognizing JX)lysemes as arising from other tropes, such as 
metonymy. 
11 see [Fowler 65] entry for metaphor. 
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Systematic metaphor 
A more impressive show of the residual metaphorical nature of 'dead' metaphors becomes 
apparent when one no longer considers metaphors in isolation, but instead looks for larger 
patterns of metaphorical language. Time and time again, words can be seen to be imported 
wholesale from one domain and applied systematically in another [Lakoff and Johnson 80]. 
The phenomenon, which is here termed 'systematic metaphor' involves a single 'core 
analogy' underlying a whole host of individual metaphors, live and de<1d. For example, 
(41) MORE IS UP:1 2 
Population is !E2_ I down I rising I falling I soaring I plwnmeting 
High fidelity , low resolution, peak performance 
A steep temperature gradient 
Prices have fallen through the floor 
Harry raised his bid 
House prices have risen out of reach of the first time buyer. 
( 42) TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT: 
In the following weeks .. . 
In the preceding days ... 13 
The time will come ... 
The time has arrived 
The hours passed I crept I crawled I dragged I sped I whizzed !z:i.. 
(43) ARGUMENT IS WAR: 
Your position is indefensible 
He attacked every weak point in my argument 
His criticisms were right on target 
I've never won an argument with him 
You disagree? Okay, shoot! 
If you use that strategy, he'll wipe you out 
He shot down all of my arguments 
The big guns in the audience were ready to shell Professor X' s position. 
Systematic metaphors are conventionally named with a short mnemonic name written in 
capitals, so MORE IS UP, TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT, and ARGUMENT IS WAR are three systematic 
metaphors. Each of these systematic metaphors has an underlying analogy, called its 'core 
analogy'. MORE 1s UP reflects the analogy between an increasing and decreasing quantity and 
a rising and falling object. TIME 1s A MOVING OBJECT reflects an analogy between the elapsing 
of time and the movement of a physical object. ARGUMENT 1s. WAR reflects a complex analogy 
between a proponent and a critic of an argument and military defenders and attackers. 
The individual metaphors which come under the umbrella of one of these systematic 
metaphors are termed 'manifestations', so that 
12 The naming of these core metaphors is due to Lakoff and Johnson, and is only intended to be a labelling for convenience and not necessarily an accurate statement of the core metaphor. 
13 It is arguable whether 'preceding' should be considered primarily as a temporal word or a spatial word. 
'Before' is a word that is similarly ambiguous. 
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( 44) The summer rolled by 
is a manifestation of TIME rs A MOVING OBJECT. The analogy underlying this manifestation is 
an elaboration of the core analogy of TIME Is A MOVING OBJECT.i4 
Lakoff and Johnson show systematic metaphor to be extremely pervasive in everyday 
language - they identify some fifty examples which cover a very wide range of metaphors, 
both live and dead [see Appendix B], and it is not hard to find more. 
Systematic metaphor seems to be very deeply rooted in the language, even manifesting itself 
at the etymological level: 
(45) MORE IS UP: 
He is underage 
It is overdone 
Tom underestimated its value, so undercharged Harry 
Dick overcompensated for the fall in the dollar, and overspent his budget We must Y:J2_grade our facilities. 
This metaphorical structure among word senses can be quite complex, as, for example, in 
Michael Reddy's 'conduit metaphor' [Reddy 79]. This underlies much talk about 
communication, seeing ideas as objects which are packaged in messages (containers) and 
sent along a conduit to be unpacked by a hearer: 
( 46) IDEAS ARE OBJECTS 
LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS 
COMMUNICATION IS SENDING: 
It's hard to g.f1. that idea across to him 
I gave you that idea 
None of Mary's feelings came through to me with any clarity Whenever you have a good idea practise capturing it in words Try to pack more thoughts into fewer words 
The sentence was filled with emotion 
The lines may rhyme, but they are empty of both meaning and feeling 
Thus a 'dead ' metaphor may exhibit few of the hallmarks of metaphor in a local context, 
but when seen alongside other associated dead and live metaphors, the metaphorical 
processes at work -are undeniable. Dead metaphors may have lost their metaphorical colour, 
but they retain their capacity to be extended, a capacity which is constantly being exploited. 
In view of this, I shall follow Cooper [Cooper 86] in preferring the term 'established 
metaphor' to the somewhat pejorative 'dead metaphor'. 
14 It is perfectly possible for a metaphor to be a manifestation of more than one systematic metaphor. 
22 2.2 
Computational implications 
In the light of this evidence, it is possible to see a distinct disadvantage in the usual 'mere 
polysemy' approach of computational linguistics: when processing some utterance, if an 
appropriate word sense is not to be found in the system's dictionary there would seem to be 
very little scope for even an approximate interpretation - all that can be done is to look at 
senses of the word which have been listed in the dictionary and try to adapt them somehow 
to make sense of the utterance. But this puts the system in a difficult position; as Cooper 
puts it: 
Why, for example, should attacking an argument not be, by analogy with 
'attacking a good steak', relishing rather than criticizing the argument? Why shouldn't a knock-down argument, by analogy with 'knock-down prices', be an argument which has lost its value rather than a powerful 
argument against an opponent? Why shouldn't an abandoned argument be like abandoned behaviour - something to revel in -: rather than an 
argument one has given up? 15 
Clearly, knowledge of two things would be of great value in these circumstances: firstly, 
knowing the systematic metaphor ARGUMENT Is WAR, and secondly, knowing which among the 
listed senses of attack, knock-down, and abandoned is the parent sense. This knowledge 
would indicate which of the known polysemes to adapt, and also give some guide as to how 
to adapt it. This is the approach taken in this thesis. 
Literalness and eore senses 
This observation has an important contribution to make to the discussion of 'literalness' . It 
can now be seen that there is a genuine and useful distinction between 'literal' word senses 
and established metaphorical word senses: literal senses are parent senses, whereas 
metaphorical senses remain derivative in nature, but become so familiar and are processed so 
easily that their metaphorical nature is easily overlooked. To avoid later confusion, 16 this 
singled out 'literal' sense will be referred to as the 'core sense' of a particular homonym. 
The term 'core' is preferred to, say, 'original', since the concern in this work is primarily 
with synchronic derivation of new word senses; this relies on current intuitions about what is 
a core sense, and these intuitions might be at variance with the historical origins of a word. 
In general, one might expect to be able to identify a single core sense for each homonym, 
with all metaphorical polysemes within a homonym being derived in some way from this 
single core sense. In view of the difficulty of distinguishing homonymy and polysemy, as 
pointed out above, this expectation would appear to be a simplification of the real situation. 
15 [Cooper 86] p. 132 
16 Later, a concept of literalness with respect lo a compuJer application is developed. 
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In what follows, however, it will be assumed that a single core sense can be found for each 
homonym, and furthennore, the existence of more than one homonym for a particular word-
fonn will generally be ignored. Thus attention will be focused on how metaphorical 
polysemes are derived from core senses. 
2.3 Why use metaphor? 
Having now gained an idea of the occurrence of metaphor in English, it is only natural to 
ask why speakers use metaphor in the first place. There would seem to be no single answer 
other than 'for a variety of reasons'. This short section is intended to review a few 
suggestions which have been made, and these suggestions offer significant insight into what 
a computationally useful theory of metaphor should seek to explain. 
Poetic and rhetorical effect 
Probably the most obvious motivation for using metaphor is to achieve some sort of poetic 
effect. The speaker seeks to convey some unusual image to the hearer, thus enabling him to 
manipulate the hearer's subjective reaction. 
(47) Juliet is the sun 
conveys images of Juliet as radiant and dazzling, evoking positive feelings in the hearer, 
whereas 
(48) Who would bear the whips and scorns of time? 
evokes very negative reactions associated with 'whips' and 'scorns'. 
This idea of influencing the hearer's attitudes can also be seen in somewhat more prosaic 
metaphors, and so metaphors are important weapons in the annoury of rhetoric. They 
highlight certain features which the rhetorician wants to be prominent in his audience's 
mind, and play down others, which are perhaps damaging to his argument. 
For example, commenting on privatization: 
(49) The government is freeing industry from the shackles of state control 
emphasizes the restrictions of state ownerShip on nationalized industries and arouses feelings 
associated with release from bondage, whereas 
(50) The government is selling off the family silver 
emphasizes that nationalized industries are national assets, and has connotations of shame. 
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This point is further exemplified by Lakoff and Johnson, where they cite the use of 
systematic metaphors deliberately chosen to suggest a particular course of action to the 
hearer: 
For example, faced with the energy crisis, President Carter declared "the 
moral equivalent of war." The WAR metaphor generated a network of 
entailments. There was an "enemy," a "threat to national security," which 
required "setting targets," "reorganizing priorities," "establishing a new 
chain of command," "marshaling forces," "imposing sanctions," "calling 
for sacrifices," and so on and on. The WAR metaphor highlighted certain 
realities and hid others. The metaphor was not merely a way of viewing 
reality; it constituted a license for policy change and political and 
economic action.17 
This metaphorical highlighting depends on the speaker drawing attention to some 
commonality between the source and target. For more complex similarities, the term 
'analogy' would seem more appropriate, and extended metaphors are often employed. A 
rhetorical example of such an extended metaphor is Arnold Toynbee's comment on 
American foreign policy: 
(51) America is a large friendly dog in a small room. Every time it wags its tail, it 
knocks over a chair. 
There are also numerous didactic metaphors expressing analogy, such as 
(52) The atom is a tiny solar system, the nucleus is the sun and electrons are the 
planets. 
Filling gaps in the lexicon 
A frequently suggested reason for using metaphor is that there are simply not enough words 
in the language to express what needs to be expressed. The problem is particularly acute in 
more abstract domains, where concepts are inevitably more remote from pre-existing 
vocabulary. When talking of the mind, for instance, attention, allegiance and respect are 
'paid', 'shifted', '~ained', and 'lost'. When a new technology is developed, it is easier to use 
suggestive old words to convey meaning than to coin lots of new words. For example, the 
terminology used in the field of computing abounds with metaphors such as 'memory', 
'stacks', 'pointers', 'garbage collection', 'routines', 'procedures', 'programs', and so on. 
17 [Lakoff and Johnson 80] p. 156 
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17 [Lakoff and Johnson 80) p. 156 
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Economy 
There is also no doubt that a well chosen metaphor can be a great deal more concise than a 
corresponding literal expression of the same ideas. Compare 
(53) Time flies 
(54) Time appears to elapse very quickly. 18 
An interesting explanation of this economy is that a metaphorical utterance forces a hearer 
to deepen his thinking, so that he appreciates ideas and feelings which would otherwise need 
to be said explicitly. 
Social intimacy 
A social aspect of metaphor, pointed out by Ted Cohen and picked up by Cooper [Cohen 
78], [Cooper 86], is that the use of metaphor, like the telling of jokes or the use of a private 
language, helps to cultivate a certain intimacy between the speaker and hearer: 
Primacy 
There is a unique way in which the maker and the appreciator of a 
metaphor are drawn closer to one another. Three aspects are involved: (1) 
the speaker issues a kind of concealed invitation; (2) the hearer expends a 
special effort to accept the invitation; and (3) this transaction constitutes 
the acknowledgment of a community. All three are involved in any 
communication, but in ordinary literal discourse their involvement is so 
pervasive and routine that they go unremarked. The use of metaphor 
throws them into relief, and there is a point in that. 19 
Seemingly against all these explanations of why speakers should employ metaphor, there is 
the long-standing thesis of what Cooper calls 'the primacy of metaphor' .20 This thesis has it 
that far from being somehow bizarre, metaphor is the normal mode of human thought and 
this is reflected in natural language. So-called 'literal truth' is really a consequence of a 
metaphorical truth that has become so well established that nobody notices its metaphorical 
nature. A chair is not called a chair because it 'is' a chair· in any absolute sense, it is only 
called a chair by a metaphorical extension of some prior conception of 'a chair'. Cooper 
quotes Nietzsche: 
What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, etc. . . . 
which after long usage seem to a people fixed, canonical and binding. 
Truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that this is what they are -
18 
. It is impossible to avoid using dead metaphorical terms of speed. 
19 [Cohen 79] p. 6 
20 Cooper discusses this at length in [Cooper 86] pp. 257-279. 
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metaphors that have become worn out and without sensuous force; coins 
that have lost their face and are considered, no longer as coins, but as 
mere metal. 21 
Similar observations about the 'myth' of objective truth, how there is a sort of cultural 
'received' objectivity which is perpetuated in language, are made at length by George Lakoff 
and Marie Johnson [Lakoff and Johnson 80], [Lakoff 87]. 
This view at first sight may seem a little extreme, seemingly flying in the face of 
conventional attitudes towards the objective nature of truth; after all, surely a chair is a chair 
and a book is a book, surely there is no metaphor involved. This, however, is to look only 
at the extremes of the scale of description. The primacy view considers these apparently 
clear cut cases to be the most 'worn' examples, and in other examples the distinction 
between metaphorical and literal is nothing like so obvious. The primacy theory replaces the 
notions of literal and metaphorical with a continuum of, say, 'familiarity', and this is 
consistent with many of the observations made in this chapter. The diachronic evidence of 
etymology and the synchronic evidence of systematic metaphor would seem to lend 
considerable support to the primacy thesis, as many current word senses can be seen to have 
derived from metaphorical roots. 
This realization of the central place of metaphor in language has been less than evident in 
previous theoretical approaches to metaphorical interpretation, such as those outlined in the 
next section, and has certainly been lacking in computational approaches, where metaphor 
has been firmly labelled as aberrant. This apparent attitude of setting metaphor apart has 
attracted justified criticism, but it should be realized that the primacy view increases the 
need to find a good mechanism for interpreting metaphors, · since this same mechanism 
would then be simultaneously valid for so-called 'literal' interpretation. Certainly the 
mechanisms generally proposed for literal interpretation do not seem to be readily extensible 
to cover metaphor. One of the major points to recommend the computational theory of 
metaphor developed in this document, is that it turns out to be remarkably consistent with 
the idea of primacy, although the deeper philosophical questions of the nature of truth, 
metaphorical or otherwise, are not specifically addressed. 
2.4 Theories of metaphor 
The final part of this examination of the linguistic and philosophical context of this work is 
a short discussion of the currently predominant theories of metaphor comprehension. These 
theories are almost always aimed at explaining how sense can be made of 'novel' metaphors 
considered in isolation, they would require some development to cover the phenomenon of 
21 [Nietzche 79] p. 314, [Cooper 86] p. 258. 
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systematic metaphor. Nevertheless, they cover much of the groundwork for the 
computational theory of systematic metaphor developed in the next two chapters. 
2.4.1 The serial process approach 
The common idea behind many, and probably most, of these theories is what might be 
termed the serial process approach to metaphor comprehension. This is that on hearing an 
utterance, (a) a hearer has to identify whether or not the utterance is literal, (b) if it is not, 
he must then identify the trope being used, and (c) he must interpret the utterance in an 
appropriate way to find its intended meaning. These three stages can be termed 
'recognition', 'classification', and 'interpretation' .22 Of these, the interpretation stage is the 
one that most specifically requires a theory of metaphor. 
Recognition 
Broadly, two recognition strategies have been predominant: 'semantic anomaly' and latterly 
'pragmatic anomaly'. The semantic anomaly approach involves looking for nonsensical 
sentences, that is, sentences where the words used are semantically incompatible. For 
example, 
(55) Harry erupted 
(56) Tom is a. cabbage. 
This semantic anomaly test cannot, however, detect irony, hyperbole, or litotes. It also has a 
deeper failing in that it cannot recognize sentential metaphor, such as was seen in examples 
(25)-(27), or the second sentence in Levinson's example: 
(57) A: What kind of mood did you find the boss in? 
B: The lion roared. 23 
In such examples -of sentential metaphor there is no semantic anomaly, as, by definition, a 
semantic interpretation is possible. What is required is an appeal to pragmatics - the 
sentences must not be considered in isolation, but rather as part of a discourse, with due 
consideration given to context. Levinson gives such a pragmatic account of the recognition 
phase by appeal to Grice's maxims of quality, quantity, relevance, and manner [see 
Glossary]: if a literal reading appears to 'flout' one or more of these maxims, then the 
utterance displays 'pragmatic infelicity', and a non-literal interpretation is called for to 
remedy the situation [Levinson 83]. For example, in (57), the literal interpretation of the 
22 Following [Cater 87] . 
23 [Levinson 83] p. 153. 
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second sentence flouts the maxim of relevance. In other sentential metaphors, such as 
(58) Mrs . Thatcher reduced Mr. Kinnock to mincemeat 
the literal interpretation flouts the maxim of quality (which requires the speak.er to speak 
truthfully). 
Clearly both semantic and pragmatic approaches are required, since the testing of a literal 
interpretation for pragmatic felicity presupposes that a literal meaning can be found . For the 
computational linguist, semantic anomaly, being a local phenomenon, is the easier part of 
the problem and can be dealt with, for example, by considering selection restrictions on the 
arguments of predicates. Pragmatic infelicity is much less clearly defined and currently, for 
the most part, beyond the state of the art. There are one or two pragmatic phenomena, 
however, which can be dealt with: a computational system with only a semantic capability 
could detect blatant truths and falsehoods, such as 
(59) No man is an island 
(60) All the world's a stage 
(which flout the maxims of quantity and quality respectively); and a basic discourse handling 
capacity would mean that flouting of the maxim of relevance due to metaphorical definite 
reference could be detected, as, for example, in (23) and (57).?A 
The theory of descriptional analogy developed in the next two chapters recognizes the roles 
of both semantic and pragmatic anomaly, and the MINT system which implements this 
theory uses a hybrid test with both semantic and pragmatic elements. In particular, reference 
resolution is carried out prior to the test for anomaly. 
Classification 
After the use of non-literal language has been recognized, the serial process approach 
requires the classification of an utterance to identify the trope being used. This is not easy. 
In principle, both metaphor and metonymy can give rise to semantic anomaly, and all the 
tropes mentioned above, bar simile, give rise to pragmatic infelicity.25 
The pragmatic anomaly test, then, merely identifies a sentence as non-literal, and fails to 
distinguish between metaphor and metonymy, irony, hyperbole, and litotes. The means by 
which they can be discriminated can be seen to involve a deep appreciation of a discourse, 
with substantial inference and appeal to 'world knowledge': in Searle 's example [Searle 79] 
(61) It's getting hot in here 
?A Assuming, of course, that context gives no alternative referents for 'the disease' and 'the lion' . 
25 Simile stands out as an exception, as it is generally regarded as literal, involving neither semantic anomaly 
nor pragmatic infelicity. 
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contexts can be imagined where the utterance is intended literally (if it is indeed becoming 
hot in the place of utterance), ironically (if the temperature is in fact decreasing), 
hyperbolically (if it is in fact only getting warm), litotically (if it is becoming really 
unbearable), or metaphorically (if an argument is getting more angry).26 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that more than one trope can be in play at 
the same time. 
This thesis does not address the issue of classification, and from now on metaphor is 
assumed. 
Interpretation 
Assuming now that a metaphorical utterance has been encountered and identified the 
remaining task of interpretation is somehow to discover the utterance meaning - what was 
the speaker trying to communicate? 
There are two predominant theories of how to recover this meaning, they are known as the 
'comparison theory' and the more advanced 'interaction theory'. These are now described in 
some detail. 
2.4.2 The comparison theory 
The comparison theory is essentially that metaphors are compressed, or 'elliptical', similes. 
The meaning of a metaphor is therefore an assertion of similarity, so the interpretation phase 
can be subdivided into a 'reconstruction ' phase, where a literal paraphrase of the metaphor is 
constructed, followed be a literal interpretation phase, in which this literal reconstruction is 
interpreted in just the same way as any other literal sentence is interpreted. 
In this view, the non-literalness of a metaphor is due to the omission of a few words 
explicitly indicative of similarity. So, for example, (62) can be reconstrued to give the literal 
utterance (63): 
(62) Man is a wolf 
(63) Man is like a wolf 
This reconstruction can get rather involved, and the resulting literal paraphrase 
correspondingly clumsy. For example, trying to repair (18) gives something like (64): 
(64) Mrs. Ghandi did something that was like something steaming ahead. 
26 Searle omitted the hyperbolic and litotic readings, but added an indirect speech act reading (asking the 
· hearer to open a window) assuming literal truth. In fact an additional indirect speech act along the lines of 
" ... and please do something about it" could be implicit in all the given readings . 
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An advanced account along these lines is given by George Miller in his paper Images and 
Models, Similes and Metaphors [Miller 79]. He presents a number of fonnal rules for 
constructing just such literal paraphrases from his three classes of metaphor (nominal, 
predicative, and sentential), working in a sort of logical form . For example, (18) is rendered 
as the logical equivalent of (64) : 
(65) (3F)(3y){ SIM[F(Mrs. Gandhi) ,STEAMING-AHEAD(y)]} 
The comparison approach is successful in delivering a literal paraphrase with explicit 
assertions of similarity, but it seems to stop short of a full interpretation: (64) may be literal, 
but what does it mean? 
Truth-conditional semantics has it that the meaning of a sentence is the set of ' truth-
conditions' under which that sentence can be said to be true, but this quickly runs into a 
problem for similes: everything is like everything in at least some respect, so the mere 
assertion of similarity is vacuous, it is trivially true - any simile, and so any metaphor, 
becomes a tautology, devoid of meaning in the truth-conditional sense. 
Ortony [Ortony 79b] gets round this tautological objection, allowing him to have 
comparisons which are false, by considering only 'high salience' predications of the source 
and the target.27 Consider, for instance, the two similes 
(66) Encyclopaedias are like dictionaries 
(67) Encyclopaedias are like gold mines. 
Encyclopaedias and dictionaries do share high salience predicates, but encyclopaedias and 
gold mines share none. Therefore, argues Ortony, (66) should in fact be classified as a 
' literal comparison' , and is literally true, whereas the term 'simile' should be reserved for 
the more involved (67), which is literally false (and should be interpreted metaphorically).28 
There is, unfortunately, a problem with this line of argument, which is that salience is a 
matter of degree and not an absolute, so literal truth should also be a matter o f degree. 
Consider the intennediate example 
(68) Encyclopaedias are like reference libraries 
is this a literal comparison or a simile?29 
In view of these comments, perhaps a more apt way of describing the relationship between 
simile and metaphor would be to say not that a metaphor is an elliptical simile, but that a 
simile is an explicit metaphor - producing a simile paraphrasing a metaphor leaves much 
interpretive work still to be done. 
27 The terms 'source' and 'target' can be extended to apply to similes as well as metaphors. 
28 Note that this is not saying that a simile is not literal, a statement can be literal or not literal, and if literal, 
it can be true or false. 
29 Earl MacConnac builds a theory of metaphor on just such an idea of degree of truth, using a four valued 
logic running through ' true ', 'epiphor' , 'diaphor', ' false' [MacConnac 85). 
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What is required is an insight into how the source and target are similar. What similarities 
was the speaker intending to convey? This is the fundamental problem with the comparison 
theory, a problem which is addressed squarely in the interaction theories. 
2.4.3 The interaction theory 
The interaction theory of metaphor, due originally to Max Black [Black 62], [Black 79], 
says that the interpretation of a metaphor can be achieved by consideration of its source and 
target domains and how they interact. The interaction theory can be regarded as an extension 
of the comparison theory - both maintain that a metaphor involves similarities, but the 
interaction theory goes further in analyzing the nature of these similarities. 
Black's original theory 
Black's own summary of his interaction theory is as follows: [with explanatory comments 
added here in square brackets] 30 
(1) A metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects, to be identified as the "primary" 
subject and the "secondary" one. [These are what have been described here as the 
target and the source domain] 
(2) The second_ary subject is to be regarded as a system [a conceptual domain] rather than 
an individual thing. 
(3) The metaphorical utterance works by "projecting upon" the primary subject a set of 
"associated implications," comprised in the implicative complex, that are predicable of 
the secondary subject. [i.e., implications, or statements, that can be made about the 
source are applied to the target via some 'projection' mechanism] 
(4) The maker of a metaphorical statement selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes 
features of the primary subject by applying to it statements isomorphic with the 
members of the secondary subject's implicative complex. [Since statements about the 
source are applied to the target, the metaphor maker, in his choice of source, 
effectively selects features of the target to highlight and conversely plays down others]. 
(5) In the context of a particular metaphorical statement, the two subjects "interact" in the 
following ways: (a) the presence of the primary subject incites the hearer to select 
some of the secondary subject's properties; and (b) invites him to construct a parallel 
implication-complex that can fit the primary subject; and (c) reciprocally induces 
30 [Black 79] p. 28 
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parallel changes in the secondary subject [such changes are due to the highlighting and 
downplaying of source and target features in the hearer's mind]. 
This theory is consistent with many of the observations on metaphor made in this chapter, 
such as the observation that a metaphor has a source and a target and that the interpretation 
relies on noticing a similarity between the two. It goes further than the comparison theories 
in that the interpretation of a metaphor is put down to the transference of features from the 
source's 'implicative complex' to the target, and the nature of these features explains how 
metaphors can highlight some features of the target and play others down. In choosing the 
source appropriately, this highlighting and down-playing is under the control of the speaker. 
Black's interaction theory, however, uses rather general tenns, like 'properties', 'projection', 
and 'implication-complex'. These need making much more specific before the theory can be 
adopted by the computational linguist. Also, as it stands, the theory says nothing about the 
phenomena of established, extended, and systematic metaphor. 
Developments of the interaction theory 
More theories have been proposed that fit into the mould of the interaction theory, but which 
are more specific in the operation of interpretation. These mostly rely on representing 
properties as 'semantic markers' - atomic features that may be positively attributed to some 
entity (e.g. +MALE), negatively attributed (e.g. -MALE), or simply not specified. 31 
In these schemes; projection is seen as the transference of a subset of the source's semantic 
markers to the target, the other markers having been 'cancelled' (these cancellation and 
transference operations constitute the 'interaction' between source and target). 
Such an account is given in the context of other linguistic devices involving marker 
cancellation by Jonathan Cohen [Cohen 79]. For example, in the metaphor 
(69) Their legislative program is a rocket to the moon 
the target, the legislative program (sic), induces a cancellation of certain markers in the 
source, 'a rocket to the moon' ;32 Thus markers such as +MATERIAL, +AIR-CLEAVING and 
+CYLINDRICAL are dropped, leaving markers such as +FAST-MOVING and +FAR-A.L.WNG.33 
Cohen goes on to address the problem of which markers should be cancelled; he proposes a 
notion of 'semantic importance' to rank markers and guide the cancellation process, though 
this idea is not fully developed in the paper. 
31 There are, of course, some variations on this theme. See for example [Lyons 77]. 
32 Cohen's terminology is 'topic' and 'comment' for target and source. 
33 Cohen contrasts this metaphorical cancelling of markers from the comment with 'literal ' cancelling of 
markers from the topic: in "The stone lion" the source 'stone ' causes markers such as +ANIMATE to be 
dropped from the target. 
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A much more detailed account involving semantic markers in noun-verb sentences is given 
by Samuel Levin in his book The Semantics of Metaphor [Levin 77]. 
Levin proposes two modes of marker adjustment, which he collectively terms 'ad junction'. 
The first of these is 'disjunction', where semantically incompatible markers are cancelled,34 
and the second 'conjunction', where markers are pooled. The direction of either of these 
forms of adjunction can be either from the verb to the noun (so the 'meaning' of the noun is 
altered) or from the noun to the verb (thus modifying the 'meaning' of the verb). 
Consider, for example, the predicative metaphor 
(70) The stone died. 
'Stone' has a number of semantic markers, the ones relevant here are +MINERAL, +NATURAL 
and +PHYSICAL. Similarly, 'die' is supposed to be predicable of things with markers +HUMA'.'{ 
and +NATURAL. 
Adjunction gives four readings for (70): 
a) N~ V; disjunction: The natural physical object died. [ +MINERAL dropped from 'stone'] 
b) N~V; conjunction: The stone (as if human) died. [+HUMAN added to 'stone'] 
c) N~V; disjunction: The stone ceased to exist. [+HUMAN dropped from the argument 
restriction of 'die'] 
d) N~V; conjunction: The stone died (as if 'die' were predicable of objects jointly human 
and mineral). 
In addition to adjunction, there is a process of 'displacement ', which simply allows one 
word to stand for another in a nominal metaphor. These words can be recovered by a simple 
'look-up' operation. 
This gives a further two readings for (70), say, 
e) N~V: The dolt died. 
t) N~V: The stone disintegrated. 
making six readings in all. 
This theory has the attractive feature of seeming to explain the imagery of metaphor - the 
idea of seeing things in new ways - through the conjunctive readings, and simultaneously 
giving literally interpretable readings through disjunction or displacement. 
34 The notion of incompatibility is made formal in Levin's book, but is not of direct relevance to the 
· argwnent here. 
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2.4.4 Problems with these theories 
Representing relationships 
The mechanism of interaction through semantic marker manipulation, however, has an 
inherent problem. Markers as presented above are very isolationist in application. Giving a 
rocket to the moon the markers +MATERIAL, +AIR-CLEAVING, +CYLINDRICAL, +FAST-MOVING and 
+FAR-AIMING says much about a rocket to the moon, but nothing about the relationships 
between a rocket and associated entities, such as its launch pad, its designer, its crew, and 
so on. In cases of extended metaphor and systematic metaphor, such relationships are of 
central importance. Consider the example 
(71) You are my honeysuckle, I am the bee. 
What is most important here is the relationship between honeysuckle and bees, their 
individual properties are of lesser concern. Semantic markers are not suited to capture this 
sort of knowledge, and a much richer representation is required for a treatment of extended 
and systematic metaphor.35 Even if honeysuckle had a marker, say, +ATIRACITVE-TO-BEES, 
there is no mechanism for making use of this. Although the name of the marker appears 
meaningful to a human reader, as far as a computational system would be concerned, a 
marker is simply a marker - its name is simply a meaningless string of characters.36 
This problem of non-meaningful names, however, is a problem associated with the use of 
semantic markers, and not a problem for the interaction theory per se. What is required to 
provide a better realization of the theory is an improved representation covering relationships 
for the semantics of the source. This is clearly indicated by Black himself when he says 
''The secondary subject is to be regarded as a system rather than an individual thing". 
The recursive nature of metaphor and abstraction 
There is, however, a problem highlighted by the semantic marker system, but which is 
general to the interaction theory. It is this: the markers that end up being applied to the 
target of a metaphor, or simile, are very often valid only in a metaphorical sense. This can 
be clearly seen in Cohen's analysis of (69). For a moon rocket to be 'fast-moving' and 'far-
aiming', and a legislative programme to be 'fast-moving' and 'far-aiming' are quite different 
things. In the particular case of semantic markers this problem would appear to be 
35 It is possible to extend the semantic marker system to include some relational information [see Lyons 77 section 9.9], but it is not easy to see how the mechanisms for metaphor interpretation presented above 
could be extended to make use of this. 
36 It is difficult for a human reader not to read and write meaning into marker names, and this can lead to 
confusion. The term 'markerese' has been coined to draw attention to this pitfall [Lewis 72] . 
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insurmountable, as markers are supposed to be absolute and atomic in meaning, there should 
be no scope for interpreting the name of a marker metaphorically. 
It is worth dwelling on this 'recursive' property of metaphors - having to interpret markers 
(or ' properties' in a more general framework) metaphorically - as it is central to the 
operation of systematic metaphor and so of great importance in this thesis. What we have 
seen so far in the interaction mechanism37 is a process of 'abstraction' - as more and more 
features are dropped from the source, the resulting semantic concept becomes more and 
more abstract, encompassing more and more entities or situations. So, for example, to make 
'die' cover the end of a stone, it is abstracted to mean 'cease to exist' . 
Abstraction has proved useful in many examples of metaphor, and seems to form an integral 
part of metaphorical interpretation. On its own, however, abstraction is not sufficient for 
those examples requiring the recursive metaphorical interpretation of properties. Abstracting 
'.a rocket to the moon' enough to encompass a legislative programme leaves very little 
semantic information, whereas the intended metaphorical meaning of the phrase is something 
much more specific. 
Consider Searle's example 
(72) Sally is [like] a block of ice. 
The intended meaning of this utterance is that Sally is unemotional. Abstracting 'a block of 
ice' leaves only properties like 'physical object' and 'composed of water'. This is not very 
enlightening as an interpretation. The property we need to interpret (72) is 'cold', which 
must itself be interpreted metaphorically as 'unemotional' by appeal to the known systematic 
metaphor EMOTIONALITY IS TEMPERA TIJRE, the systematic metaphor behind the terms 'warm', 
'cold', 'fiery' and so on when applied to people. Similarly, the example 
(73) Queen Victoria was made of iron 
requires the same sort of metaphorical interpretation of properties such as 'hard', 'resilient' 
and 'inflexible ' using systematic metaphors such as OPEN MINDEDNESS IS FLEXIBILITY. 
A pragmatics objection 
A final objection to these marker-based realizations of the interaction approach, one raised 
by John Searle [Searle 79], is that the mechanism of interaction acts .at the semantic level, 
whereas it is necessary to act at the pragmatic level: In (70), semantic markers for the 
lexical 'stone' and 'die' are what interact, but in (72), "Sally" is a referring expression so is 
simply not semantically comparable to "a block of ice" - "Sally" has no markers of its own 
37 except in Levin's conjunction operation 
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to be used as a basis for interaction. What is needed is a knowledge of the referent of 
"Sally", which in conventional linguistic accounts is not available until the pragmatic level of interpretation, after semantic analysis is complete. Fortunately for the computational linguist this is not such a problem, as the semantic / pragmatic distinction tends to be rather blurred. In particular, reference resolution can be done at an early stage of processing, allowing access to accumulated knowledge about the target, including so-called 'world knowledge'. 
Summary 
It can be seen, then, that although the interaction theory seems useful as a starting point for a computational theory of metaphor, it is in need of substantial modification and specification of details. Important among these changes are a more powerful representation, a way of capturing the recursive nature of systematic metaphor, and a greater role for pragmatics. 
2.5 Previous computational approaches to metaphor 
This section offers a brief survey of previous computational approaches to metaphor. There have been relatively few of these, possibly due to a conventional attitude that metaphor is some deviant form of language, indeed, it has been mentioned under the title of 'ill-formed input'. Nevertheless the computational treatment of metaphor offered in this thesis has been influenced by this earlier work, and seeks to improve upon it. 
It must be emphasized at this point that this review of computational approaches to metaphor is limited in scope to their success, or otherwise, in accounting for the observations on metaphor made above. This is undoubtedly to do them an injustice in that in general they are not specifically intended to account for metaphor, but rather they are attempts to broaden the scope of existing schemes to include particular metaphorical phenomena. In other words, they were never intended, for the most part, to be theoretically valid, but were engineering solutions to particular problems. 
2.5.1 Early work 
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Preference Semantics 
One of the earliest proposals came from Yorick Wilks [Wilks 77, 78], where he developed a 
strategy for dealing with 'extended word use' in his preference semantics system.38 In 
outline, preference semantics (PS) is a system capable of resolving certain linguistic 
ambiguities by consideration of the argument preferences of verbs. For example, when faced 
with the sentence 
(74) The policeman interrogated the crook 
preference semantics selects (75) in preference to (76) because in the former the preferences 
of 'interrogate' for a human actor and a human object are satisfied, whereas in the latter a 
preference is broken: 
(75) [policeman] [interrogated] [crook (man)] 
(76) [policeman] [interrogated] [crook (thing)] 
The square brackets notation is shorthand for the semantic primitive expansion of the 
enclosed word or words. 
In general, though, not all preferences needed to be satisfied in the then extant version of 
preference semantics [Wilks 75] , the system simply accepted the reading with the most 
satisfied preferences. Thus 
(77) My car drinks gasoline 
was accepted by preference semantics at face value, even though the preference of 'drinks' 
for an animate actor is broken. This was not unreasonable in the envisaged application of 
machine translation, where the metaphor could be translated as it stands, as, say, "Ma 
voiture boit de l' essence", but for a different application, where a deeper understanding was 
required, an extended use of 'drinks ' would need to be captured. 
The proposal that Wilks made for this was that the offending 'template' (actor-action-object 
combination) should be somehow matched against templates in a sort of encyclopaedia entry 
for [car], called a 'pseudo-text'; the best match, if any, should be 'projected' onto the 
original formula by replacing its action semantics. Thus 
(78) [my+car drinks gasoline] 
matches 
(79) [engine uses #liquid]39 
38 An implementation based on these ideas is given by Fass [Fass 88a] . 
39 The # symbol indicates a 'thesaurus entry'. 
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in the pseudo-text for [car], and projection yields 
(80) [my+car uses gasoline] 
Ignoring the detailed problems of how this matching and projection might be done, the 
underlying strategy of this approach is to match a semantically anomalous utterance against 
a body of world knowledge and to project the matching item onto the original utterance, 
giving a semantically well formed result. 
There is good potential in this method for obtaining very specific interpretations of 
metaphors, but there is an obvious problem, which is that an encyclopaedia entry must 
anticipate the general meaning of all potential metaphorical utterances if a match is to be 
found at all. For example, the utterances 
(81) My car spits gasoline all over the road 
(82) My car bleeds oil 
would require encyclopaedic knowledge about faulty cars as well as typical cars. Also, this 
particular approach does not seem to offer any insight into how systematic metaphor might 
be handled. 
Some further proposals as to how extended word uses could be interpreted, rather than 
merely tolerated, in preference semantics are given in [Fass and Wilks 83]. The additional 
mechanisms do not involve world knowledge, but simply change the semantic heads (overall 
categories) of the meaning representation of either the offending noun phrase or the verb 
preference. So in (77), either [car] has its head changed from 'vehicle' to 'animate', or 
'drinks' has its actor preference modified to include vehicles. 
This treannent is similar to Levin's Nf-V and N-"7 V conjunction described earlier, and is 
shown to be valuable in the machine translation task (where the metaphors are translated 
word for word), but it cannot really be called interpretation, as an animate car is not very 
much more meaningful than a drinking car. 
2.5.2 Analogical approaches 
The two analogical approaches to metaphor interpretation ~viewed next, those of Carbonell 
and Indurkhya, have strongly influenced the development of the theory of descriptional 
analogy and the MINT system. Both ace.aunts take the form of unimplemented proposals, 
and are theoretical in nature. Both, however, have the weakness of viewing metaphorical 
processing as significantly different from 'normal' linguistic processing, a weakness that 
descriptional analogy seeks to overcome. 
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Carbonell 
Jaime Carbonell in 1980 proposed an elaborate scheme to enable a computational system to 
exploit systematic metaphor [Carbonell 80, 82]. He too observed that systematic metaphor is 
extremely common in the sort of English that computational linguists should be interested in, 
and that the task of interpreting metaphors by appeal to known core analogies, rather than 
from first principles, should be both more feasible (since it relies on recognition rather than 
reconstruction) and useful. 
His plan was to represent core analogies as structured objects, each having four main parts: 
(a) a 'recognition network' to identify instances of its use, (b) a 'basic mapping' to do the 
initial interpretation and so establish a framework for more subtle interpretation, (c) an 
'implicit-intention' component to deliver stock pragmatic inferences (why the speaker used 
this particular metaphor), and (d) a 'transfer mapping' to do the more subtle interpretation 
not accomplished by the basic mapping. 
This remains an unimplemented proposal, and the principal objection to it is that the 
somewhat unwieldy representation of these core analogies goes against the idea that 
metaphorical and literal interpretation should not be all that different in character. Carbonell 
himself says 
Perhaps a more subtle process that integrates metaphor information more 
closely with other conceptual knowledge is required.40 
Nevertheless, the underlying process of interpretation, viz identification, skeletal fitting of the 
metaphor and filling in of details seems very plausible. 
A later publication of Carbonell and Minton [ Carbonell and Minton 85] goes into a little 
more detail about what the basic and transfer mappings might look like in a semantic 
network formalism. The essential point made is that these mappings must not only pair off 
individual entities as being alike, but must include reference to the relationships between 
groups of entities. Such relationships, they argue, are crucial in metaphor interpretation. 
Carbonell and Minton point out that such structured mappings would be good candidates for 
more informative IS-A links, thus linking metaphorical interpretation more closely with 
literal interpretation. 
These ideas have been adopted in the theory of descriptional analogy and developed to the 
point where an implementation has been possible . 
. 
40 [Carbonell 80] p.18, [Carbonell 82] p.418. 
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Constrained Semantic Transference 
A very detailed treatment of what amounts to a realization of Carbonell's basic and transfer 
mappings has been developed by Bipin Indurkhya in a series of recent publications 
[lndurkhya 85, 86, 87). Indurkhya's approach is to develop a formal account of analogy in a 
predicate calculus notation, this he calls 'Constrained Semantic Transference' , or 'CST'. He 
goes on to assert that metaphors can be understood by constructing and elaborating 
analogies, 'T-MAPs', between source and target domains, and using these T-MAPs to 
translate statements in the source domain to statements in the target domain. 
The two domains involved are represented as two logical systems made up of a 'vocabulary' 
(names of functions and predicates of zero or more arguments) together with a number of 
logical statements, or 'structural constraints', which give relations between the various terms 
in this vocabulary. So, for example, the domain FAMILY has the terms mother, 
father, parent, daughter, male, and female in its vocabulary, together with 
constraints to the effect that mothers are female parents, and so on. 
A T-MAP relates two domains by pairing off some of the vocabulary terms of its source 
domain with suitable terms in the target domain. Logical statements made in the source 
domain can then be interpreted by straightforward substitution of target terms for source 
terms as directed by the T-MAP, giving a new logical statement in the target domain. 
Clearly, not all translatable statements will be valid in the target domain, so a T-MAP also 
specifies a subset of its source domain's structural constraints which can be mapped to 
consistent target structural constraints. 
An example of such a T-MAP would be between the FAMILY domain and the DAG 
domain ('DAG' for 'directed acyclic graph'). This .T-MAP would pair off, for example, the 
term node in the DAG domain with female in the FAMILY domain, and arc with 
mother ,41 and would specify a subset of the structural constraints of FAMILY such as 
mother (x, y) :::::) female (x) which ate still valid when transformed into statements in 
DAG, e.g., arc (x, y) :::::) node (x). 
The static view of T-MAPs (where T-MAPs are given and immutable) leads to a logical 
system where a pre-determined amount of the structure of a. source domain is inherited via a 
T-MAP by a target domain. In the interpretation of novel metaphor, on the other hand, 
T-MAPs must be constructed dynamically, so that a statement involving both source and 
target terms can be translated to a statement involving solely target terms. 
Indurkhya outlines algorithms for doing this construction, including the interesting operations 
'augmentation ' and 'positing structure' both of which extend a T-MAP by incorporating 
41 
· mother and arc are both regarded as two place predicates, the former being a relation between two 
people, and the latter between two nodes (i.e., the existence of a directed arc from the first to the second). 
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more terms from the source domain together with structural constraints relating them to 
terms already present. New vocabulary in the target domain is created to serve as the 
images of these newly incorporated source tenns. For example, the T-MAP given above can 
be augmented by including the source tenn 'sibling', together with a definition of sibling in 
terms of parents and children. A new term such as 'DAG-sibling' is created in the DAG 
domain and as a result it possible to make sense of 'sibling nodes'. This creation of new 
terms in the target domain corresponds to metaphor extension and the creation of new 
metaphorical word senses. 
Indurkhya's work is of great value in fonnally linking metaphor to analogy and he points 
out at length how this view of the processes explains many empirical observations on 
metaphor. It is easy to see that core metaphors could be pre-coded as T-MAPs. The 
drawback of the approach, however, is that it is highly theoretical and unfortunately totally 
impractical from a computational point of view: Indurkhya has couched his theory in terms 
of predicate calculus and model-theoretic semantics, and there is a consequent heavy burden 
of consistency checking to be managed. In the pure logical 'Constrained Semantic 
Transference' theory outlined above, Indurkhya shows the problem of consistency checking 
to be theoretically insunnountable, and he attempts to get round this by using an 
approximation to CST called 'Approximate Semantic Transference' or 'AST', which is no 
longer logically kosher, but reduces the problem to one that is at least theoretically 
computable. Even this, though, remains unimplemented. 
Another uncomfortable feature of the theory is that it depends on an extremely strong notion 
of domain. All knowledge in Indurkhya's scheme is packaged into neat, isolated domains 
which are simply unrealistic in the rather messy real world with which natural language 
systems have to deal. The dominant status of the domain leads to a wide gulf between literal 
processing and metaphorical processing, which take place within and between domains 
respectively. 
2.5.3 Practical sy~tems 
The preceding two treatments of metaphor have had most influence on the theory of 
metaphor developed in this thesis, but the following two computational treatments of 
metaphor come closest to the practical implementation of this theory in MINT. Both deal 
specifically and practically with systematic metaphor in a way that is closely related to their 
treatment of 'normal' language. 
It is especially interesting that in both cases the motivation for giving a treatment of 
metaphor seems to have come from a practical experience of the ubiquity and apparent 
'ordinariness' of metaphor in the two systems' chosen domains (nai"ve physics and 
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computing). 
Hobbs 
The first of these is work done by Jerry Hobbs as part of the SATE and DIANA discourse 
analysis systems [Hobbs 77, 79, 81]. 
Hobbs works using a predicate calculus based semantic representation and draws inferences 
by forwards and backwards logical reasoning from input representations and a list of 
'axioms' which encode the systems' lexical and world knowledge. The precise details of the 
representation vary between the SA TE and DIANA systems, but the gist of it is as follows: 
The predicate go, say, has axioms associated with it which constitute a definition in terms 
of other predicates, such as at and become: 
(83) go(x,y,z) & at(wl ,x,y ) & at(w2, x,z ) """""7 become(wl,w2) 
This notation requires a little explanation, (83) should be read as follows: if x goes from y 
to z, and wl and w2 are states such that wl is the state of x being at y and w2 is the state 
of x being at z, then it can be inferred that there is a change of state from wl to w2 - wl 
'becomes ' w2. 
If an input is made of "John went to London" (from New York), which has the logical form 
(84) go(John,NewYork,London) 
then, using forwards and backwards reasoning, the system can make the inferences 
(85) at ( Statel, John, NewYork) 
at(State2,John,London) 
become(Statel,State2) 
But, says Hobbs, if such an input is encountered, it should really be interpreted as "John 
flew to London in an aeroplane", to demonstrate proper understanding of the situation. This 
requires a process called 'predicate interpretation', which takes a general predicate like go, 
and interprets it as a more specific predicate like fly-in-an-aeroplane, depending on 
context. Predicate interpretation is achieved by having a series of axioms of the form 
(86) specific-predicate ( ... ) """""7 general-predicate ( ... ) 
and choosing the right one to apply in . the circumstances (in backward reasoning). This 
choice is effected in the system by dynamically reordering the axioms according to context, 
so that the most appropriate axioms are found and used first. 
So far, this is all 'normal ' processing, but Hobbs claims that systematic metaphor can be 
handled using the same mechanism of predicate interpretation. For example, a variable in 
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computer science can take a number of values; at any particular moment it is said to be 'at' 
a particular value. So in the context of variables, the general predicate at has a specific 
interpretation of has-the-value, and this axiom underlies a system of spatial metaphors 
for variables, metaphors such as 
(87) N approaches 100 
(88) N goes from 1 to 100. 
The interpretation of these metaphors is achieved by specifying the axiom 
(89) variable(x) & has-the-value(w,x,y) -t at(w,x,y) 
and using predicate interpretation to interpret, for example, (88) as 
~m has-the-value(Statel,N,1) 
has-the-value(State2,N,100) 
becomes(Statel,State2) 
Hobbs's work has made a significant contribution to the treatment of systematic metaphor in 
that it has exploited the idea that the addition of a single axiom, (89), (representing the 
systematic metaphor v ALUE rs LOCATION) allows indirect interpretation of many metaphors, 
such as those that describe variables as 'going' and 'approaching'. Furthermore, he has done 
this in a way which does not treat metaphor as bizarre. 
There is, however, a difficulty with this approach, which is that it makes no distinction at all 
between metaphorical and literal word senses, whereas it has been argued that there is a 
distinction to be made. The system relies very heavily on abstraction: predicates are made 
sufficiently abstract to encompass all possible uses; at, for example, is treated as a 
predicate applicable equally to both physical objects and variables. Since the meaning of at 
is now so abstract, it is difficult to see how, say, 
~1) at(Statel,John,NewYork) 
can have anything but the vaguest of meanings (taking care not to interpret at as if it were 
the English word). It certainly does not · have the specific meaning of physically-
located-at. One way of tackling this problem of vacuous meaning would be to have a 
new specific predicate physically-located-at and the corresponding axiom 
(92) physical-object(x) & physically-located-at(w,x,y) 
-tat(w,x,y). 
In this case, predicate interpretation would be able to deliver the appropriate specialized 
interpretation. This, however, puts physically-located-at on a par with has-the-
value, rather than as a distinguished core sense of 'at'. It was observed earlier that such 
distinguished senses are an essential requirement for systematic metaphor interpretation -
metaphors should be interpreted by reference to a core sense, not some abstract sense. 
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Jacobs 
The final work considered here also deals specifically with systematic metaphor. It is recent 
work done in the context of the Berkeley Unix Consultant system [Wilensky et al. 88], and 
is most fully developed by Paul Jacobs in [Jacobs 87, 88].42 
Jacobs's TRUMP natural language analyser is ' built on a development43 of the KODIAK 
general knowledge representation system [Wilensky 87] - an advanced frame / semantic 
network representation, largely inspired by KL-ONE [Brachman and Schmolze 85] .44 Jacobs 
represents the knowledge behind systematic metaphors as a special kind of structured 
relationship between frames. 45 These relationships are specified by 'VIEW' links: the main 
link is between two frames and correspondences between slots of the frames are given by 
'role-play' relations. 
For example, the systematic metaphor ACTING rs GIVING which is manifested in examples like 
(93) John gave Mary a kiss 
is represented as a VIEW link between the t r ansfer-event frame (which has slots for 
giver, object, and recipient) and the act i on frame (which has slots for actor and patient). 
This VIEW link specifies that the 'role' of the recipient in the transfer - event 
frame is 'played' by the patient in the action frame. 
Interpretation of an input metaphor is achieved through the 'concretion' mechanism, which 
is a general method of speculating on a more specific reading of an input, analogous to 
Hobbs's predicate interpretation. ('Cut', for example, when applied to an 'edible-obloid', 
such as salami, is concreted to 'slice'). On encountering the input (93), initial interpretation 
results in . an instantiation of the transfer-event frame {giving is a transfer event), 
whose object slot is filled by something which is a kiss and whose recipient slot is 
filled by Mary. The concretion mechanism of TRUMP is triggered by the presence of an 
action (the kiss) in the object slot, causing the instantiated transfer-event to be 
specialized to an action (that of kissing) whose patient slot is filled by Mary, as 
indicated by the roie-play relation. 
This work has several good features: it appears to be successful in interpreting a number of 
manifestations of systematic metaphor, the use of frames 'seems to be well suited to the 
representation of core analogies, and both literal and metaphorical examples are processed in 
a reasonably uniform way, using the concretion mechanism. Furthermore, all this occurs in a 
42 A slightly different development of systematic metaphor in the UNIX Consultant system is given in [Martin 87, 88]. 
43 
'Ace' [Jacobs 86] 
44 Jacobs treatment of systematic metaphor originated in his work on generation [Jacobs 86]. 
45 These are not thought of as analogies by Jacobs. 
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system with a relatively large linguistic coverage. 
This practical system for handling systematic metaphor, however, is not given any 
theoretical basis; Jacobs does not, for example, see VIEW links as representing analogies. 
Moreover, because of the complexity of the knowledge representation and the algorithms 
involved, the motivation behind TRUMP's processing is not very clear. 
2.5.4 Summary of computational approaches 
There have been relatively few computational attempts to deal with metaphor, and those that 
have been made have proved deficient in several important areas. Lessons to be learnt from 
this previous experience include: 
• Metaphor interpretation relies on semantic knowledge. 
• Core analogies should be represented in a semantic network using structured links. 
• A strong notion of domain artificially widens the distinction between literal and 
metaphorical processing. 
• The notion of frames is useful in the representation of analogy. 
• It is possible to integrate literal and metaphorical processing, but this requires a better 
theoretical justification. 
The computational account given in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis can be seen to take 
account of all these observations. 
2.6 Summary 
In this chapter a number of significant observations about metaphor have been made, 
observations that will be taken into account in the theory of metaphor to be developed in the 
next two chapters. They include: 
(1) A metaphor describes some c-entity (its target) as though it were a different c-entity 
(the source), that is, the target is described using words. drawn from the source domain. 
There may be more than one source or target involved. 
(2) Individual metaphors can occur at the word, phrase, or sentence level. 
(3) A metaphor reflects some analogy between its source(s) and target(s). 
(4) Extended metaphor occurs when this underlying analogy is re-used and developed 
during a text. In this way, whole texts can be regarded as metaphorical. 
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(5) There is no easy way to separate the notions of 'literal' and 'metaphorical' -
established metaphors can be seen to retain their metaphorical character even though 
they would generally be regarded as literal. 
(6) Established metaphors give rise to polysemous word senses which can be distinguished 
from their parent 'core' senses. 
(7) Systematic metaphor occurs when a single 'core' analogy can be seen to underlie many 
established and novel metaphors. 
(8) Systematic metaphor is very common. 
(9) Particular manifestations of a systematic metaphor should be interpreted by appeal to 
the core senses of words and the core analogy of the systematic metaphor. 
(10) Metaphors can highlight certain aspects of their targets and suppress others in the 
hearer's mind. 
(11) Recognition of metaphor depends on the detection of both semantic and pragmatic 
anomaly. 
(12) It is not easy to tell the various tropes apart without extensive pragmatic and world 
knowledge. 
(13) Reference resolution should occur at an early stage of the interpretation process. 
(14) Interpretation should involve abstraction, i.e., selective property inheritance. 
(15) Inherited properties can be fairly complex, so a complex semantic representation is 
required. 
(16) Inherited properties sometimes require recursive metaphorical interpretation, especially 
where systematic metaphor is involved. 
Previous theories of metaphor have sought to explain many of these observations, but have 
principally concerned themselves with 'one-off' metaphors, interpreting them without appeal 
to knowledge of Other metaphors, without admitting the recursive character of metaphor. 
Such theories have thereby neglected the phenomena of extended and systematic metaphor. 
The next two chapters outline the new theory of 'descriptional analogy', which seeks (with 
considerable success) to explain these observations, while at the same time being sufficiently 
detailed that a practical implementation is possible. This implementation has been done in 
the MINT system, which is described in the subsequent two chapters. 
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3. Descriptional Analogy 
In the last chapter much evidence has been seen concerning the occurrence of metaphor in 
English, and some of the theories from philosophy and linguistics which have been proffered 
in an attempt to explain why metaphor is used and how it can be interpreted. These theories 
offer valuable insights into the problem of how to interpret metaphors, but fall short of 
being computationally useful, either because they are couched in terms which are too vague 
to be implemented directly, or because they depend on a representational system, that of 
semantic markers, which is too weak to account for relational phenomena and defective in 
that it cannot account for the recursive nature of metaphor. 
It is the aim of this chapter and the next to provide a new and computationally useful theory 
of metaphor, namely the theory of descriptional analogy, which is capable of explaining 
many of the observations made in chapter 2, and in particular covers the phenomenon of 
systematic metaphor, thus representing a significant advance over its predecessors. 
The success of descriptional analogy stems from a remarkably simple premise, which is that 
descriptions are inherited across analogies. From this simple observation it is possible to 
derive principled and coherent mechanisms for producing paraphrases of both 'literal' and 
'metaphorical' utterances. An important aspect of the approach of descriptional analogy is 
that all descriptions are treated as equally valid as descriptions. As far as the operation of 
description inheritance goes, no distinction is made as to whether a description is 'literal' or 
'metaphorical', as both are seen as being derived from analogies - literalness is seen as a 
relative concept, only determined by reference to a particular (but arbitrary) dictionary, and 
therefore almost a matter of taste on the part of a lexicographer: 
In this chapter, descriptional analogy is developed to a point where it can deliver literal 
paraphrases of metaphors using a sort of abstraction mechanism. This interpretive power is 
better than that of the theories discussed in the last chapter, since proper account is taken of 
relationships betwe.en entities. In the next chapter, this power is developed naturally to cover 
the phenomena of extended and systematic metaphor. 
Overview 
3.1 defines the importance of 'literalness' and 'well-formedness' as rela.tive terms, relative to 
a particular dictionary. 3.2 sets out informally the sort of processing that is envisaged for 
interpreting manifestations of systematic metaphor and motivates the use of analogy. 3.3 
takes a closer look at analogy and defines some terms. 3.4 introduces the formal theory of 
descriptional analogy and description inheritance. 3.5 covers c-entities and descriptions, 
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including the pivotal concepts of 'definitive entities' (ideal, 'archetypical ' individuals) and 
their ' intrinsic' descriptions. 3.6 covers description inheritance from definitive entities. 3.7 
describes how analogies involving definitive entities can be thought of as encoding both 
'commonsense ' knowledge and dictionary-style definitional knowledge. 3.8 shows how the 
analogies (with definitive entities) underlying input utterances (both literal and metaphorical) 
can be derived. 3.9 concludes the chapter by describing how descriptional analogy can be 
used to interpret by abstraction, nominal, predicative, and sentential metaphors. 
3.1 Literalness and well-formedness 
The task which is to be addressed in this work, is to take instances of systematic metaphor 
and produce 'literal' paraphrases using knowledge of core analogies. As was seen in chapter 
2, the notion of 'literal' is somewhat slippery, and so the first problem is to define what is 
to be regarded as 'literal'. The problem of finding a suitable definition of literalness is 
considerably eased by considering the question in the computational context, since it is much 
easier to quantify the various components of the system. 
The dictionary and literalness 
The initial idea of literalness presented in chapter 2 was that an utterance is 'literal' if it 
uses words and phrases in senses which appear in the dictionary. This was seen to be 
inadequate as it begs the question of whose dictionary to use. In the context of a computer 
system, however, the answer to that question is more obvious - the dictionary can be taken 
to be the machine 's dictionary, giving a system-dependent idea of literalness. 
This, however, leaves the question of which senses to include in the machine 's dictionary. 
For the purposes of this work, the extreme position will be taken that only core senses are 
listed. The motivation behind this decision · is that the potential of descriptional analogy for 
explaining how metaphorical word senses can be derived from core senses is made more 
apparent. Later, in the discussion chapter, a natural way to incorporate further, polysemous 
word senses into the scheme is discussed. 1 The choice of which sense of a word to regard as 
the ' core ' sense is sometimes debatable, but the important point is that only one sense is 
listed. 
Relative to this unambiguous dictionary, then it is possible to specify what it means for an 
utterance to be literal - an utterance is said to be 'literal' if in its intended meaning words 
are being used in their core senses. 
For simplicity, other complicating factors, such as homonymy, are ignored. 
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It was pointed out in chapter 2 that an often cited reason for using metaphor is to fill gaps 
in the lexicon - in some cases, particularly in more abstract domains, a literal word with the 
required meaning is not available, so a word from another domain is used metaphorically. 
This metaphorical use of a word can be sufficiently well established that it appears in 
dictionaries, but in limiting a dictionary to core senses only, these gap-filling senses will be 
lost. Since such senses will sometimes be needed in a literal paraphrase, it will be necessary 
to coin new words to take their place. In this thesis, coined words will generally be formed 
by hyphenating a short phrase, so that they are at once mnemonic and marked as coined, 
and they will be used to demonstrate the results of interpretation in a relatively unambiguous 
way. 
Well-formedness 
In addition to a well-defined notion of literalness for utterances, it will be useful to define 
'well-formedness'. 2 An utterance will be described as 'well-formed' if it is semantically 
well-formed, that is, if it is capable of being interpreted literally. This again is a system-
dependent notion, being relative to the particular dictionary in use . Since the working 
assumption here is that this dictionary contains only core senses, many utterances which may 
appear well-formed to a human reader will be labelled as ill-formed. 
Well-formedness almost coincides with literalness in this scheme, the difference being that 
literalness is a comment on actual speaker meaning - an utterance is literal if its intended 
meaning coincides with the core meanings of the words - whereas well-formedness applies 
to possible speaker meaning - an utterance is well-formed if it could be interpreted with the 
core meanings of the words. It can be seen that under these definitions, any literal utterance 
must also be well-formed, but the converse is not true. An example of a well-formed 
utterance intended non-literally would be any sentential metaphor; for example 
(1) Mrs. Thatcher squashed Mr. Kinnock 
is well-formed (taking the core sense of squash to be physical squashing), but highly 
unlikely to be uttered literally. 
It should be pointed out that well-formedness is to be decided after reference resolution, 
since judgement of semantic well-formedness relies on a knowledge of referents. This is 
especially clear when proper names are used, as there is insufficient semantic information in 
a name per se. Consider the example 
2 
(2) Washington is a city. 
Well-fonnedness is applied to utterances, rather than sentences, as reference resolution must be done before it can be decided, as discussed shortly. 
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If 'Washington' is seen to refer to the man, then this utterance is ill-fonned, but if 
'Washington' refers to the capital of the United States, then the utterance is perfectly well-
fonned. 
Having now established suitable notions of literalness and well-fonnedness, it is possible to 
go on to take a look at the sort of processing involved in producing a literal paraphrase of a 
manifestation of a systematic metaphor. 
3.2 An informal look at processing 
This section takes an infonnal look at the sort of processing which will be used to interpret 
systematic metaphor in the MINT system, but in a way which is independent of any 
particular representation scheme. This necessarily means a lack of rigour, but it gives a good 
idea of what metaphorical processing will look like, showing what the theory of 
descriptional analogy is aiming for and motivating the use of analogy in this theory. Later 
sections will give a more fonnal treatment. 
3.2.1 A case study 
A suitable case for study is provided by Lakoff and Johnson's THE MIND rs A BRITrLE OBJECT, 
where a person, or their mind, is described as though they were a physical structure which 
can somehow be broken:3 
(3) Her ego is very fragile 
(4) You have to handle him with care since his wife's death 
(5) He broke under cross-examination 
(6) The experience shattered him 
(7) /' m going to pieces 
(8) His mind snapped. 
Here it is assumed that the physical senses of 'fragile', 'break', 'shatter', and so on are their 
core senses, thus e.xamples (3) - (8) are not literal. 
The interpretation of these utterances, according to the theory of descriptional analogy, relies 
on knowledge of the core analogy which underlies all manifestations of TIIE MIND rs A BRTITLE 
OBJECT. This analogy is expressed as a relationship between ideas in the domain of 
psychology and the domain of physical objects. Metaphorical interpretation is achieved by 
rephrasing a metaphorical utterance until it is expressed in tenns whi<;:h can be interpreted 
directly via the core analogy. 
[Lakoff and Jolmson 80] p. 28. 
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In the core analogy in this case, a person is seen as a physical structure, and the self 
assurance, or ·confidence' of that person is seen as the structural integrity of this structure. 4 
The explanation of this very simple analogy is as follows . Structural integrity can vary: a 
broken structure has a very low integrity, whereas one that is sound has a high integrity. 
Analogously, a 'broken' person has low 'confidence', whereas an 'unbroken' person has 
high confidence. 
The steps involved in the interpretation of (6) can be shown symbolically as follows: 
*The experience shattered him 
~ *The experience severely reduced his structural integrity 
*~ The experience severely reduced his confidence. 
where an asterisk (*) marks an utterance as non-literal, '~' indicates a rephrasing step, and 
'*~' indicates metaphorical interpretation via the core analogy. 
There are several points to be made concerning this example. The original metaphorical 
utterance is marked as non-literal, but otherwise is taken at face value. The process of 
rephrasing is a sort of inference using the core senses of words ('shatter', for example, is 
taken as meaning 'severe reduction in structural integrity'). This rephrasing has the effect of 
rendering the original metaphorical utterance in terms which can be interpreted directly via 
the core analogy, as indicated in the last step of processing. 
A similar treatment can be given to (5) and (3), as shown below. 
*He broke under cross-examination 
*He broke due to cross-examination 
~ * His structural integrity was severely reduced due to cross-examination 
*~ His confidence was severely reduced due to cross-examination. 
*Her ego is very fragile 
~ *Her ego is easily broken 
~ *Her structural integrity is easily severely reduced 
*~ Her confidence is easily severely reduced. 
Using this approach, the required metaphorical senses for the words 'shatter', 'break', and 
'fragile' are nowhere specified explicitly as polysemes, instead they are 'induced' by the 
single core analogy through its interaction with the core (physical) senses on a semantic 
level. 
The analogy used so far has been very simple, involving only 'structural integrity' and 
'confidence' . It can, however, be elaborated to give greater power to the metaphorical 
interpretation step. Take, for instance, the last of the above examples. The rather clumsy 'is 
easily broken' can be avoided by noting that a 'weak' structure is one that is easily 
damaged, whereas a 'strong' one is not easily damaged. The core analogy of mind as 
4 
'Confidence' is not quite the right word, but it is an approximation - it is inevitable that approximations 
should be made when dealing with complex domains such as states of mind. 
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physical structure can be elaborated to include the idea that the 'strength-of-character' of the 
person is seen as the physical strength of the structure.5 This gives an alternative sequence 
of interpretation steps: 
*Her ego is very fragile 
~ *Her ego is very weak 
~ *The strength of her ego is very low 
*~ Her strength-of-character is very low. 
The depth of this systematic metaphor is further exemplified by introducing the idea of 
destructive forces acting upon the mind, as in the following examples: 
(9) He crumbled under the pressure 
She just couldn't bear the strain 
The tension was too much for him 
He bore up well under stress. 
It is clear that this systematic metaphor, THE MIND rs A BRTITLE OBJECT, is based on quite a 
strong parallelism between the domains of psychology and physical objects: physical 
structures can be strong or weak - if they are strong they are able to withstand pressures 
and strains without breaking; people can have 'strong' or 'weak' characters - if they are 
psychologically 'strong' they can withstand psychological 'pressures' and 'strains' without 
mentally 'breaking'. 
This parallelism is more than a simple correspondence of words, but is a correspondence on 
the semantic level, it is a correspondence between the domains themselves; there is an 
analogy between the two domains, and this analogy characterizes the systematic metaphor 
TI:IE MIND rs A BRTITLE OBJECT. The task of representing the systematic metaphor, then, 
amounts to representing the underlying core analogy, and the reasoning process used above 
to interpret manifestations of systematic metaphor is a form of analogical reasoning. 
3.3 Analogy 
Analogy and analogical reasoning have long been studied in the computing literature (see 
[Hall 89] for a survey). These studies have been attempts to make use of analogy in a 
number of areas of Artificial Intelligence, viz, theorem . proving, planning and problem 
solving, and machine learning. The processing involved in these applications is generally 
very demanding, and so the techniques developed have generally been heuristic in nature. 
This short section is intended to outline the basic ideas and terminology of analogy, just 
sufficient to support the ensuing analogical treatment of metaphor. 
'Strength-of-character' has been hyphenated to show that it is a new word, with its core sense in the 
domain of psychology. This avoids any problem of circularity arising from the fact that it contains the 
· word 'strength', whose core sense is presumed to be in the domain of physical objects. 
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An analogy is a special relationship that holds between two 'domains'. A 'domain' is 
generally regarded as a cluster of interrelated knowledge and facts, for example, Geometry 
might be said to be a domain, containing knowledge about points, lines, angles, 
proportionality, Pythagoras' theorem, and so on. Another domain might be International 
Politics, containing knowledge of world leaders, World War II, the Treaty of Versailles, 
summit meetings, and so on. A domain need not be so big, for instance The State Visit 
would be just as good a domain as International Politics, and so overlapping or completely 
contained domains are quite in order. As a rule , it is not easy to delineate domains with any 
precision, even within a fonnal subject such as mathematics. Consequently, the tenn 
'domain' is meant to refer to a general subject area, without being a particularly fonnal 
notion. 6 
There is an 'analogy' between two domains if there are apparent parallels between some 
parts of them :7 .for example, there is an analogy between the domains of the brain and the 
computer - the brain is analogous to the computer in that both take input signals, process 
them with reference to data stored in a memory, and produce output signals. An 'analogical 
mapping' is a formal description of how various ideas in the two domains of an analogy are 
related to each other (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Analogy between two domains. 
In the aoove brain-computer example, the analogical mapping would state that the brain 
corresponds to the computer, sensory input corresponds to the input data of the computer, 
the output nerve signals to the output data, the memory of the brain to the memory of the 
computer, and thinking in the brain to the processing of data in the computer. 
Many computational treatments of analogy do have rather a strong idea of domain in their 
implementations, for example lndurkhya 's Constrained Semantic Transference already mentioned [lndurkhya 85, 86, 87); but authors generally agree th at this is not a desirable state of affairs, as domains 
are so hard to delimit 
The two domains need not necessarily be distinct; indeed, because o f the difficulty in defining domains, it 
would be hard to stipulate any useful condi tions on them. 
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For convenience, an analogy is often said to exist 'between' the ideas mentioned in its 
analogical mapping, as well as between the domains. This ambiguity should not, however, 
lead to any confusion. 
It is often the case that the analogy between two domains is asymmeuic; one of the domains 
is better known, and the analogical relationship is set up in order that knowledge in the 
better known domain can be brought to bear on the lesser known domain. In these cases 
there is a 'flow of ideas' from one domain, the 'source domain', to the other, the 'target 
domain' (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Flow of ideas in an analogy. 
This flow of ideas is the basis for computational interest in analogy - if a suitable analogy 
can be found, a computer system might be able to use existing knowledge it has of the 
source domain and apply it in the target domain. In problem solving, for example, if a 
problem under investigation can be seen to be analogous to one that has been previously 
solved, then the previous solution strategy could be used to assist the solution of the new 
problem. In machine-learning, where knowledge in a new domain has to be expanded and 
organized, an analogy with a better known domain, which might be given by a teacher or 
guessed at by the system, could be used to form conjectures -or organize knowledge in the 
new domain. 
' Analogical reasoning ' is a form of reasoning that makes direct use of an analogy: To solve 
a problem in the target domain, the problem is mapped, vi a the analogical mapping , into a 
problem in the source domain. This source problem is then solved and the solution mapped 
back to a solution in the target domain (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Analogical reasoning 
This sort of reasoning is very common in mathematics, where a problem in an unfamiliar or 
difficult mathematical domain is transformed into a problem in a different domain, such as 
geometry or mechanics, where a method of solution might be more obvious or simply easier 
to calculate; a solution is then found and transformed back to a solution in the target 
domain. 
A mathematician has to be very careful that this sort of analogical reasoning is indeed valid 
- the analogy has to be very good before results proved in the source domain can be 
assumed valid in the target domain. In general, and in particular when considering metaphor, 
it is not possible to prove the validity of analogical reasoning, and so results derived in this 
way must be treated with caution. This does not prevent analogical reasoning from being 
useful; it may be, for instance, that source reasoning can be used as a guide for target 
reasoning. It might, on the other hand, simply be the best one can do when there is 
insufficient knowledge of the target domain to allow any other sort of reasoning. 
3.4 Descriptional Analogy 
It is now possible to describe the theory of metaphor interpretation by analogical reasoning 
that is used in the MINT system. In the remainder of this chapter, the theory is described as 
it applies to metaphors considered in isolation, in the next, its application to systematic 
metaphor is presented . 
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3.4.1 The Principle of Descriptional Analogy 
The relationship between metaphor and analogy in this theory can be summarized in the 
Principle of Descriptional Analogy: 
A metaphor is the linguistic manifestation of an underlying analogy 
between its sources · and targets. Moreover, given an analogy, any 
description of its sources can be applied metaphorically to the 
corresponding targets - a process called 'description inheritance'. 
This principle gives a recipe for taking an analogy and deriving metaphorical descriptions of 
its targets. It is rather a strong statement that any description of the sources can be applied 
metaphorically to the targets, and in practice, many such descriptions will not be very 
useful; the important point is that they are not ruled out. 
A further point to be made is that descriptions inherited by targets by this mechanism are in 
general assumed to be metaphorical, but it can happen that such a description is well.-
formed, in which case it may be 'accepted' as literal if this is thought appropriate. This 
leads to the interesting and important observation that not only metaphorical, but also 
'literal' utterances may be seen as arising out of underlying analogies, and this is made 
much of in the theory of descriptional analogy detailed in the rest of this chapter - all 
utterances, . both literal and metaphorical, are treated as evidencing analogies between 
discourse entities (the targets) and (usually) so-called 'definitive entities' (the sources). This 
uniform treatment of literal and metaphorical utterances is seen as one of descriptional 
analogy's chief advantages over other theories of metaphor interpretation. 
The key point relating the principle to the informal account of metaphor interpretation given 
above is that descriptions of the sources can be arrived at by inference in the source domain, 
and can then be 'inherited' by the targets by virtue of the original analogy - this is a sort of 
analogical reasoning about descriptions. Figure 5 shows this descriptional analogical 
reasoning; 'target replacement ' is the operation of substituting sources for the corresponding 
targets in a description (as defined by the analogical mapping) and 'source replacement' is 
the converse operation. Yet another point to notice is that there is nothing to prevent 
metaphorical descriptions of the sources being inherited by the targets - all descriptions are 
regarded as equally valid for this purpose, regardless of whether or not they are well-formed. 
These metaphorical descriptions of the sources will themselves have been derived from their 
own underlying analogy, so it is possible to build up chains of analogies and corresponding 
metaphorical description inheritance, a process that is used extensively below. 
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Figure 5: Descriptional analogical reasoning. 
3.4.2 An overall view of processing 
The principle of descriptional analogy can be put to work in the task of producing a literal 
paraphrase of an input utterance. This is not the only application of the theory, for example, 
metaphor production can be explained as depending on the perception of analogies, but it is 
the one chosen for the purposes of this thesis. 
The rest of this chapter is devoted to a detailed discussion of the processes of descriptional 
analogy, building up to a practicable method for interpreting isolated metaphors. This is 
inevitably somewhat protracted, and so by way of a preview, a brief summary of this 
interpretation is offered here. 
Processing can be divided into four stages: 
(1) The input utterance, whether literal or metaphorical, is used to construct an analogy 
whose targets correspond to the discourse entities of the utterance. 
(2) This analogy, in conjunction with the principle of descriptional analogy, is used to 
generate further metaphorical descriptions of the targets. 
(3) In the case of systematic and extended metaphor, these new descriptions are further 
interpreted with reference to previously known analogies. 
(4) Cenain of these new descriptions of the targets are then 'accepted' to form part of a 
literal paraphrase. 
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3.5 C-entities, definitive entities, and intrinsic descriptions 
3.5.1 C-entities and descriptions 
A conclusion of chapter 2 was that the sources and targets of metaphors were c-entities, i.e., 
mental objects and not simply textual objects. It is therefore necessary to distinguish the 
c-entities in a sentence from descriptive terms which refer to them. In order to make this 
distinction, c-enties will be written as terms in angle brackets and descriptions will be 
written in italics. For example, in 
(10) (Fred) is a policeman 
(Fred) is a c-entity, and 'is a policeman' is a description of that entity. 
Where a c-entity does not have an obvious proper name, a suitable name may be invented 
for the purpose. For example, the c-entity which is the colour of a particular box might be 
called (colour3 l) and the box itself might be called (box3 l). These c-entities can be given 
descriptions in just the same way as (Fred) was. It is also possible to give groups of 
c-entities relational descriptions, for example 
(11) (colour31) is the colour of (box31), (12) (Fred) is married to (Betty). 
Non-literalness and ill-formedness 
It can be seen that these combinations of c-entities and descriptions correspond closely to 
utterances after reference resolution. As such, they can be judged to be well-formed or ill-
formed, and in the former case, literal or non-literal. In future, such resolved utterances will 
be labelled to make the distinction clear. Utterances, after reference resolution, which are 
judged ill-formed (and so inevitably non-literal) will be marked with a double dagger, as in8 
(13) tt(My wife) is an angel. 
Utterances which are not intended literally, but which are nevertheless well-formed (that is, 
they could be interpreted literally) will be marked with a single dagger, for example9 
(14) t(The professor) eats people like him for breakfast. 
Literal utterances, which inevitably are also well-formed, will appear with no mark at all. 
Recall that here literalness and well-fonnedness are judged with respect to core senses only. The core sense of 'angel' is taken to exclude earthly people. 
This description is rather more complex than will be necessary in later examples, when the theory is more fully developed. 
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3.5.2 Definitive entities 
Entities in descriptional analogy 
It has been emphasized before that the sources and targets of metaphors (and their 
underlying analogies) are c-entities. The targets of metaphors can generally be identified by 
reference resolution, but how to establish suitable c-entities to act as the sources is not so 
obvious. For instance, in the simplest example of a nominal metaphor, 
(15) John is a lion, 
(John) can readily be identified as the target but the source would appear to be some 
arbitrary lion. One approach would be to invent a new lion, say (lion3 l ), especially for the 
purpose, but this is a little unsatisfactory - it would seem to be creating a new discourse 
entity, i.e., a c-entity introduced, albeit implicitly, in the utterance, but one with an inferior 
status to 'normal' discourse entities. For example, if a discourse following on from (15) 
alluded to 'the lion', this would appear unambiguously to refer to (John), with no possibility 
of its referring to (lion31). 
It is not, however, always necessary to invent a new source entity - a specific source may 
be given in a metaphor, 10 as in the examples 
(16) tt(Cold fusion) is the (Holy Grail) of (nuclear physics) (17) tt(Oswald Moseley) was the (Adolf Hitler) of (pre-war Britain). 
It is possible to extend this idea of forming analogies with existing c-entities so as to avoid 
having to invent new source c-entities. The entities used in place of these invented entities 
are termed 'definitive entities' and their use lends great cohesion to the whole process of 
descriptional analogy - the use of definitive entities is the key to the uniformity of 
processing literal and metaphorical utterances, and also the determination of underlying 
analogies from input metaphors. 
Definitive entities 
Consider the concept of a man. There might be any number of known men, say (Ronald 
Reagan), (Henry VIII), (Biggles), (Bruce Wayne), and (John), but it is possible to imagine, 
in addition, an archetypal man, the definitive example of a man, an entity with just the 
essential properties of a man. This man does not actually exist outside the mind, but is 
nevertheless a perfectly good c-entity, and will be known as the 'definitive entity' (man). 
10 This accords well with the technique in analogical reasoning of forming analogies with known examples in order to solve problems concerning new examples. 
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Similar definitive entities can be imagined corresponding to the archetypal lion, ogre, colour, 
piece of music, emotion, marriage, mathematical theorem, and so on. Even very abstract 
definitive entities, such as (wet-stuff) (the archetypal stuff that is wet) are quite in order. 
These definitive entities can have properties associated with them, and in particular they are 
fundamentally associated with their most basic descriptions. For example, among all men, 
(man) is the best described as 'a man', (ogre), the definitive ogre, as ' an ogre', and so on. 
For a given definitive entity, descriptions that are fundamentally associated with it in this 
way will be termed 'intrinsic descriptions' of that entity, conversely, the intrinsic 
descriptions will be said to 'belong' to that entity. Some examples of definitive entities and 
intrinsic descriptions are 
(18) (man) is a man 
(19) (ogre) is an ogre 
(20) (red) is red 
(21) (water) is water 
(22) (wet-stuff) is wet 
(23) (unpleasant-thing) is unpleasant 
It has been emphasized repeatedly that relationships between c-entities are of great 
importance. Accordingly, definitive entities can be involved in 'definitive relationships', for 
example the definitive entity (mother) is intimately related to the definitive entity (child), and 
in particular there are intrinsic descriptions of this relationship: 
(24) (mother) is the mother of (child) 
(25) (mother) is (child)' s mother 
and the description 'is the mother of' can be said to belong jointly to these two entities. 
These definitive entities provide a natural way to reason with descriptions: because 
descriptions are seen as belonging to definitive entities, the processes of descriptional 
analogy can be transformed from a rather ill-defined reasoning with words to a much more 
concrete reasoning about entities. This reasoning process is described below. 
3.6 Description inheritance from definitive entities 
Definitive entities, like any other c-entities, can enter into, analogical relationships. These 
analogies, in conjunction with the principle, explain how descriptions come to be applied to 
more than one entity. 
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3.6.1 Simple description inheritance 
Consider the definitive entity (dog), the archetypal dog. There is an obvious analogy between 
any c-entity nonnally called 'a dog' and (dog), so, according to the principle, these entities 
can inherit (dog)'s intrinsic descriptions. For example, suppose that (Fido) is indeed a dog, 
then the obvious analogy explains how the description 'is a dog' (which belongs to (dog)) 
comes to be applied to (Fido). This description inheritance can be written symbolically as 
follows: 
[(Fido) is-analogous-to (dog)] 
(dog) is a dog 
t(Fido) is a dog. 
This notation requires some explanation. The analogy between (Fido) and (dog) is 
represented on the first line, where 'is-analogous-to' is a relation between two c-entities, the 
first being the target and the second being the source. The first line of description, consisting 
of (dog) and (one of) its intrinsic descriptions, is taken to be freely available as a sort of 
axiom. The final line is the result of 'source replacement', an operation whereby a source of 
an analogy is replaced by the corresponding target (in this simple case there is only one of 
each). Source replacement is represented by 'il' (this notation is deliberately chosen to 
match that used in figure 5). 
In accordance with the principle of descriptional analogy, this description of (Fido) is 
marked (by the dagger) as being well-formed, but metaphorical. This metaphorical labelling 
is really erring on the side of caution, but the analogy in this example is a very good one, 
and since the final description does not conflict with existing knowledge about (Fido), it can 
be 'accepted' (by some as yet unspecified mechanism) as literal, and this is indicated by 
underlining. The notion of acceptance plays an important part in the interpretation of 
metaphors, and more will be said about it in due course. 
3.6.2 Chaining analogies 
Now, (dog) itself can be the target of further analogical relationships, and can inherit 
descriptions as a result, for example, there is an analogy between (dog) and (animal) the 
definitive animal: 
[(dog) is-analogous-to (animal)] 
(animal) is an animal 
t(dog) is an animal, 
and this description of (dog) can be inherited by (Fido) by chaining the analogies: 
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1: [ (Fido) is-analogous-to (dog)] 
2: [(dog) is-analogous-to (animal)] 
(animal) is an animal 
ll2 t(dog) is an animal 
ll1 t(Fido) is an animal, 
where the subscripts indicate which of the two separate analogies is being used. There is no 
limit to the length of such chains of description inheritance, and so the existence of further 
analogies involving yet more definitive entities allows numerous descriptions to be inherited 
by (Fido). 
This chaining of analogies is illustrated diagrammatically in figure 6. The operations of 
target replacement and redescription will be discussed later. 
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Figure 6: Chaining of analogie~ 
3.6.3 Relational description inheritance 
The same principles can be applied to the inheritance of relational descriptions . Just as all 
dogs were seen to be analogous to (dog), all mothers are analogous to (mother) and all 
children to (child). If an analogy should specify two such correspondences together, then 
descriptions of the relationship between (mother) and (child) can be inherited by the two 
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targets. For example, suppose that (Mary) and (Dick) are related as mother and child, then 
there is an obvious analogy between (Mary), (Dick), (mother), and (child) in which the 
former two c-entities are targets and the latter two are the corresponding sources. Relational 
description inheritance works as follows: 
[ (Mary) is-analogous-to (mother) 
and (Dick) is-analogous-to (child)] 
(mother) is (child)' s mother. 
U t(Mary) is (Dick)' s mother. 
Notice that this relational description inheritance will only work if both mother and child are 
specified in the same analogy, because otherwise the source replacement step would fail. 
This is as it should be, it would be a mistake to describe (x) as the mother of (y) if (x) were 
a mother and (y) a child, but in different families. 
As before, it is possible to chain analogies to obtain further descriptions, both simple and 
relational: 
1: 
2: 
[(Mary) is-analogous-to (mother) 
and (Dick) is-analogous-to (child)] 
[ (mother) is-analogous-to (woman)] 
(woman) is a woman 
t (mother) is a woman 
t (Mary) is a woman, 
similarly, 
1: [(Mary) is-analogous-to (mother) 
and (Dick) is-analogous-to (child)] 
2: [(mother) is-analogous-to (ancestor) 
and (child) is-analogous-to (descendent)] 
(ancestor) is an ancestor of (descendent) 
t(mother) is an ancestor of (child) 
t(Mary) is an ancestor of (Dick) 
3.6.4 Predicative descriptions 
The same relational idiom can account for predicative descriptions. Take, for example, the 
situation of interviewing. The definitive interview can be considered to be a relationship 
between two definitive entities, (interviewer) and (interviewee). u Other interviews can be 
regarded as analogous to this definitive interview, and so can inherit relational descriptions: 
jJ 
[(Tom) is-analogous-to (interviewer) 
and (Harry) is-analogous-to (interviewee)] 
(interviewer) interviews (interviewee) 
t(Tom) interviews (Harry), 
11 Later it will be found useful to add a third definitive entity into this relationship - the definitive 
interviewing event. 
64 3.6 
11 
i I 
1,1 
I . 
I, 
I 
and further descriptions can again be inherited by chaining. 
3.7 Analogies and knowledge 
In the above discussion of · description inheritance from definitive entities the role of 
analogies was paramount. The analogies used were very obvious, indeed one would be 
tempted to say that 'is-a' would be as appropriate in those examples as 'is-analogous-to', but definitive entities are intensional individuals and so saying that (John) is-a (man) would be like saying that (John) is-a (Fred). 12 
These 'obvious' analogies simply correspond to 'commonsense' knowledge, and this is why 
they are freely available for the purposes of description inheritance. For instance, that (dog) is-analogous-to (animal) simply codes the knowledge that dogs are animals. Similarly, 
analogies code the knowledge that mothers are ancestors and Mary is a mother, even though 
the latter is contingent, rather than commonsense, knowledge. During the processes of descriptional analogy three types of knowledge are used: (a) commonsense knowledge, 
which is coded as 'background analogies' between definitive entities, (b) contingent knowledge, which is usually coded as 'input analogies' between discourse entities and definitive entities, and (c) intrinsic descriptional knowledge, which simply takes the form of basic descriptions belonging to definitive entities. 13 There is no difference in form between 
the first two types of knowledge, since discourse and definitive entities are all just c-entities 
and handled in exactly the same way using exactly the same mechanisms. Indeed, as will be 
seen later, the two types of analogy are stored identically in the semantic network used by MINT. 
Dictionary definitions 
It should be appreciated that dictionary definitions fall into the first category of knowledge, for example, if 'dog' is defined as 'a carnivorous animal', this definition is reflected in the 
existence of background analogies between (dog), (animal), and (carnivore). The link between the words and the analogies is made by the anchoijng of intrinsic descriptions to definitive entities. Much more complex definitions can be accommodated through the use of 
more, and more complex background analogies. 
12 Of course, the English version of this does crop up in metaphors, for example "Moseley is another Hiller". 13 Knowledge about well-formedness conditions is handled separately - well-formedness has no effect at all on the mechanisms of descriptional analogy, it is only relevant to the issue of acceptance, which is a external process. Descriptional analogy in itself regards all descriptions as metaphorical, unless they are intrinsic descriptions being applied to their definitive entities. 
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3.8 Determining underlying analogies 
Definitive entities, then, are used to define the origins of descriptions in the system of 
descriptional analogy, and the fact that more than one entity can be described in the same 
way is put down to the extensive analogical interrelationships between them. But the idea 
that descriptions belong in some fundamental sense to particular entities or combinations of 
entities can also be used to explain how the input analogies (i .e., the underlying analogies) 
used in processing metaphors are determined from input utterances. 
Consider the utterance 
(26) Bonzo is a dog. 
This utterance contains explicit reference to the entity (Bonzo), but also an implicit reference 
to the definitive entity (dog), as the word 'dog' is fundamentally associated with (dog). The 
very fact that (Bonzo) is being described in terms which belong to (dog) indicates an 
analogical relationship between the two. 14 Using this reasoning, initial processing of (26) 
yields the input analogy 
[(Bonzo) is-analogous-to (dog)] 
Having established this analogy, other descriptions of (Bonzo) can be inherited directly from 
(dog), or indirectly via other analogies which have (dog) as a target, and this is the basic 
mechanism of paraphrase, which is discussed more fully later. 
Note that if the input utterance had been the metaphor 
. (27) John is a dog 
a very similar input analogy (with (John) substituted for (Bonzo)) would have resulted. 
A similar analysis can be given for relational descriptions. For example 
(28) Fred interviewed Mary 
would be interpreted as 
[ (Fred) is-analogous-to (interviewer) 
and (Mary) is-analogous-to (interviewee)] 
whereupon other descriptions of the relationship between· (Fred) and (Mary) could be 
generated and accepted. 
In general, simple English descriptions can be transformed into input analogies by a sort of 
look-up process: targets are determined by reference resolution, sources and the exact form 
14 This assumes that the description of (Bonzo) is down to descriptional analogy. It is possible that the 
description might have arisen in some other way, most notably by metonymy, which would indicate a 
different relationship between (Bonzo) and (dog). For the purposes of this investigation, however, analogy 
is assumed. 
66 3.8 
I 
of the analogy are determined by the description itself. More complex descriptions can be 
transformed into a set of analogies by a compositional process driven by a syntactic parse of 
the input utterance. For example, the input utterance 
(29) Mary's mother interviewed John's mother 
would be decomposed into three input analogies sharing some of their targets as follows: 
[ (mother3 l) is-analogous-to (interviewer) 
and (mother32) is-analogous-to (interviewee)] 
[ (mother3 l) is-analogous-to (mother) 
and (Mary) is-analogous-to (child)] 
[(mother32) is-analogous-to (mother) 
and (John) is-analogous-to (child).] 
There is no great need at this stage to make detailed commitments about this process of 
determining input analogies from utterances, as it is of practical, rather than theoretical 
concern. Of course, such a mechanism has been implemented in the MINT system, and thls 
is described in a later chapter. 
3.9 Descriptional analogy and isolated metaphors 
Description inheritance and the mechanism for determining the input analogies for utterances 
provide the necessary equipment for metaphor interpretation. Before showing how this 
equipment can be applied to systematic metaphor, its application is described in the simpler 
case where metaphors are considered in isolation. This is done for nominal, predicative, and 
sentential metaphors. In each case it will be shown how the underlying analogy can be used 
to explain how the metaphor is derived and also to produce further (metaphorical) 
descriptions of its targets, a selection of which can be 'accepted' to form a literal 
paraphrase. 
Nominal metaphors 
Consider a simple example of nominal metaphor, 
(30) John is an ogre. 
According to the Principle of Descriptional Analogy, this metaphor is the linguistic 
manifestation of an analogy between (John) and the definitive ogre (ogre). This analogy can 
be derived from (30), by the mechanism described above. It is 
(31) [ (John) is-analogous-to (ogre)] 
67 3.9 
Conversely, given this analogy the principle shows how (30) is derived, shown symbolically 
as follows: 
(John) 
1l (ogre) 
=) (ogre) is an ogre 
.U tt(John) is an ogre 
Notice that two new operations have been introduced here. They are intended to show a 
more directed form of description inheritance than the somewhat random inheritance from definitive entities described above. Here, as before, each line represents a description of the 
c-entities (John) or (ogre) (the first two lines represent the 'trivial', or 'null', description), 
'II' indicates target replacement ((ogre) for (John)), ' =) ' indicates redescription, and ·.U· indicates source replacement ((John) for (ogre)). This notation has been chosen to match that 
used in figure 5. 
Using the same input analogy in conjunction with previously known background analogies, (John) can be described using other terms applicable to (ogre), such as 
(32) tt(John) is a monster (33) tt(John) is a creature (34) tt(John) is a beast. 
The symbolic derivation of the first of these is 
1: [(John) is-analogous-to (ogre)] 
2: [(ogre) is-analogous-to (monster)] 
(John) 
1l1 (ogre) 
1l 2 (monster) 
=) (monster) is a monster 
.U2 t(ogre) is a monster 
.U1 tt(John) is a monster. 
Similar derivations can be given for the other two descriptions. 
These descriptions of (John) remain metaphorical, and indeed ill-formed (assuming the core 
senses of 'monster'., 'creature', and 'beast' require non-human referents). This does not, 
however, prevent them from being useful, particularly in future reference resolution, which 
is discussed later. 
It is not inevitable that descriptions of the source should be ill-formed when applied to the 
target, for example, further reasoning in the source domain (searching for further background 
analogies) gives 
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1: 
2: 
1l 1 
1l 2 
==> 
.ll2 
.ll1 
Also, 
1: 
2: 
[(John) is-analogous-to (ogre)] 
[(ogre) is-analogous-to (thing)] 
(John) 
(ogre) 
(thing) 
(thing) is a thing 
t (ogre) is a thing 
t(John) is a thing. 
[ (John) is-analogous-to (ogre)] 
[ (ogre) is-analogous-to (frightening-thing)] 
(John) 
(ogre) 
(frightening-thing) 
(frightening-thing) is frightening 
t(ogre) is frightening 
t(John) is frightening. 
These descriptions of (John) are well-formed, but still regarded as metaphorical according to 
the principle of descriptional analogy. Because they are well-formed, however, they can be 
'accepted' by some external mechanism as literal statements about (John) and used in the 
production of a literal paraphrase. This acceptance is indicated by the underlining. More will 
be said about acceptance later. 
The power of the analogical view of metaphor becomes more evident for more complex 
metaphors where relationships are involved. For example, consider the nominal metaphor 
(35.) Inflation is a disease of the economy. 
This example can be seen as a manifestation of an analogy between (inflation) and (disease), 
and so description inheritance can be used to derive a number of further metaphorical 
descriptions of (inflation): 
(36) tt(inflation) can be painful 
(37) tt(inflation) can be infectious 
some of them well-formed, such as 
(38) t(inflation) is undesirable. 
In addition, however, there are a number of relational inferences to be made in the source 
domain, such as 
(39) A disease is damaging to the affected part 
which can be interpreted via the original input analogy to the well-fonned statement15 
(40) t(inflation) is damaging to (the economy). 
15 Assuming that 'damage' is being used in its core sense in (40). 
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Symbolically, this is written 
1: 
2: 
[ (inflation) is-analogous-to (disease) 
and (economy) is-analogous-to (affected-part)] 
[(disease) is-analogous-to (damaging-thing) 
and (affected-part) is-analogous-to (damaged-thing)] 
(inflation), (economy31) 
(disease), (affected-part) 
(damaging-thing), (damaged-thing) 
(damaging-thing) is damaging to (damaged-thing) 
t(disease) is damaging to (affected-part) 
t(inflation) is damaging to (economy31). 
This metaphorical interpretation of relationships is possible because the analogy underlying 
the original metaphor has two targets, viz (inflation) and (economy), and both of these are 
available to the interpretation process. 
Predicative metaphors 
Descriptional analogy works just as well for predicative metaphors, the difference being in 
the exact nature of the source and target entities. Consider the famous example 
(41) The ship ploughs through the sea. 
The source of this metaphor is ploughing, but the target is unstated - it is simply whatever 
the ship was doing. Miller's interpretation of ( 41), [Miller 79], would have been 
(42) The ship is doing something to the sea like something ploughing through 
something. 
This is no problem, however, for descriptional analogy, as it is easily circumvented by 
inventing a name for the first something, and noting that the second and third somethings 
are definitive entities of ploughing. Call them activity3 l , plough-ag, and plough-pat 
respectively. In addition, it will be useful to involve another definitive c-entity, (ploughing), 
fo r the ploughing of (plough-ag) through (plough-pat). It should be borne in mind that 
(plough-ag), (plough-pat), and (ploughing) are not simply ad hoe entities, they are bound to 
be available to processing, together with analogies involving them, since they are intimately 
connected with knowledge about ploughing - if such knowledge is at our disposal, then this 
is manifested in the existence of defini tive entities along with background analogies 
expressing that knowledge. 
The input analogy underlying (41) is determined, then, as one with three sources and targets 
(equivalent to a nominal metaphor with three targets): 
(43) [(ship31) is-analogous-to (plough-ag) 
and (sea31) is-analogous-to (plough-pat) 
and (activity31 ) is-analogous-to (ploughing)] 
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Thus the predicative metaphor is potentially productive of relational inferences. For example, 
descriptional analogy yields 
(44) t(activity31) is the moving of (ship31) across (sea31) 
(45) t(activity31) is the pushing aside of (sea31) by (ship31) 
or alternatively 
(46) t(ship31) is moving across (sea31) 
(47) t (ship31) is pushing aside (sea31) 
both of which are well-formed and can be accepted. Symbolically, these descriptions are 
derived as follows: 16 
(activity31), (ship31), (sea31) 
1l (ploughing), (plough-ag), (plough-pat) 
=> a) (ploughing) is the ploughing of (plough-ag) through (plough-pat) 
b) (ploughing) is the moving of (plough-ag) across (plough-pat) 
c) (ploughing) is the pushing aside of (plough-pat) by (plough-ag) 
il tta) (activity31) is the ploughing of (ship31) through (sea31) 
tb) (activin,31) is the moving of(ship31) across (sea31) 
tc) (activity31) is the pushing aside of (sea31) by (ship3 l). 
where (a), (b), and (c) represent alternative descriptions of the relevant entities. 
Note that the inclusion of (ploughing) and (activity3 l) is not strictly necessary, it simply 
proves useful (especially in more complex examples) to have entities corresponding to the 
event or activity being described. 
Sentential metaphors 
Sentential metaphors can be characterized as utterances which are well-formed, but not 
literal. Consider the example (after reference resolution), 
( 48) t(Mrs. Thatcher) was (Reagan)' s slave. 
This is perfectly well-fonned, but the literal interpretation of (48) is only one of a number, 
and it may be reject_ed on pragmatic grounds, in this case due to its unlikelihood. 
If it is rejected, it is necessary to seek an alternative interpretation. One way of finding such 
an alternative would be to assume that the utterance was intended metaphorically, in which 
case descriptional analogy can offer well-formed redescriptions such as 
(49) t(Mrs. Thatcher) did whatever (Reagan) told her to do 
(50) t(Mrs. Thatcher) was dominated by (Reagan) 
(51) t (Reagan) controlled (Mrs. Thatcher), 
16 For simplicity, the analogies between (ploughing) etc. and (moving) and (pushing) have been omitted. 
These derivations are, however, no more complicated than that for 'damaging ' presented above. 
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and so on. 
Later it will be seen how choosing between systematic metaphors can also lead to alternative 
interpretations. 
3.10 Another look at processing 
The mechanisms given above are now sufficient to give a simple strategy for producing a 
literal paraphrase from an input metaphor (nominal, predicative, or sentential). 
The strategy is as follows: (a) determine the underlying input analogy of the input metaphor, 
(b) use knowledge of background analogies to generate further descriptions of the targets, 
and (c) accept any of these descriptions that are well formed. 11 
It can be seen that this is an abstraction approach to metaphor interpretation: description 
inheritance corresponds to the property inheritance of, say, the interaction theories, and only 
well-formed (semantically compatible) descriptions (properties) of the sources are inherited 
by the targets to appear in the literal paraphrase. So, for example, the literal paraphrase of 
(30), (35), ( 41), and ( 48) would be made up of a set of descriptions inherited from the 
relevant sources, including 
(52) John is frightening, 
John is a thing. 
(53) Inflation is undesirable, 
Inflation is damaging to the economy. 
. (54) The ship moves across the sea, 
The ship pushes the sea aside. 
(55) Reagan controlled Mrs. Thatcher. 
A point worth emphasizing is that because of the use of definitive entities, both literal and 
metaphorical utterances are transformed to analogies in the input process. Also, in the 
redescription process, no account is taken of whether descriptions are well- or ill-formed - it 
is only in determining which descriptions to include in a literal paraphrase that well-
formedness is considered. Well-fonnedness has been taken to be a dictionary-dependent 
judgement, and so largely a matter of taste on the part of a lexicographer. The processing of 
both literal and metaphorical input, then, is very uniform in descriptional analogy, very 
much in line with the observations made in chapter 2. 
Already, there is a substantial improvement on the interaction theories discussed in chapter 
2, as in descriptional analogy it is possible to handle relationships, and literal and 
metaphorical processing proceed using the same mechanisms (the literal paraphrase of a 
17 Well-formedness is actually only the initial filter for removing unwanted descriptions. 
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literal input would include that input, since it would be an inherited description that was 
found to be well-fonned). But so far, metaphors have been considered only in isolation, that 
is, without reference to previously encountered metaphors or systematic metaphors. This was 
seen in chapter 2 to be a major failing of the abstraction approach, but in descriptional 
analogy, because of the emphasis on descriptions, rather than properties, this failing is easily 
overcome. The mechanism used is metaphorical reference resolution. This is the subject of 
the next chapter. 
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4. Descriptional Analogy and Systematic Metaphor 
In the last chapter it was seen how the simple mechanism of description inheritance via 
analogies can explain how metaphors are generated and also how metaphors can be 
interpreted by abstraction. This chapter concludes the presentation of the theory of 
descriptional analogy by showing how it can be used to interpret extended metaphors and 
manifestations of systematic metaphor. 
Overview 
4.1 considers the basic process of reference resolution in which c-entities are identified from 
their descriptions. This process is extended naturally to allow reference resolution starting 
from metaphorical descriptions in extended metaphors. 4.2 shows how simple manifestations 
of systematic metaphor can be interpreted using the same process of metaphorical reference 
resolution. 4.3 extends the process to 'generalized' metaphorical reference resolution which 
enables the interpretation of much more complex manifestations of 'associated' systematic 
metaphors. 4.4 concludes the chapter with a discussion of the case when an input admits 
more than one interpretation. 
4.1 Reference resolution 
Consider the discourse fragment 
(1) Rover is a dog. John is terrified of the animal. 
The second sentence in this example requires for its interpretation the identification of the 
referent of 'the animal'. This is done straightforwardly by noticing that the required 
reference resolution is simply a search for a known entity which can be described as 'an 
animal'. Such a description is found to apply to (Rover) by the following reasoning: as 
before, the first sentence is interpreted as expressing an analogy between (Rover) and (dog): 
[ (Rover) is-analogous-to (dog)] 
As a result of this analogy (Rover) inherits descriptions from (dog), including (by chaining) 
that of being 'an animal': 
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1: [ (Rover) is-analogous-to (dog)] 
2: [(dog) is-analogous-to (animal)] 
(Rover) 
(dog) 
(animal) 
(animal) is an animal 
t(dog) is an animal 
t (Rover) is an animal. 
Then, when processing the second sentence, 'the animal' can be resolved to (Rover), since 
(Rover) is an entity known to be describable as 'an animal' : 
() 
John is terrified of the animal 
(John) is terrified of (Rover), 
where () indicates reference resolution. The description ' (Rover) is an animal' is known as 
the 'antecedent description' for this resolution. 
Having resolved the referent, further processing can be performed on the result. 
Metaphorical reference resolution 
Consider now the discourse fragment (which is an extended metaphor) 
(2) John is an ogre. The monster terrorizes the local children. 
The reference resolution in this example proceeds in just the same manner as before, the 
only difference being that the descriptions involved are marked as metaphorical. The 
antecedent description of (John) in this case can be derived from the first sentence as 
follows: 
1: [ (John) is-analogous-to (ogre)] 
2: [(ogre) is-analogous-to (monster)] 
(John) 
11'1 (ogre) 
11' 2 (monster) 
==> (monster) is a monster 
.U.2 t (ogre) is a monster 
.U.1 t t(John) is a monster. 
The resolution step can be shown symbolically as follows: 
The monster terrorizes the local children 
(t ) (John) terrorizes the local children, 
where ' (t)' indicates that the reference resolution had a metaphorical antecedent description. 
More generally, if an utterance is metaphorical, the principle of descriptional analogy gives a 
way of generating extensions of that metaphor - new descriptions of a target are found 
which, in general, are ill-formed and metaphorical. These metaphorical descriptions are, 
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however, not without use, as they can be the antecedent descriptions in reference resolution. 
Such reference resolution which uses metaphorical antecedents will be termed ' metaphorical 
reference resolution' and the antecedents will be termed 'antecedent metaphors'. 
4.2 Metaphorical reference resolution in systematic metaphor 
In the above example, the antecedent metaphor used in metaphorical reference resolution 
was found as a consequence of a previous input metaphor - in this case, the current input 
represents an extension of the previous input metaphor. It is , on the other hand, possible for 
the antecedent metaphor to be found as a consequence of a known systematic metaphor, in 
which case the current input represents a manifestation of that systematic metaphor. 
As an example, consider EMOTIONAUfY rs TEMPERATURE. The core analogy underlying this 
systematic metaphor views a person as a physical object and their emotionality as its 
temperature. This analogy has two targets (a person and their emotionality), and two sources (a physical object and its temperature). Definitive entities provide the ideal way of 
representing this core analogy, since by associating the metaphorical descriptions above with 
the definitive person (person), it is ensured that such descriptions are inherited by all other 
persons. 
The core analogy can be represented thus: 
[ (person) is-analogous-to (object) 
· and (emotionality) is-analogous-to (object's temperature)] 
where, (person) is the definitive person, (emotionality) is the emotionality of (person) (i.e., 
another definitive entity in a definitive relationship with (person)), (object) is the definitive (object), and (object's temperature) is, of course, the temperature of (object). 
This core analogy is identical in form to any other analogy between definitive entities, and 
as such should be considered as simply another background analogy representing a piece of 
commonsense knowl~dge - it represents a piece of knowledge about how people and their 
emotionality are described, and it can be used in description inheritance in the same way as 
any other background analogy. For example, it licenses a metaphorical description of the 
relationship between (person) and (emotionality): 
(person), (emotionality) 11 (object), (object's temperature) ~ (object's temperature) is (object)' s temperature il tt(emotionality) is (person)' s temperature. 
This is in addition to the intrinsic description of the relationship 
(emotionality) is (person)' s emotionality. 
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The core analogy, then, might be summed up in the slogan "a person can be seen as an 
object provided their 'temperature' is interpreted as their emotionality". 
Suppose that it is known that Sally is a person, then descriptional analogy has it that (Sally) 
is analogous to (person). Chaining analogies gives a metaphorical description of Sally's 
emotionality: 
1: [(Sally) is-analogous-to (person) 
and (Sally's emotionality) is-analogous-to (emotionality)] 
2: [(person) is-analogous-to (object) 
and (emotionality) is-analogous-to (object 's temperature)] 
(Sally), (Sally's emotionality) 
fl'i (person), (emotionality) 
112 (object), (object's temperature) 
~ (object's temperature) is (object)' s temperature 
JJ.2 tt(emotionality) is (person)' s temperature. 
JJ.1 tt(Sally's emotionality) is (Sally)' s temperature. 
This description of Sally's emotionality as her temperature can be used to interpret Searle 's 
example (seen in chapter 2) 
(3) Sally is a block of ice. 
The intended meaning of this utterance, that Sally is unemotional, was seen to be beyond 
the abstraction approach, as it depended crucially on interpreting an abstracted feature of ice, 
viz coldness, metaphorically. The initial interpretation of (3) is the input analogy 
[(Sally) is-analogous-to (block of ice)]1 
and the interpretation of (3) can be achieved as follows : 
n 
(Sally) 
(block of ice) 
(block of ice) is cold 
(block of ice)' s temperature is low2 
t(Sally)' s temperature is low 
t (Sally's emotionality) is low. 
As it happens, botl:i of the final two sentences in this sequence are well-formed, so it would 
be possible to stop at the first and accept that as an interpretation of (3). Here, though, that 
interpretation is rejected and the second sentence, to the effect that Sally is unemotional , is 
accepted in preference. More will be said about choosing between interpretations later. 
Notice that the metaphorical reference resolution is triggered by reference to Sally's 
temperature, which is the central linking idea behind all examples of EMOTIONALITY rs 
2 
(block of ice) is rather unlikely to be a definitive entity present in the system, but it might well be 
constructed from (block) and (ice). For simplicity here, it is assumed to be available. 
This description is treated here for simplicity as an intrinsic description of (cold-thing), however it is 
analyzed further in MINT using the analogy [(cold-thing's temperature) is-analogous-to (little-quantity)]. 
The use of the word 'low' is of course an instance of MORE IS UP. The co-occurrence of two systematic 
metaphors is no problem for descriptional analogy, but for simplicity the issue is ignored in this example. 
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TEMPERA TIJRE. This means that this method of metaphorical interpretation is general to all 
utterances which make reference, explicit or implicit, to a person's temperature, examples 
such as 
(4) John is a warm person 
(5) Sally is frigid 
(6) Mary is a bonfire. 
The technique of using known core analogies to derive antecedent metaphors for use in 
metaphorical reference resolution is the key to processing a great many manifestations of 
systematic metaphor. For instance, the example used in the informal look at processing 
earlier in this chapter, THE MIND IS A BRITI1..E OBJECT, can be handled in just the same way, 
taking the underlying analogy to be 
[(person) is-analogous-to (structure), (confidence) is-analogous-to (structural-integrity) (strength-of-character) is-analogous-to (strength).] 
Knowledge of this analogy enables references to a person's structural integrity to be 
interpreted as references to the person's confidence. 
A more complex example 
The preceding examples make use of metaphorical reference to various properties of a 
person, their strength, temperature, confidence, and so on, which are entities in special 
relationships with that person. The process of metaphorical reference resolution is, however, 
capable of dealing with more general predicative relationships. Take, for example, TIME IS A 
MOVING OBJECT. Here, the elapsing of time is seen as movement, and this can be captured in 
an analogy between the definitive elapsing and the definitive movement: 
1: [ (time-interval) is-analogous-to (moving-object), (elapsing) is-analogous-to (movement).] 
An utterance such as 
(7) The summer rolled try 
can then be interpreted as follows : 
Initial processing of (7) yields two input analogies: 
2: [(summer3 l ) is-analogous-to (time-interval)] 3: [(summer3I) is-analogous-to (rolling-object) 
and (event31) is-analogous-to (rolling), J 
where (event31) is the event being described in (7). 
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The first of these in conjunction with the background analogy above yields a metaphorical 
description of the elapsing of (summer31): 
(summer3 l), (elapsing3 l) 
n 2 (time-interval), (elapsing) 
fi1 (moving-object), (movement) 
=> (movement) is the movement of (movin·g-object) 
il1 tt(elapsing) is the movement of (time-interval) 
il2 tt(elapsing31) is the movement of (summer31). 
The latter analogy, in conjunction with a background analogy between (rolling-object) and 
(moving-object), 
4: [ (rolling-object) is-analogous-to (moving-object) 
and (rolling) is-analogous-to (movement)] 
enables the following reasoning (where the antecedent metaphor of the resolution step is the 
description of (elapsing31) derived above): 
(summer31), (event31) 
(rolling-object), (rolling) 
(moving-object), (movement) 
(movement) is the movement of (moving-object) 
t(rolling) is the movement of (rolling-object) 
tt(event3 l)' is the movement of (summer31) 
t(event31) is (elapsing31). 
In other words, the event being described in (7) is the elapsing of the summer. More subtle 
'fleshing out' of this basic interpretation can be achieved by considering further background 
analogies involving (rolling) capturing, say, smoothness and uniformity of motion. 
It . should be clear that similar reasoning can be applied to any utterance in which a time 
interval is described as though it were moving in some fashion. 
4.3 Associated metaphors 
Metaphorical refere_nce resolution is an approach suitable for the interpretation of many 
utterances involving systematic metaphor, but will only work when metaphorical reference is 
made to some functional attribute of an entity - the temperature of an object, the 
emotionality of a person, the elapsing of a time-interval, and so on. 
There are, however, cases when reference is made to an incidental property of an entity, 
such as a child of a person, a reading of a book, and a criticism of an argument. In these 
cases it is necessary to use a modification of the reasoning outlined above. This modified 
processing is called 'generalized metaphorical reference resolution', and is accomplished by 
the use of 'associated metaphors' . 
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UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING is an example of a systematic metaphor in which the 
straightforward metaphorical reference resolution process is not by itself adequate. 
UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING is one of a group of closely associated systematic metaphors: 
(8) UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING 
IDEAS ARE OBJECTS 
DISCOURSE IS A LlGHT MEDIUM: 
I see what you' re saying. 
It looks different from my point of view. 
Now I've got the picture. 
Let me show you the idea. 
That is an interesting observation. 
The argument is clear. 
The discussion was opaque. 
Here, ideas are seen as objects, understanding an idea is described as 'seeing' it, and the 
more easily an idea is 'seen', the more easily it is understood. 
Consider the utterance 
(9) / see the idea. 
There is no unique attribute of the idea that is being referred to in this example, rather it is 
an observation of the idea. 
The two relevant core analogies in this utterance are 
1: [ (idea) is-analogous-to (object)] 
2: [ (understanding) is-analogous-to (seeing) 
and (understander) is-analogous-to (seer) 
and (understood) is-analogous-to (seen)] 
Where (idea) is the definitive idea, (object) is the definitive object, (understanding), 
(undetstander), and (understood) are definitive entities in the relationship of understanding,3 
and (seeing), (seer), and (seen) are definitive entities in the relationship of seeing. These two 
associated metaphors can be summed up as "an idea can be regarded as an object provided 
'seeing' is interpreted as understanding". 
In addition to these two core analogies, there is a third background analogy available (as 
commonsense knowledge) for use in interpretation: 
3: [(seen) is-analogous-to (object)] 
which reflects the idea that, in the core sense of 'see', what is seen is an object It is the 
conjunction of these three analogies that enables a 'seeing' of an idea to be interpreted as an 
understanding of the idea: 
That is , (understanding) is the archetypal event of understanding, (understander) is the understander in that event, and (understood) is the idea which is understood. 
80 4.3 
I 
II 
, I 
Initial interpretation of (9) yields the input analogy 
4: [(speaker31) is-analogous-to (seer) 
and (idea31) is-analogous-to (seen)], 
which, when chained with analogy (3), shows (idea31) being described at though it were an 
object, i.e., this input utterance is a manifestation of IDEAS ARE OBJECTS. Since this systematic 
metaphor is associated with UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING, the reference to a 'seeing' of (idea31) 
can be resolved to an 'understanding' of (idea31 ), yielding a paraphrase of (9) as 
(10) / understand the idea, 
which is well-formed and can be accepted. 
The precise mechanism for this processing is not easily expressed in the implementation independent notation of this chapter, but is described fully in chapter 6 as it is implemented in the MINT system. 
4.4 Perspectives, interpretations, and acceptance 
It has been seen that the result of metaphorical interpretation is sometimes only one of a 
number of possible interpretations. This is most obvious in the case of sentential metaphors, 
such as 
(11) Sally was crushed, 
where there is a literal interpretation as well as a metaphorical interpretation (as a 
manifestation of THE MIND rs A BRIITLE OBJECT). It is also possible for there to be more than 
one metaphorical interpretation. An example of that has already been seen in the interpretation of (3): when considering the derived description 
(12) t(Sally)' s temperature is low 
this could either be accepted at face value, or interpreted further as a manifestation of 
EMOTIONALITY IS TEMPERATURE. 
In both these cases, the different interpretations correspond to different perspectives on Sally. In the literal interpretations, Sally is seen as a physical object by virtue of being seen as a body, a view which might be termed the physical perspective. In the metaphorical interpretations, the psychological perspective is adopted and she is again seen as an object, but this time by virtue of analogies in which she is considered as a thinking agent. 
The idea of an interpretation corresponding to a perspective takes on a greater importance 
when multiple descriptions are produced in response to an input utterance. For example, (11) 
might be paraphrased as 
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(13) Sally was damaged 
(14) Sally was destroyed 
(15) Sally's structural-integrity was reduced 
(16) Sally's structural-integrity changed. 
These fonn a coherent interpretation as long as the same perspective is adopted throughout; 
if, on the other hand, the perspective is varied between the physical and the psychological, 
then these descriptions taken together do not fonn a coherent interpretation. 
Another example showing the importance of maintaining a consistent perspective during 
interpretation is 
(17) Sally was frosty at first, but soon warmed up. 
These issues of interpretations and perspectives will be discussed more thoroughly in the 
implementation described in chapter 6, where they are crucial to the control of processing. 
Acceptance 
In general, processing of an utterance results in a paraphrase in which a number of 
descriptions have been interpreted consistently according to a particular perspective on the 
target Together, this group of descriptions constitutes an 'interpretation' of the input 
utterance. 
Such an interpretation can be accepted or rejected on pragmatic grounds, that is, depending 
on whether it is seen as plausible in context. If it is rejected, then another interpretation 
might be possible as long as another perspective on the target can be found. 
This . acceptance of an interpretation is an acceptance of a number of well-fonned 
descriptions as a whole. There is a problem, however, which is that individual descriptions 
within the interpretation might not be valid, as they are arrived at by a fonn of analogical 
reasoning, which is inherently unreliable. For example, in the interpretation of "John is an 
ogre", abstractions must be treated with caution, so while both of 
(18) (John) is a thing 
(19) (John) is frightening 
are individually valid, neither of the following well-formed. descriptions fonn part of the 
intended meaning: 
(20) (John) is mythical 
(21) (John) is very tall. 
The individual descriptions within an interpretation must be regarded as defeasible, so that 
they can be overridden in the light of existing or future knowledge and expectations. The 
mechanism by which this can be done is not an issue addressed in descriptional analogy, 
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which concentrates solely on how to derive interpretations. There are, however, a number of heuristics developed in other research into metaphor and analogy which may be useful in picking out the descriptions most likely to be intended by the speaker. In particular, Jaime Carbonell's 'invariance hierarchy' [Carbonell 82), Dedre Gentner's Structure Mapping Theory [Gentner 89), and Holyoak and Thagard's constraint-satisfaction theory [Holyoak and Thagard 89) provide such heuristics. All of these, for example, favour complex relational 
assertions over simple attributes of entities, and a likely approach to the problem of which individual descriptions within an interpretation to adopt would be to select a core of only the 
most favoured according to these heuristics. 
4.5 Summary 
In these two chapters, it has been shown how the Principle of Descriptional Analogy can be 
used to generate literal paraphrases of metaphors by abstraction, and of manifestations of known systematic metaphors by a combination of abstraction and (generalized) metaphorical 
reference resolution. The form of processing used is, however, equally applicable to literal input utterances, and so descriptional analogy has achieved much in being a theory of 
metaphor that does not treat metaphor as deviant, but rather as the norm. 
The outline processing is as follows: 
(1) An input utterance (literal or metaphorical) is initially interpreted as an input analogy (or, for more complex utterances, a set of input analogies) in accordance with the Principle of Descriptional Analogy. 
(2) The targets of this analogy are redescribed by description inheritance, either directly from the sources or indirectly by chaining analogies. 
(3) Some of these descriptions may themselves be interpreted metaphorically by (generalized) metaphorical reference resolution. 
(4) Descriptions of the targets which are judged to be well-formed (relative to the system's dictionary) are combined to form an 'interpretation', or literal paraphrase. 
(5) A consistent perspective is maintained on the targets during this processing, and the 
resulting interpretation can be accepted or rejected on deep semantic and pragmatic grounds. If an interpretation is rejected, a different interpretation may be found by processing with alternative perspectives on the targets. 
In general, an interpretation produced by this mechanism will consist of a number of well-formed descriptions of the targets, which will each make a contribution to the overall interpreted 'meaning ' . This meaning may differ from the intended meaning of the speaker in 
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two ways. Firstly, some of the components of the interpretation may not have been intended 
by the speaker, (for example, the description "John is large" produced from the input "John 
is an ogre"). It is likely that some of these descriptions may be filtered out as semantically 
at odds with prior knowledge or pragmatically unlikely. In any case, individual descriptions 
in an interpretation should be regarded as defeasible. Secondly, part of the meaning of a 
metaphorical utterance may be lost due to inadequate knowledge in the system, for example 
when a suitable systematic metaphor is not known, the interpretation process becomes one of 
abstraction. In this case, it is reasonable to suppose that the partial meaning recovered will 
still be of use. 
The uniform handling of input utterances, both literal and metaphorical, is largely due to the 
use of definitive entities in descriptional analogy - ordinary semantic knowledge (including 
dictionary definitions), such as the ' fact ' that mothers are ancestors, can be represented in 
just the same way as the analogies underlying metaphors, and in particular the core 
analogies underlying systematic metaphors.4 
Descriptional analogy has been presented in an implementation independent form in these 
chapters. For this reason it has not been possible to describe in detail many of the processes, 
in particular the processes of generalized metaphorical reference resolution. Also, there has 
not been any discussion on the procedures required to search for possible interpretations. In 
the next two chapters, an implementation will be presented where this level of detail will be 
given. 
4 The analogies underlying input metaphors are not fundamentally different from core analogies, except 
perhaps that core analogies tend to be between definitive entities (background analogies), whereas the 
analogies underlying metaphors tend to have discourse entities as their targets (input analogies). 
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5. DREP 
We now tum to the practical implementation of descriptional analogy. This falls naturally 
into two parts as follows. Firstly, there is the analogical knowledge representation DREP, 
which is the subject of this chapter. Secondly, there are the algorithms used to exploit this 
knowledge in language processing. These are embodied in the MINT system, which is the 
topic of the next chapter. 
Overview 
This chapter describes DREP as a knowledge representation, without concentrating on how it 
is to be used in MINT. 
5 .1 reviews the overall requirements of DREP and motivates its implementation as a fully 
intensional, homogeneous semantic network. 5.2 presents the fundamentals of DREP - its 
single type of node, the 'concept', which represents the c-entities of descriptional analogy, 
and the single type of link - the 'd-link', which is a structural link representing analogies. 
This section also describes how chains of d-links can be 'composed' to give 'composite' 
d-links, and 'widened' to increase their information content. 5.3 discusses the frame 
interpretation of DREP. 5.4 reviews the matching operations in the network. 5.5 considers 
giving a fully intensional semantics to DREP based on Castefieda's theory of guises. 5.6 
reviews the various representational idioms used in MINT, covering nouns, verbs, adjectives, 
event structure, and prepositional phrases. 5.7 compares DREP as a knowledge 
representation with other representations in terms of representational power and suitability 
for use in language processing. 5.8 looks at how DREP is used in MINT, and in particular 
the correspondence of d-links and descriptions, which is the key to MINT's handling of 
well-formedness. 
5.1 Introduction 
DREP is a semantic network formalism whose nodes represent c-entities (both discourse 
entities and definitive entities) and whose structured links represent analogies (both input 
analogies, generated as a result of input utterances, and background analogies, which 
represent a form of commonsense knowledge). Before giving a detailed presentation of 
DREP, the factors motivating the formalism are discussed below. 
85 5.1 
l
'I 
,II 
5.1.1 Requirements of the representation 
There are a number of requirements for DREP which arise from the general methodological 
aims of this work and from the specific features of the theory of descriptional analogy. 
These requirements are outlined below. 
Analogies 
As should be clear from the outline of descriptional analogy given in the last two chapters, 
DREP is primarily required to represent c-entities and analogies. In descriptional analogy, 
analogies form the basic mechanism by which entities are related - not only are analogies 
seen as the mechanism responsible for the generation and inheritance of metaphorical 
descriptions, but literal descriptions too are seen as being arrived at by analogy with 
definitive entities. The consequence of this ubiquity is that efficient storage and retrieval of 
analogies should be of prime consideration in the representation. 
Commonsense knowledge 
DREP is only intended to represent descriptional knowledge, that is, knowledge about how 
an entity can be described, both by itself and in its relationships with other entities. DREP is 
not intended to be a general knowledge representation although, not surprisingly, this 
descriptional knowledge strongly reflects the more conventional knowledge that general 
knowledge representations attempt to capture. 
For example, knowing that (Tw~ty) can be described as 'a canary' means that (Tweety) can 
also be described as 'a bird', an observation which is conventionally attributed to the 
'commonsense' knowledge that all canaries are birds. In descriptional analogy, on the other 
hand, these inherited descriptions are just that - descriptions - they are not required to be 
statements of objecti':'.e fact. A particular point to make is that DREP is not required to 
support full logical inference, and logical inconsistencies are not only to be tolerated, but are 
essential as they are only to be expected in metaphors. 
In short, DREP is required to represent descriptional knowledge which reflects general 
knowledge, but this knowledge is not to be interpreted in the conventional way. There will 
be further discussion of the relationship between descriptional knowledge and conventional 
knowledge later in this chapter. 
86 5.1 
I I 
11 
, I 
Breadth and depth of knowledge 
While DREP does in a sense represent commonsense knowledge, that knowledge is spread 
rather thinly over a large area: the knowledge covered is principally about the core senses of 
words, which might cover any number of domains, 1 rather than senses directly applicable to 
some chosen domain of discourse. 
This is a rather different situation from the more usual position in analogical reasoning, 
where a small domain is modelled in considerable detail. A consequence of this broad and 
shallow semantic coverage is that DREP needs to be very flexible in what it can represent. 
Quite crude approximations will have to be made, and the system as a whole cannot rely on 
anything like completeness in its knowledge. 
Multiple perspectives 
It was also seen in the theoretical account of the sort of processing required of MINT that it 
is possible to arrive at more than one interpretation of a metaphorical input. The different 
interpretations were seen to be reflections of a choice of perspective on the entities involved, 
for example, two perspectives on a person were given as the person seen as a physical body 
and the person seen as a thinking agent. 
The ability to represent such 'multiple perspectives' is ~ frequent requirement of knowledge 
representations and DREP is no exception. 
Simplicity 
A final point is a restatement of the methodological aim of simplicity. This was seen as a 
very important factor in the design for a number of reasons. Firstly, DREP was developed as 
the foundation for an experimental system, so modification during its implementation was 
only to be expected-. The ease with which such modifications could be made would have 
been considerably reduced had the knowledge representation been more complex. Secondly, 
it was never intended that this implementation should be used directly as a component of a 
larger project. Instead, it is envisaged that the ideas and methods used in MINT should be 
re-implemented in a larger, and perhaps already existing, system. Naturally, the less complex 
MINT and DREP are, the easier this re-implementation in a different programming context 
would be. Finally, as MINT is the experimental vehicle for the development of a new theory 
of metaphor, simplicity in the implementation makes it easier to see the theoretical wood, 
Where 'domain' is an informal term for ' subject area ' - domains have no formal status in DREP. 
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despite the implementational trees. 
5.1.2 The implementation of DREP 
DREP has been implemented as a fully intens1onal semantic network with structured links 
giving it a strong frame flavour. The reason for the choice of semantic network over other 
representations, such as logical form or a primitive based representation, is to do with the 
twin issues of notational simplicity and efficiency. 
Notational simplicity 
One of the reasons given for having simplicity as a methodological aim of the 
implementation was that this would render the underlying ideas of the system more visible 
and hence easier to identify and incorporate into a more comprehensive system. An 
extremely important factor in the visibility of underlying mechanisms is choice of notation -
the more naturally the notation can accommodate the knowledge structures associated with 
descriptional analogy (i .e., analogical mappings), the more apparent these mechanisms 
become. 
It turns out that the analogical mappings central to the operation of descriptional analogy 
cannot be naturally represented in either a logical notation or a semantic primitives notation, 
since in both cases the result is somewhat verbose, whereas in the semantic network / frame 
representation developed here, the notation is very concise and easy to follow. A rough 
formulation of descriptional analogy in a logical notation is given at the end of this chapter, 
where the clumsiness of the result is clearly visible. 
Efficiency 
In the processing required for the interpretation of metaphors, many analogies have to be 
combined and matched in an extensive knowledge base. The use of a semantic network 
means that relevant analogies can be found quickly and effic~ently by their positions in the 
network. Although efficiency is not an overriding concern in this experimental system -
clarity for example, is considered of greater importance - the sheer scale of these operations 
demands an efficient implementation. 
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5.2 Basic DREP 
As is usual in semantic networks, DREP representations are made up of nodes and links. 
Nodes 
The nodes of DREP are called ' concepts'. Concepts correspond to the c-entities of 
descriptional analogy, each is known by a unique name, which will be indicated in sanserif 
fount. For example, John, man, and person are all concept names. 
All concepts enjoy equal status in DREP - there are no primitive concepts with special 
meaning in the representation. Concepts only acquire meaning by virtue of their position in 
the network, that is, their relationships with other concepts. 
Some concepts, in addition to their links to other concepts within the network, have direct 
links into the system's lexicon specifying their intrinsic descriptions (in logical form). Such 
concepts are the representations of the definitive entities of descriptional analogy. There is 
no stipulated limit on the complexity of these intrinsic descriptions, but in practice they are 
only very basic, corresponding to single words or predicates. For example, man is linked 
only to the unary predicate MAN, and person to the unary predicate PERSON. More complex 
descriptions, and in particular dictionary-like definitions, are built compositionally as a result 
of analogical relationships between concepts within the network. 
This linkage to the lexicon is the ultimate means by which concepts within the network are 
anchored to the ' outside world' and so ultimately how they derive their interpretations; the 
names of concepts, for example, are invisible to an observer of MINT and so are only 
incidentally relevant to the meanings of concepts - DREP would function just as well if its 
concepts were given nonsense names. The nature of this interface between the 
representational network and the outside is described fully in the next chapter. 
Apart from having a name, links to other concepts, and possible links to the lexicon, a 
concept has no internal structure. All inform ation about concepts resides in the complex 
links connecting them. 
Links 
There is only one type of link in DREP2 and it represents the analogical mappings of 
descriptional analogy. It is a complex link connecting groups of concepts ('sources' and 
2 Although there are a couple of labels, or 'features', which can be applied to these links, viz literal / 
metaphorical and type i or p. The significance of these features is discussed at the end of this chapter. 
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'targets') and is known as a 'description inheritance link', or 'd-link' (hence the name DREP 
for 'd-link representation'). 
A d-link is a bundle of 'maps', each of which links two concepts, a 'target concept' and a 
' source concept'. The number of maps in a d-link is known as the 'width' of that d-link and 
can be arbitrarily large. The width corresponds directly to the number of sources in the 
represented analogy. 
D-links can be represented graphically as in figure 7. 3 This figure shows two d-links ; the 
first has only one map (i.e., has width 1) and is the representation of the analogy 
[(dog) is-analogous-to (animal)] 
the second has width three and is the representation of the analogy underlying the systematic 
metaphor l:J\l)ERSTA.'',DlNG IS SEED\G:4 
[ (understanding) is-analogous-to (seeing), 
(understander) is-analogous-to (seer), 
(understood) is-analogous-to (seen)] 
animal 
t s:e•f-g~~~~-s~f~e-r~~~~-s11e: 
dog understanding understar:ider understood 
Figure 7: Example d-links of widths one and three 
There are several points to be made about this graphical notation: 
Firstly, d-links are asymmetric with respect to source and target concepts: source concepts 
appear above the d-link and target concepts below. This convention parallels the convention 
of drawing the source domain above the target domain in the diagrammatic representation of 
analogies in chapter 3. 
D-links, as has already been pointed out, are essentially bundJes of maps. These maps are 
represented in the diagrams by vertical lines linking source and target concepts, and the 
horizontal lines joining the maps together indicate how they are bundled to form the d-link. 
There is a possible source of confusion in this notation for readers familiar with Alshawi's MEMORY 
formalism [Alshawi 83, 87], whose Corresponds: links bear a syntactic resemblance to d-links of 
width 2. In the DREP notation, these width 2 links are essentially 'H' shaped, whereas Alshawi's would 
have been 'I' shaped. The DREP notation is more suitable here, as it is easily extended to cover greater 
widths . 
The .• labelling on this d-lin.k marks it as metaphorical - one of the two features discussed in a previous 
footnote. This labelling is to do with the determination of well-formedness and should be ignored for the 
presenL 
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Toe lines used to indicate maps will not always be drawn strictly vertically, since some 
distortion is often necessary to represent more than one d-link on the same diagram . The up-
down orientation reflecting the source-target distinction will, on the other hand, always be 
preserved. 
This up-down convention leads to the idea of descriptions filtering downwards from source 
concepts to target concepts. Concepts do not, however, necessarily form a strictly 
hierarchical structure, or even a tangled hierarchy with a clear notion of top and bottom, as 
there is nothing to prevent cycles of d-links arising in the network. Such cycles could not be 
drawn maintaining the up-down convention, but the problem does not often arise as only a 
few d-links are ever represented on a single diagram. The extra clarity lent by the 
convention to the diagrammatic representation makes perseverance worthwhile.5 
The ordering of maps in a d-link is of no consequence at all, so the two d-links shown in 
figure 8 are completely equivalent All target concepts have equal status with respect to the 
d-link, as do all source concepts. The order of maps in the diagrammatic representation of 
d-links is frequently swapped around to avoid clashes between links sharing sources or 
targets. 
mother child child mother 
H 
Mary Tom H Tom Mary 
Figure 8: The ordering of maps is immaterial 
To reiterate , the d-link is the only type of link in DREP. There are a couple of labels which 
can be attached to d-links to facilitate processing, but these are of minor significance in 
DREP itself - all d-links represent analogies. 
5.2.1 Some more examples 
In the above examples, some trouble has been taken to use words of English to name 
concepts. This, however, soon becomes a hopeless task, and in fu tu re · hyphenation and 
abbreviation will be used widely. There is a standard set of suffixes corresponding 
frequently to traditional semantic cases, such as -ag for the agent of an action, -pat for the 
In fact, the problem of representing cycles of d-links on the same diagram is overcome by duplicating 
concepts on the diagram. Such duplicated concepts will be highlighted by underlining . 
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patient, -inst for an instrument, -ev for an event, and so on. The use of these suffixes is 
intended only as a mnemonic, it does not indicate any committnent to the idea of semantic 
cases, and frequently they will be misused as an approximation (in the implementation, such 
names are generated semi-automatically). The name of a concept is of no significance at all 
to DREP, as has already been pointed out, concepts derive their 'meanings' from their 
connections into the lexicon, so concept names should not be taken too seriously. 
Using this new concept naming convention, the earlier example of the analogy underlying 
the systematic metaphor UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING is shown in figure 9. 
see-ev 
·t sTg seFt 
understand-ev u nderstand-ag understand-pat 
Figure 9: UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING 
Figure 10 shows three more d-links of various widths involving definitive entities. Notice 
that these d-links between definitive entities reflect dictionary-like definitional infonnation, 
for example 'kissing' is seen to be a fonn of 'touching' , ,' man' can be seen to have 'person' 
as part of its definition, and similarly 'mother' has 'ancestor' as part of its definition. 6 It 
should be remembered, of course, that these are not explicit definitions of words, rather, the 
analogical knowledge in a DREP network combines cumulatively to give infonnation about 
(definitive) concepts, and this infonnation is understood as applying to the words in the 
intrinsic descriptions of the concepts involved. 
touc·t---ev __ t_o_u .... r~--a_g_ tourpat ancestor descendent H kiss-ev kiss-ag kiss-pat man mother child 
Figure JO : D-links between definitive entities 
Figure 11 shows d-links between definitive entities and discourse referents , that might result 
6
. The mul tiple perspective mechanism discussed shortly has the effect of fleshing out these definitions. 
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from the inputs 7 
(1) John is a man 
(2) Dick kissed Mary. 
man 
t 
kiss-ev 
t 
kir 
John events, Dick 
Figure 11: "John is a man" and "Dick kissed Mary" 
Notice that because of the analogical semantics of DREP and the fact that the concepts involved are regarded as individuals (and not as 'generic' concepts), there is no need to 
mark these links as 'instantiations' - they simply represent analogies between (what happen 
to be) discourse entities and definitive entities. There is no explicit type / token distinction, 
since there are no explicit types. This is a distinguishing feature of DREP as compared to 
other semantic network formalisms; more will be said on this point later in this chapter. 
Figure 12 shows how two d-links can represent different perspectives on a concept - one 
views Mrs. Thatcher as the prime minister of UK and the other views Mrs. Thatcher as 
the wife of Mr. Thatcher. 
nation prime-minister wife husband 
t \. / t \ / UK Mrs. Thatcher Mr. Thatcher 
Figure 12: D-links forming multiple perspectives 
It is possible fo r two or more maps of a d-link to share the . same target concept, for example 
in the representation of 
(3) John kicked himself 
which is shown in figure 13. 
Recall · that dcscriptional analogy regards such utterances as expressing analogies between their referents and definitive entities. 
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kick-ev kick-ag kick-pat 
f \. / \/ 
event52 John 
Figure 13: "John kicked himself' 
It is not, however, permitted for two maps in a d-link to share the same source concept The 
asymmetry in allowing of shared targets but not shared sources is due to the asymmetry in 
the direction of description inheritance - given descriptions of two source concepts, they can 
easily be applied to the same target concept, but in the case of a shared source, a description 
of it would somehow have to be divided up between the corresponding target concepts.8 
5.2.2 Chains, composition, and widening 
Chains 
Concepts and d-links combine in a single data structure which takes the form of a highly 
structured network. D-links combine to form what are called 'chains' when they butt onto 
each other source end to target end, that is, when one or more sources of a 'lower' d-link 
also occur as targets of a second 'higher' d-link. In general, a chain can consist of any 
number of d-links (including one), as long as they join sources to targets. The number of 
d-links in a chain is known as the ·~· of the chain. Figure 14 shows examples of chains 
of length three and two. 
Note that is is not necessary for the sources and targets of the d-links in a chain to match 
perfectly, it is enough for just one source of the 'lower ' d-link simultaneously to be a target 
of the 'higher' d-link. 
Composition of chains 
According to the Principle of Descriptional Analogy, all descriptions of sources are inherited 
by targets. Descriptions of sources can arise by two routes: either they are fundamentally 
associated with the sources (intrinsic descriptions of definitive entities) or they are inherited 
from other entities as a result of further analogies . In the case of a chain of d-links, this 
One might take the view that a description of a shared source should be applied equally to all 
corresponding target concepts, but it is not clear that this would always be desirable. The presence of 
shared sources would in any case considerably complicate operations carried out on the network, so it is 
better to rule them out completely at this stage. 
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touch-ev touch-ag touch-pat 
t t t 
increase-ev increase-pat 
t t hit-ev hit-ag hit-pat 
t t t rise-ev rise-pat rise-pat H -height kick-ev kick-ag kick-pat 
t \. / event53 balloon51 \ 7 
event52 John 
Figure 14: Chains of length three and two 
means that descriptions of the sources of the top d-link in the chain can filter all the way 
down to the targets of the bottom d-link, exactly as if the chain were compressed into a 
single analogy between the top sources and the bottom targets. 
This equivalence is made explicit in the process of 'composition': Given a chain in the 
network, it may be 'composed' to give a new d-link as follows: for each source of the top 
d-link, a path is traced down the maps of the d-links making up the chain until either it is 
not possible to continue any further or a target of the bottom d-link is reached. A new d-link 
is formed from maps corresponding to paths successfully traced down the entire length of 
the chain (see figure 15). The resultant d-link is called a 'composite d-link', and the chain 
that was composed is called the 'parent chain' . 
Composite d-links represent a convenient way of handling a chain as a unit. This ability is 
used extensively in MINT, where chains are seen as representing descriptions of their 
targets. 9 
A composite d-link is for most purposes just like any other d-link, and in particular, it can 
itself take part in chai?s, which may then be composed to give further composite d-links. In 
the implementation, however, there is a need to keep track of the origins of d-links, and 
especially composite d-links, for a number of reasons. Firstly, a composite d-link is usually 
regarded as a sort of shorthand for its parent chain, and some operations on the composite 
d-link, notably widening (which is discussed next), are in fact implemented as operations on 
its parent chain. Secondly, the act of composing a chain leads to a duplication of 
information in the network, as the composite d-link is an explicit representation of an 
· analogy that was implicit in its parent chain. In matching operations it is necessary to allow 
for this redundancy by ignoring the parent chain in favour of its composite d-link. Thirdly, 
9 
· The correspondence of chains and descriptions is described at the end of this chapter. 
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I 
kick-ev 
I 
event52 
,our·g ,ouTp., 
kick-ag k ick-pat 
' / 
'\/ 
John 
parent chain 
i ncrease-ev 
I 
,;,HP·'. 
event53 balloon51 
rise-pat 
-height 
touch-ev 
t 
event52 
touch-ag touch-pat 
\. / 
"\/ 
John 
composited-link 
i ncrease-ev 
t 
event53 
Figure 15: Composition of chains 
there is a matter of housekeeping. Composition constitutes making a change to the network, 
and such changes need to be reversible, as backtracking is required in the case of multiple 
interpretations. Also, after processing a series of utterances, the network is returned to its 
original state by undoing the changes made rather than rebuilding it from scratch. 
Widening 
Widening is a second basic operation on d-links, but unlike composition, it alters an existing 
d-link rather than creating a new one. 'Widening' is the operation of adding extra maps to 
an existing d-link, an· 9peration which corresponds to elaborating the represented analogy. A 
simple example of widening is shown in figure 16 where the single added map is indicated 
by dashed lines. As with composition, there is a certain amount of housekeeping associated 
with the widening operation to enable backtracking after an interpretation is generated. 
The widening operation becomes rather more complex in the case of composite d-links, 
when it is actually an operation of widening the parent chain. In this case, some or all of the 
component d-links of the parent chain are themselves wid_ened and extra concepts may need 
to be created for this purpose. Again, there is an asymmetry between source and target 
directions in the chain: widening is done starting from the source end, working towards the 
target end. The new source concept (assuming for simplicity there is only one map being 
add.ed) is mapped down the chain as far as possible along existing maps; when no further 
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hit-ev hit-ag hit-pat hit-ev hit-ag hit-pat hit-inst 
t t t ~ t t t--------t event54 Mary John event54 Mary John rol Ii ng-pi n 51 
Figure 16: Widening ad-link 
maps are available, new 'dummy ' concepts are created to complete the path downwards, 
until finally the new target concept appears at the bottom of the chain. 10 An example of the 
widening of a composite d-link and its parent chain is shown in figure 17. 
composile: phF-b- ___ -~rht 
John John's-hei ght 
parenl chain: 
climrpat 
Everest 
ph~-~r 
,isH~~~ __ ,~s-e~rt·height 
climb-ev climb-ag =dummy = 
t t--------t 
event SS John John's-height 
Figure 17: Widening a composite d-link 
The reasoning behind this algorithm for widening a chain is again due to the direction in 
which descriptions are inherited: since widening is a method of augmenting an existing 
analogy, existing specifications of that analogy should be respected. A chain might already 
partially specify how a new source concept is to be interpreted, if a path can be traced part 
of the way down. These specifications are maintained in the widened chain and the widening 
operation is regarded as specifying how this chain of description inheritance from ultimate 
source to ultimate target is to be completed. 
5.3 The frame interpretation of DREP 
As has been previously remarked, there is a strong frame flavour about DREP, and it is the 
purpose of this short section to explain how this comes about. 
10 
. Du~y concepts are simply anonymous concepts, which are created as required during widening to bridge gaps in the network. 
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The idea of frames is totally implicit in the representation - they can only be said to arise as 
a consequence of the relationships among concepts specified by intrinsic descriptions and 
d-links . The implicit frames are easiest to appreciate in the case of a group of definitive 
entities which are involved in a definitive relationship, as explained below. 
Consider the the relationship of hitting, where there is an event of someone hitting 
something. A frame representation of 'hitting ' might contain slots for event, agent, and 
patient, and for each event, a new copy of the frame would be made with these slots filled 
by the particular individuals involved, say event59, John, and man23 respectively in the 
event of John hitting a man (figure 18). 
hitting-event 
event: event59 
agent: John 
--+-------
patient man23 
Figure 18: A frame for "John hit a man" 
Now, definitive concepts can be seen as fillers of the same slots in an archetypal instance of 
the frame (figure 19), and because of the archetypical association of these concepts with 
particular slots in the frame, they may be regarded as uniquely labelling those slots. 
hitting-event 
event: hit-ev 
agent: hit-ag 
--+-------1 
patient: hit-pat 
Figure 19: Definitive concepts seen as slot fillers 
A d-link which has these definitive concepts as sources can now be regarded as specifying 
that its targets fill the slots 'labelled' by the corresponding sources in another instance of the 
98 5.3 
I 
'I 
I 
frame. Furthermore, if another d-link appears directly below this one in a chain, then its 
targets can be considered as filling those slots in yet another instance of the 'hitting' frame, 
and so on (figure 20). 
hit-ev 
t 
kick-ev 
t 
event52 
hirg hirat 
kick-ag kick-pat 
\. / 
"\/ 
John 
hitting-event 
event: kick-ev 
agent: kick-ag 
patient: kick-pat 
hitting-event 
event: event52 
agent: John 
patient: John 
Figure 20: D-links specifying instances of frames 
Because frames are implicit, there is no restriction as to which groups of concepts can 
combine in frame-like relationships. An implicit frame instance is 'created' whenever a 
group of concepts occur together at the same end of a d-link. These groupings may be 
different for different d-links, and this can be interpreted as many small implicit frames 
either overlapping or coalescing to form arbitrarily large frames . 
It is, however, important to bear in mind that the idea of a frame is not a formal notion in 
DREP - concepts can only be said to be organized into frames by virtue of their being at 
the same end of some d-link or their being involved in the same intrinsic description. A 
frame cannot be handled as a unit, instances of frames are never actually created, all 
concepts within a frame have equal status (there is no owner, concept, for example), and 
frames are rather hard to delimit due to the overlapping or coalescing described above . It is 
particularly important to bear in mind that . a d-link is not an ' is-a' link, or a ' frame 
instantiation ' link. It is a descriptional analogy link between (intensional) individuals. 
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5 .4 Network matching 
Interpretation in MINT is very largely a matter of matching d-links and chains generated as 
a result of input utterances against the pre-existing network which encodes both the system's 
commonsense knowledge and .knowledge accumulated from previous input 
There are two types of matching used in processing, 'complete matching' , which attempts to 
match a complete template d-link against chains in the network, and 'partial matching', 
which looks for chains that are 'consistent' with its template: 
Complete matching 
The complete match operation takes a template d-link11 and searches the network for chains 
which when composed yield composite d-links which have at least the maps specified by the 
template, and possibly more. In other words, the composite d-links obtained by composing 
matching chains should be widened versions of the template. 
Figure 21 shows how complete matching might yield two matches for a template specifying 
Dick and Mary as its targets and touch-ag and touch-pat as the corresponding sources. 
lemplale: 
'"T" '"T" '"T" 
hir .. - v--h~i1 ... ·p_a_t --hi ..... r~nst 
''T" 'T'" ,,,~,,fin 
event56 Ma ry Dick Dick' s fis t 
matches: 
touH· pat 
Dick Mary 
touch-ev 
t 
kiss-ev 
t 
eventS 1 
tour·ag 
'T' 
Dick 
tour-pat 
'T" 
Mary 
Figure 21: Complete matching 
Partial matching 
Partial matching is an operation similar to complete matching in Lhat it takes Lhe same sort 
of template and returns a list of matching chains, but it requires only a partial consistent 
match - at least one, but not necessarily all , of the maps specified in the template must be 
realized in each matching chain (partiality) and whenever a matching chain and the template 
have a source in common, the corresponding targets must also be the same (consistency). 
l l Technically, the template is not a d-link, but a specification o f its constituent maps (i t is not part of the 
· network). 
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This is equivalent to saying that any matching chain could be widened using the maps of the 
template to give a legal result, i.e., one without multiple occurrences of a source concept 
Figure 22 shows an example of partial matching where only one of the two maps in the 
template matches the chain. The match is consistent, as the only other source in the 
template, move-ev, does not map to any target in the chain. 
template: 
moRe-pat 
match: 
event57 summerS 1 
mo,Re-e, 
,;me-rer,al elap,;ng 
summer 
f 
summers, 
Figure 22: Partial matching 
5.5 Semantics for DREP 
The task of a semantics for DREP is to specify the link between the syntactic concepts and 
d-links of the representation and the sort of entities and relationships they are supposed to 
represent. 
This section is at best a sketch of what such a semantics might look like - since the 
enterprise undertaken in this research has been the evolution of a theory of metaphor and its 
implementation, a process which cannot claim · to be complete, it would be rather premature 
to attempt to build a ·rigorous semantic edifice at this stage. Also, since the handling of 
metaphor is only a small part of the greater enterprise of natural language interpretation, 
building a rigorous semantics for this component out of context would not be a particularly 
useful exercise. 
Several factors which should be manifest in the semantics are, however, clear at this stage of 
the development process. 
The first is that we are dealing with mental, or 'intensional'. entities (c-entities). Some of 
these entities correspond in some way to objects or otherwise identifiable 'things' out there 
in the real world, but many, and perhaps most, correspond only to fictional entities or 
entities that have no independent 'existence · external to the system, such as is the case with 
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definitive entities. 
The second major point is that the links of DREP, that is the d-links, do not express what 
might be called 'objective' facts about the entities they organize. They express facts about how these entities can be described both alone and in relation to other entities. This 
concentration on descriptions as opposed to objective facts again points to an intensional interpretation of DREP - descriptions, especially overtly metaphorical descriptions, are seen 
as artifacts of mental processing and not directly related to the outside world, although a 
correspondence in some cases can be seen. In this view, the analogies expressed by d-links 
are also seen as artifacts of mental processing rather than objective realities. This chimes in 
well with the intuition that it is possible to find analogies of varying quality anywhere 
simply by looking hard enough, and the corresponding intuition that there seems to be no practical limit to the ways in which entities can be described metaphorically. 
So ideally the semantics given to DREP should be fully intensional. Another semantic 
network regarded as fully intensional is Stuart Shapiro's SNePS [Shapiro 79, 86], [Maida 
and Shapiro 82], which was designed to handle reasoning in intensional contexts such as the 
referentially opaque contexts of belief and knowledge. A paper by William Rapaport [Rapaport 85] considers giving an intensional semantics to SNePS. He first of all rejects a Montague-like approach involving possible worlds [Israel 83] on the grounds that it is not fully intensional and, by definition, it is not possible to represent impossible intensional 
objects (such as 'round squares' which are perfectly valid as objects of thought) in a possible worlds framework.. Instead · he proposes giving SNePS a Meinongian Semantics (after Alexius Meinong [Meinong 04]) which interprets all objects of thought as intensional 
objects which may or may not be associated with real world objects. Rapaport considers three recent formulations of Meinongian semantics, finally settling on Hector-Neri Castafleda's theory of guises as the most appropriate for SNePS. Guise theory is also well 
suited to form an outline semantics for DREP, although it is not sufficiently well formalized to be rigorous. Such an outline is presented below. 
5.5.1 Guise Theory 
Hector-Neri Castafleda's guise theory is a large and elaborate fully intensional ontological theory with just one sort of object, the guise. The theory is presented in considerable detail in [Castaneda 77], where he discusses its application as a general theory . of perception, 
encompassing natural language, vision, and reasoning, but the portion of interest here is 
relatively straightforward. 
Guises are specified by sets of properties. Typical properties might be 'being the present King of France' , 'being bald', 'being round', 'being square ' , and so on. These properties are 
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collected into sets called 'guise cores', from which 'guises' can be obtained by applying the 
'c' operator. Thus, some examples of guises being obtained from guise cores are: 
( 4) p = c { being round, being square} 
(5) q = c { being the tallest mountain} 
(6) r = c{being Everest} 
(7) s = c{being the Morning Star} 
(8) t = c{qeing the Morning Star, being a planet} 
Thus a guise can be said to be the intensional individual with exactly (no more and no less 
than) the properties specified in its guise core. 
A guise core can be infinite, but only finite guises can be 'directly apprehended' in the mind 
and therefore used in cognition. It is a characteristic of actual existing objects that they are 
infinite propertied, so these, or rather the guises corresponding to them, cannot be directly 
apprehended and must be thought about via 'facets' - guises formed from finite subsets of 
their properties. 
The properties listed in guise cores are 'internal' properties, which constitute the only 
internal properties of the relevant guises. These internal properties may even be inconsistent 
(as in p, the round square). There is in addition, an 'external' predication called 
'consubstantiation' which amounts to the assertion that two or more guises are facets of the 
same 'real' thing. Consubstantiation is written 'C*', examples are 
(9) C*qr 
(10) C*st 
where q, r, s, and t are the guises defined above. Roughly translated, these say that Everest 
is actually the same thing as the tallest mountain and the Morning Star is actually the same 
thing as the planet, the Morning Star. 
Consubstantiation is an equivalence relation which essentially asserts that two intensional 
guises have the same extension (i.e., they corefer), although this extensional individual lies 
outside the theory, and so cannot be handled directly. Because there is no direct access to 
extensions, it is quite possible to talk about both the tallest mountain and Mt Everest without 
realizing that they are consubstantiated, and this is the key to how reasoning in opaque 
contexts can be modelled in guise theory - consubstantiation is an objective fact about 
guises and so not directly accessible to the mind, all that a mind can represent is believed 
consubstantiation. 
There is an analogous external predicate 'consociation ', written 'C** ', which is used in the 
case of fictional 'extensions', for example, 
(11) C**(c{being Hamlet},c{being the Prince of Denmark}) 
The distinction between consubstantiation and consociation is useful in guise theory in 
characterizing existence, but the two can be regarded as equivalent in the current context. 
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5.5.2 Using guise theory as a semantics for DREP 
There is a natural way of associating the concepts and d-links of DREP with the elements of 
guise theory. Concepts can be seen to denote guises and both d-links and intrinsic 
descriptions denote properties. 
More specifically, an intrinsic description of a concept denotes the property 'can be 
described as ... ' or 'can be described in relation to the guises ... as ... ', and a d-link denotes 
the property 'can be described in the same way as the guise ... ' or 'can be described in 
relation to the guises ... in the same way as the guise ... in relation to the guises .. .'. 
It is apparent that the properties denoted by d-links and intrinsic descriptions are complex in 
that they make reference to guises. This sort of property does not seem to be mentioned 
explicitly by Castaneda, but it is clear that he has complex properties such as these in mind 
when he formulates more sophisticated guises, such as 'propositional' guises which 
represent, not surprisingly, propositions. 
Concepts denote the guises whose guise cores consist exclusively of the properties denoted 
by their intrinsic descriptions and d-links. 12 This ties in well with the idea of definitive 
entities being idealized intensional individuals having only the minimal number of properties 
consistent with their intrinsic description, and conversely the view that guises are 'things 
under a description', that is, things having focused on a subset of their properties. 13 
There is no direct role for consubstantiation (nor consociation) in this semantics, which 
might at first seem surprising, but consubstantiation is a matter of external predication - a 
matter of objective fact which is essentially inaccessible to a mind - and so we should not 
expect to see it in a representation of mental processing. 14 There is, however, an implicit 
idea of consubstantiation in the processing associated with DREP. As operations are 
performed on the network, d-links are both added and modified, which corresponds to the 
changing of properties in guise cores. In guise theory, if a guise core changes, then the guise 
corresponding to the resultant core is a different guise - it is not simply a modification of 
the old guise. The appropriate construal for these operations then, is that attention is being 
shifted from one guise to a (believed) consubstantiated (or consociated) guise, so that 
although the guise may have changed, we are still reasoning a.bout the same extensional (or 
fictional) entity. 
12 Note that only d-links up from the concept are considered here, that is, d-links which have the concept as 
a target. 
13 [Castaneda 77] p. 324 ff. 
14 It should be restated that this work is not an exercise in cognitive modelling, but it does involve a computational equivalent of mental processing, and the arguments in guise theory about direct 
apprehension of external predication carry through. 
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5.5.3 Summary 
DREP is a fully intensional semantic network capable of representing non-existent and 
impossible objects, and whose links represent analogies. These specifications militate against 
giving DREP a 'standard' set-theoretic or possible worlds semantics and point towards a 
Meinongian . semantics, as with SNePS. Guise theory is a well-developed, off-the-shelf 
Meinongian semantics that has been applied widely in explaining cognition. It turns out to 
be relatively easy to express the semantics of DREP in these terms. 
5.6 Representational idioms in DREP 
The examples processed by MINT require a fairly extensive range of semantic representation 
in DREP. Of course, there are many candidate ways of achieving these representations, and 
some sort of choice has to be made. Since it is not the object of this work to develop deep 
semantic models of the various phenomena that need to be handled, the representations used 
have been approximations chosen for their relative simplicity and consequent ease of 
implementation. Their use does not imply any commitment to any particular semantic theory 
or theories, and more to the point, the metaphorical theory underlying MINT processing 
does not rely on the use of these idioms. 
5.6.1 Nouns 
Nouns give rise to the simplest representations in DREP. Proper nouns are seen as indexing 
concepts directly, common nouns are seen as specifying d-links (i.e., analogies) to definitive 
concepts, and relational nouns are seen as specifying d-links to definitive concepts in 
definitive relationships (figure 23). 
man husband wife 
John t H 
John John Mary 
Figure 23: "John", "John is a man", "John and Mary are husband and wife" 
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5.6.2 Verbs 
Verbs, like relational nouns, are seen as specifying relationships between concepts. The 
occurrence of a verb leads to the setting up of a d-link from the concepts filling their 
various argument places, or thematic r6les, to the corresponding definitive concepts. In 
addition to these thematic r6les, there is an extra argument place and definitive concept 
corresponding to the event or state (or whatever) described by the verb. Two examples of 
this are shown in figure 24. There is no treatment of tense or time in the system as it stands, 
but in theory, temporal information could be associated with these event and state concepts. 
sleHp-pat kick-ev 
t 
stateS 1 John event58 
Figure 24: "Jolm sleeps", "Jolm kicked Mary" 
5.6.3 Adjectives 
Adjectives are seen as specifying states in much the same way as verbs can, and the d-link 
translation of an adjective predication looks very much like that of an intransitive verb 
(figure 25). 
evil-st evil-person 
H 
stateS-2 John 
emotional 
emotiRson 
state53 Sally 
Figure 25: "Jolm is evil", "Sally is emotional" 
Note that there is a strong degree of uniformity in all these representations, and indeed it 
would probably be more consistent to include a state concept in the d-links arising from 
nouns, as shown in figure . 26, where man-st is a definitive concept for 'the state of man 
being a man ' . This would be a way of recognizing that, say, manhood is not an eternal 
condition, but the earlier representation without states is retained for simplicity. 
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man-st man 
H 
state54 John 
Figure 26: An alternative representation of "John is a man" 
5.6.4 Event structure 
As explained above, the representational idioms for both verbs and adjectives make reference 
to events and states. It turns out to be useful in the examples processed by MINT to employ 
a very simple idea of event structure, where an 'event' is seen to lead to a ' consequent 
state', and conversely, a 'state ' is seen as resulting from an 'antecedent event' .15 
Figure 27 shows how these ideas are used in relating the event of breaking and the state of 
being broken. This connection of broken-st to break-ev means that whenever a d-link is 
constructed for either an event of breaking or a state of being broken, there is an implicit 
reference in the network to a corresponding consequent state or antecedent event 
respectively. These implicit references can be exploited by WNT in language processing. 
b,earat 
glass51 
event conseq t--~r 
break-ev broken-st 
t 
event510 
event conseq 
t--:r b,earat break-ev broken-st 
t 
vase51 state SS 
Figure 27: "John broke the glass", "The vase is broken" 
5.6.5 Prepositional phrases 
The range of examples tackled by MINT is greatly enhanced by the inclusion of a method 
of handling prepositional phrases in the input. These prepositional phrases are specified by 
the parser as attached to either a noun or an event, and are handled in Mlt,..,T'f by matchi ng 
15 This event structure can be viewed as a much simplified vers ion of that given in [Moens and Steedman 87]. There is no reason why a more sophisticated treatment could not be encoded in DREP, but the . existing event / consequent state treatment is adequate for ctuTent purposes. 
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them to d-links in the network in just the same way as other input forms. This matching 
process is described in detail in the next chapter, the important point here is that the key to 
matching is the presence of d-links which specify how prepositional arguments attach to 
events (figure 28). 
pp-anchor with pp-anchor t o 1or 
H t t t 
hi t- ag hi t -pat h it- ev hit- inst se ll -ag se ll -pat se l l -ev sel l-t o sell -for 
t t t t t t t t t M ary Joh n event S4 roll ing-p ins 1 John book s 1 events 11 Bill pounds 1 
Figure 28: Attaching prepositional arguments to events 
5.7 DREP as a knowledge representation 
In the preceding sections of this chapter, it has been stated that DREP is not intended to be 
a general knowledge representation and yet much of the knowledge it encodes has very 
much the appearance of that represented in other more conventional frame / semantic net 
formalisms . The difference is that DREP is designed to represent descriptional knowledge; 
the reasoning licensed by DREP is reasoning about descriptions and in general reasoning is 
not expected to be literally valid. The knowledge represented in DREP is therefore very 
close to lexical semantic knowledge, a sort of intuitive knowledge as reflected in the use of 
language, rather than objective knowledge derived by scientific study. This is in line with 
the approaches adopted in the T ACITUS system [Hobbs et al. 86], [Hobbs 87] and in 
Dahlgren's 'Naive Semantics' [Dahlgren et al. 89] . 
On the other hand, this lexical semantic knowledge is not totall y divorced from reality -
there would appear to be a good deal of overlap between this lexical knowledge and what is 
generally described · ~s ' commonsense knowledge '. This is apparent in the ' frame 
interpretation' of DREP outlined above and no doubt I have already been guilty of 
inaccurately paraphrasing the representational content of DREP as commonsense knowledge 
rather than descriptional knowledge. This laxi ty is likely to continue - forever saying 'can 
be described as' is rather more cumbersome than the concise 'is a', but the distinction is 
always present and should be born in mind. 
It is , then, meaningful to ask how DREP compares with conventional knowledge 
representation formalisms used in artificial inte ll igence in so far as they all represent 
'commonsense ' knowledge. 
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5.7.1 Representational power 
When considering the expressive power of DREP, it is useful to translate the representations 
into a logical formulation, an operation which is relatively straightforward. This is done as 
follows: 
Concepts translate directly as logical constants, for example John becomes John and man 
becomes man. Descriptions, on the other hand, translate as predications, so we have 
MAN (man) 
PERSON(person) 
KICK(kick-ag,kick-pat,kick-ev) 
HIT(hit-ag,hit-pat,hit-ev) 
EVIL(evil-person,evil-st) 
Notice that these are all intrinsic descriptions of definitive concepts. 
D-links can be translated as analogy predications, but since a d-link can have any width, and 
there is no order of the maps within a d-link, it is best to consider the DLNK predicate as 
operating on a set of ordered pairs, for example 
(12) DLNK({(man,person)}) 
(13) DLNK({(John,man)}) 
(14) DLNK ( {(kick-ev, hit-ev), (kick-ag, hit-ag), (kick-pat, hit-pat)}) 
These analogies license the inheritance of descriptions, so we are entitled to say, for 
example, 
MAN(John) 
PERSON(man) 
PERSON(John) 
HIT(kick-ag,kick-pat,kick-ev) 
This way of characterizing description inheritance in logical notation rapidly gets unwieldy, 
but a shortcut can be found by observing that because the descriptive predicate MAN, say, is 
fundamentally associated with the definitive concept man, if it is known that MAN ( x) is a 
valid description of x then there must be an analogical relationship between x and man 
(along a chain of d-links, or the logical equivalent): 
\::Ix MAN(x) => DLNK({(x,man)}) . 
Similar comments can be made for more complex descriptive predicates with more than one 
argument, so given KICK (x, y, e) we can assume 
DLNK ( { (x, kick- ag), (y, kick-pat), (e, kick-ev)}). 
With this observation, the d-links (12) and (14) above can be interpreted as follows: 
\::Ix MAN(x) => PERSON( x) 
\::/x,y,e KICK(x,y,e) => HIT(x,y,e) 
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To put (13) in this fonn, however, would entail inventing a predicate JOHN to be an 
inuinsic description of John: 
v'x JOHN( x ) => MAN(x) . 
This shorthand way of translating the knowledge represented in DREP into logical fonn is 
not truly representative, for example, it does not reflect the analogical mechanism very well 
(it does not acknowledge the r6le of definitive entities and the d-link mechanism is lost) and 
it depends on the existence of a descriptive predicate for each combination of entities. Th.is 
last point leads to a very uncomfortable proliferation of predicates - for example it would be 
necessary to have a predicate HIT-WITH-INSTRUMENT to include references to hit-inst. 
Also, the logical notation suggests an inappropriate extensional semantics, whereas what is 
required is an intensional semantics with logical constants denoting, say, guises. 
Nevertheless, the logical fonnulation is useful in testing the representational power of 
DREP. 
So far we have seen that knowledge of the fonn 
v'x P (X) => Q (X) 
(where x is a tuple of variables) can be represented using one d-link, as shown in figure 29 
where intrinsic descriptions are indicated on the diagram applying to the relevant concepts. 16 
HIT ( hit-ev hit-pat ) 
t t KICK ( kick-ev kick-ag kick-pat ) 
Figure 29: v'x P (x ) => Q (x ) 
From this it is easy to-see how to represent the conjunction of consequents (figure 30). 17 
And similarly it is easy to represent disjunction in the antecedent (figure 31). 
DREP can also express implications involving existential quantifiers in the consequent, 
though it must be born in mind that for DREP, existence does not mean real existence, but 
existence in a sort of Platonic universe of all imaginable (including impossible) things. An 
example of this is shown in figure 32 where concept evocation would be used to create the 
necessary concept during processing of a particular example of a grandparent - grandchild 
relationship. 
16 Of course lhere are no variables in DREP, lheir place is taken by representative (definitive) concepts . 
17 The vector notation x is retained, but it is not necessary for all variables to be used in all predications. 
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b, b2 ... bn c, C2 Cn female ancestor descendent 
--7 
"' 
/--;/ 
a, a2 an mother child 
Figure 30: \ix P (x) ~ Q (x) /\ R (x) 
c, C2 Cn ancestor descendent 
--~ 
/~ J /""-. ~ / X 
father child mother child 
a, a2 ... an b, b2 bn 
Figure 31: \ix P (x) v Q (x) ~ R (x) 
parent child 
/~"//~ 
grandparent z grandchild 
Figure32:\i.x,y GRANDPARENT(x,y) ~ (3z PARENT(x,z) /\ PARENT(z,y)) 
It is not, however, possible directly to represent disjunction in the consequent as in 
"\ix P (X) ~ Q (X) V R (X)" 
"\ix,y PARENT(x,y) ~ MOTHER(x,y) v FATHER(x,y)" 
and it is difficult to represent conjunction in the antecedent, 18 as in 
"\ix P (X) /\ Q (X) ~ R (X)" 
"\ix, y PARENT (x , y) /\ FEMALE (x) ~ MOTHER (x, y) ." 
Both of these involve going from more general to more specific descriptions, which is a 
general weakness of DREP per se, but is handled instead in MINT as part of the metaphor 
interpretation process. 
18 There is in fact a method of representing conjunctions in the antecedent which involves the use of 
. ' associated d-links ' which are not discussed until the next chapter. 
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Another logical inadequacy in DREP is that negation receives no treatment - it is not 
possible, for instance, to represent 
"'i/x MALE (x) => -,FEMALE (x) " 
however, the knowledge represented in DREP . is supposed to be close to natural language 
where negation is notoriously different from logical negation. Also, since DREP is intended 
to represent metaphorical as well as literal descriptions, it is probably as well to avoid the 
explicit denial of a description. 
These shortcomings are not of great consequence in the MINT system. For one thing, much 
can be done using the representational power available - this representational power is, for 
example, broadly equivalent to the power in Hiyan Alshawi's MEMORY formalism [Alshawi 83, 87], which has been used successfully in his own database knowledge 
acquisition task and also in a project to develop a transportable natural language front end 
for database systems [Copestake and Sparck Jones 89]. Secondly, MINT is a system 
intended to be a preprocessor to supply literal input to an application system where more 
powerful reasoning might be done using a different representation. 
5.7.2 Ontological promiscuity 
DREP conforms well to the idea of ontological promiscuity put forward by Jerry Hobbs [Hobbs 85] where he proposes a logical notation suitable for discourse processing (actually 
employed in the T ACITUS project [Hobbs et al. 86), [Hobbs 87]). He advocates two criteria 
for such a notation: 
Criterion I: The notation should be as close to English as possible ... Criterion II: The notation should be syntactically simple. 19 
Hobbs goes on to recommend "multiplying kinds of entities, by allowing as an entity 
everything that can be referred to by a noun phrase" which is very much the idea of 
c-entities and therefore DREP concepts. 
Hobbs's formalism, then, is a logical notation which shares many of the aims of DREP, and 
indeed looks roughly like the logical notation developed above. He too has event and state 
variables, intensional individuals, and impossible individuals. But with Hobbs's notation, in 
common with all logical formalisms, there would be significant problems when it came to 
implementing descriptional analogy. Firstly, the emphasis on individuals is lost and so 
analogies become hard to represent and use. Secondly, and consequently, there would be the 
proliferation of predicates as outlined above - Hobbs already has two versions of each 
predicate, one with and one without the event (or state) variable, and more would follow for 
19 [Hobbs 85) p. 61 
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different combinations of the arguments. 
5.7.3 Semantic networks 
DREP is more directly comparable to other semantic network formalisms, such as KRL 
[Bobrow and Winograd 77] , KL-ONE [Brachman and Schmolze 85], and KODIAK 
[Wilensky 87]. It would not be appropriate here to go into detailed comparisons of DREP 
with these general knowledge representation formalisms , as their aims are rather different. 
There are, however, notable areas of similarity and difference which can be pointed out in 
general terms: 
The knowledge represented 
DREP is intended to represent descriptional knowledge, whereas the other formalisms 
discussed here generally seek to represent more concrete 'absolute' knowledge. This, 
however, is less of a difference than it might appear at first sight: 
The primary concern of DREP is to represent how descriptions are inherited by one concept, 
or group of concepts, from another concept, or group of concepts. These descriptions may be 
'metaphorical', and so in general will not be mutually consistent, if taken literally. The other 
representations, on the other hand, are primarily concerned with properties and how they are 
inherited - these properties are generally taken to represent 'objective' knowledge and are 
expected to be mutually consistent.2() It would be possible to use DREP simply to represent 
property inheritance by equating descriptions with properties in the obvious way and banning 
all 'metaphorical' descriptions. DREP would still retain its analogical nature together with 
the concomitant advantages outlined below. 
Frames 
All these representations have a strong frame flavour to them, there is much talk of slot 
filling and role playing, and there is a strong idea of structured inheritance, that is, 
inheritance of relationships rather than simple lists of properties. Differences emerge, 
however, when considering the formal status of frames in the different representations; in 
general there has been a move away from the explicit recognition and handling of frames . 
In KRL and KL-ONE the principal nodes in the networks corresponded directly to frames 
and consequently have a great deal of internal structure, KRL having the richer set of 
20 The notion of consistency is considerably complicated when dealing with 'default' properties and non-
monotonic reasoning. See, for example, [Ginsberg 87] . Such issues are ignored here. 
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possibilities. KODIAK has a much weaker notion of frame in that its nodes have no internal 
structure, instead organizing nodes, 'owner' nodes, are related externally to other ' role' 
nodes representing their slots, so that the distinction between frames and slots becomes less 
visible, but it is there nonetheless. In DREP, by contrast, the notion of frame is completely 
implicit - all concepts have the same status, there is no owner concept and consequently no 
role-owner distinction. This is made possible by the use of definitive concepts which 
implicitly label the slots of implicit frames, as discussed earlier. 
This move away from the explicit representation of frames to a more implicit approach has 
major advantages in terms of the flexibility of the resulting system: (a) Adding more detail 
to the representation often involves adding slots to frames (in DREP it would be done by 
adding and widening d-links), this becomes a neater operation whose consequences need 
only be felt locally, as there is no need for changes to be made wherever the frame is 
mentioned. (b) An often cited criticism of frames has been that they have a tendency to 
become too large and monolithic - as more and more detail is represented, the number of 
slots in a frame increases rapidly making the frame itself cumbersome to handle. By not 
handling the frame as a unit, the extra details are hidden until they are required, a 
phenomenon that might be regarded as an of attitude of 'lazy evaluation'. (c) Incompleteness 
of knowledge in instances of a frame is handled more efficiently as it is simply ignored 
without the creation of large tracts of empty structure. 
Complexity 
Not unrelated to the movement away from a formal notion of frames is a decrease in 
complexity of the representations. KRL was enormously complex, being deliberately 
profligate in its provision of representational devices, which in the end saw KRL "collapsing 
perhaps under the weight of its own features". 21 KL-ONE attempted to rationalize much of 
this representational machinery, but still, with all the internal structure of its nodes, had a 
very large array of different node and link types with special meaning to the system. In both 
these cases, much of the complexity arose out of a desire to cater for all requirements and to 
provide efficient built-in mechanisms for processing certain types of information. Toe result 
in both cases is a rather inhomogeneous representation. KODIAK attempted to do away with 
most of this inhomogeneity by reducing the number of node and link types and getting 
closer to the spirit of natural language, which seems to have a very uniform way of 
representing things, and does not seem to map very precisely onto the built-in ideas of, say, 
'is a', 'and', 'or', and 'not' in artificial representations. But even KODIAK has a substantial 
complexity, particularly arising from its method of structured inheritance for frames, which 
21 [Brachman and Levesque 85] p. 263 
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makes knowledge represented in the network difficult to follow. 
Although it is not really fair to compare the complexity of DREP with those of the above 
representations, as DREP is markedly less ambitious in its representational aims, there have 
been significant savings in complexity as a result of the omission of explicit frame concepts 
and also with respect to instantiation as described below. 
Instantiation 
Instantiation is the area where DREP shows most difference from the more conventional 
semantic network representations mentioned above and this difference is a direct 
consequence of its semantics. Instantiation ('individuation' in KL-ONE) is the process of 
going from a generic individual to a specific individual - the Arc de Triomphe, for example, 
is an instance of the generic concept of an arch, and John is seen as an instance of the 
generic man. See, for example, [Brachman 83] . The process of instantiation is generally a 
source of complexity in semantic networks, for example in KL-ONE individuation leads to 
some duplication of representational machinery - one version for generic relationships and 
another for individuated relationships. In DREP, though, there is no notion of generic 
individual which has special meaning in the formalism - the role of the generic individual is 
typically played by a definitive concept, all concepts are deemed to be individuals and 
instead of links specifying that one is an instance of another links specify that one is 
analogous to another. 
Generic individuals can, of course, be represented in a way that is meaningful to the user of 
the network, but which has no significance to DREP; this is done by modelling the 
instantiation relationship as unexceptional knowledge. For example, it is possible to represent 
set membership (a popular interpretation of individuation used in semantic networks) by use 
of the definitive concepts set and member. A set is then seen as an individual and its 
members are seen as more individuals standing in the same relation to the set as member to 
set (figure 33). 
set member 
t t 
set-of-all -men John 
Figure 33: Representation of set membership 
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5.7.4 Summary 
DREP is a fully intensional semantic network formalism which, though not fully logically 
adequate, is capable of representing usefully a significant range of 'commonsense' 
knowledge in a way that is simple and homogeneous. This knowledge is principally to do 
with lexical semantics. DREP can be seen as carrying through a notable trend in semantic 
network formalisms, having achieved a marked simplification over its predecessors. This 
simplicity can be put down to the absence of a formal idea of domains or frames (although 
there is a strong implicit idea of frame) and critically to the use of definitive concepts to 
play the part conventionally played by generic individuals. 
5.8 The correspondence of d-links and descriptions 
Up till now, this chapter has described DREP as a semantic net formalism which is capable 
of representing homogeneously many types of knowledge. This section is intended to outline 
how this knowledge is thought of in the MINT system and how it is particularly suited to 
the representation and interpretation of metaphors. The key point is that d-links represent 
analogies, and by virtue of the Principle of Descriptional Analogy, these analogies can be 
seen to correspond to descriptions of their targets. 
This will be an important point to be born in mind when considering the major processing 
of MINT, and how it relates to the discussion in chapters 3 and 4 - the processing there was 
largely reasoning with descriptions, whereas the processing in MINT is achieved by 
reasoning with d-links. The correspondence between d-links and descriptions also underlies 
the representation of well-formedness conditions in MINT, namely the labelling of d-links as 
literal or metaphorical and the specification of argument restrictions. These issues too are 
outlined in this section. 
5.8.1 D-links correspond to descriptions of their targets 
A d-link represents an analogy, and so by the Principle of Descriptional Analogy it can also 
be seen as representing a description of its targets, namely the intrinsic description of its 
sources transformed by source replacement. For example, the intrinsic descriptions of the 
sources of the d-links in figure 34 are 
(15) ( RISE "rise-pat " "r ise-ev") and 
(16) (SEE "see-agll "see-pat" "see-ev"). 
These can be transformed into descriptions of the targets by source replacement: 
(17) (RISE "soar-pat" "soar-ev" ) and 
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(18) ( SEE "under stand-ag " "under stand-pat" "under stand-ev ") 
and these are the descriptions corresponding to the two d-links. 
Of course, there will not always be an intrinsic description of these sources given in the 
lexicon, but the idea can be carried through ,to all d-links by postulating for each 
combination of sources a description "S1 .. . Sn are related in such and such a way".21 
rist=--~rat 
soar -ev soar-pat 
(RISE "soar-pat • "soar-ev " ) (SEE "understand-ag • "understand - pat • "unders t and-ev") 
Figure 34 : d-links representing descriptions 
Literal and metaphorical d-links 
The first of the above descriptions, (17) , is deemed (by a notional dictionary) to be a literal 
description of the definitive concepts soar-pat and soar-ev, and so its d-link is labelled as 
'literal '. ( 18), on the other hand, is deemed to be a metaphorical description of 
"understand-ag " , " understand-pat", and "understand- ev", and so its d-link 
is labelled as 'metaphorical' (using the * notation). 
It is important to note that these classifications of literal and metaphorical are not necessarily 
rooted in ' objective' fact, rather they are judgements about the use of language - a different 
dictionary might give the d-links different labels. This literal / metaphorical label on d-links 
should be seen as a 'feature' value - it does not alter the fact that all d-links represent 
analogies, it is simply a comment attached to the analogy by the dictionary saying whether 
the corresponding description is deemed literal or metaphorical. In fact, in MINT processing, 
this feature of d-links is ignored except when judging the well-formedness of descriptions. 
Literal and metaphorical chains 
Chains of d-links can also be seen as corresponding to descriptions, since when composed 
they yield composite d-links which specify descriptions in j ust the same way as simple 
d-links. Unlike simple d-links, however, these chains are not explicitly marked as either 
22 This is not as ad hoe as it may at firs t appear: in practice, d-links only ever combine sources which are re lated in a straightforward way, since, under the frame interpretation, the sources of a d-link are always members of the same frame. The problem only arises when there is no direct linguistic way of expressing the relationship, as, for example, the relationship between rise-ev, rise-pat, and rise-pat-hi. 
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literal or metaphorical. Instead, their literal or metaphorical status can be deduced by 
considering the status of the component d-links - if these are all literal, then the composite 
d-link, and therefore the chain, is also literal. If, on the other hand, any one of the 
component d-links is marked as metaphorical, then the composite is also assumed to be 
metaphorical. 
This latter assumption is really erring on the side of caution: it is quite possible that the 
description represented by the chain would be regarded as literal by the dictionary; the point 
is that the chain by itself gives no evidence of literalness. Figure 35 shows examples of 
literal and metaphorical chains. 
'"T·~·· ''"'('' '""'r" 
1:e ... r _v ____ s_e ... ef-ag ____ se ...... r:t 
soa r-ev soar-pat 
underland-ev underland-ag unders/and-pat 
comprehend-ev comprehend-ag comprehend-pat 
Figure 35: Literal and metaphorical chains 
5.8.2 Well-formedness conditions 
Well-fonnedness, as defined in chapter 3, was a condition which could hold of a description. 
The criteria for well-fonnedness in that implementation-independent theory were determined 
in an unspecified manner by the system's dictionary; the technique used in MINT is to 
specify these conditions within the DREP network itself through the interaction of 'argument 
restrictions' and the literal / metaphorical labelling of d-links described above. In this way, it 
is possible for MINT to _judge whether an input description, or a new description generated 
internally, is well-formed. 
Argument restrictions 
The realization of well-formedness conditions in MINT depends on a development of the 
well established idea of 'argument restrictions·, or 'verb preferences' :23 for a predication to 
be well-formed, its arguments must be of a certain 'son'. For example, for the description 
(RISE II x 11 11 e 11 ) (roughly " 11 e II is the event of II x 11 's rising") to be well-formed, it is 
23 See, for example [Wilks 75]. 
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necessary for "x" to be a physical object and "e" to be an event.24 
Conventionally in natural language systems, sorts are specified in a separate 'sort hierarchy', 
but in DREP, this 'sort' hierarchy forms an integral part of the network, indistinguishable 
from any other type of knowledge represented. Instead of requiring that arguments be of a 
specified sort in some 'objective' sense, DREP requires that arguments be literally 
describable in specified ways. This confers an intuitively appealing consistency to the 
system in its rejection of the idea of 'objective' knowledge, and it enables sortal restrictions 
to be represented using d-lin.ks, in a way which is much more flexible than more 
conventional treaunents - any DREP concepts may be used to specify argument restrictions, 
and restrictions may involve relationships between arguments. It also has the major 
advantage, when it comes to processing, that if an argument is found to be only 
metaphorically describable in the way specified by an argument restriction, the analogy 
underlying that metaphor can be used for further interpretation of the original description 
whose well-formedness was being established. This offers the key to MINT's handling of 
extended and systematic metaphor described in the next chapter. 
I-links and p-links 
In DREP, the arguments of predicates, and so also argument restrictions, are associated with 
definitive concepts. The restrictions are represented by d-links which have the definitive 
concepts as targets, and are marked as being of type 'p' ('p' for 'preference'). Most, if not 
all, of the d-links encountered so far have been of type 'i ', and in future, when it is 
necessary to distinguish type 'i' and type 'p' d-links, they will be abbreviated to 'i-links' 
and 'p-links'. This type information should be regarded, like literalness, as a 'feature' 
attached to a d-link - p-links and i-links both represent analogies (and correspondingly 
descriptions), but are used slightly differently in processing.25 
Examples of p-links (dotted) representing the argument restrictions for RISE are shown in 
figure 36(a). Figure 36(a) also shows how these relate to the i-link representing (RISE 
"balloon51 " "event53") . Composing the two chains (one for each p-link) yields two 
composite p-links26 which specify the conditions required of balloon51 and event53 (figure 
36(b)). 
These composite p-links are used as templates for (complete) matching operations; if 
matching literal chains can be found, the original i-link is judged well-formed, (along with 
24 The restriction on "x" could be made tighter, perhaps a mobile physical object, but a plain physical object 
will do as a first approximation. 
25 One of the main differences is that p-links are 'invisible' to matching operations. 
26 A chain involving a p-link yields a composite p-link when composed. 
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Figure 36: p-links specifying argument restrictions 
the corresponding description), otherwise it is judged metaphoricaU7 
The evaluation of (RISE "balloon51" "event53") as well-formed is shown in part 
(c) of the figure . The matching chains of literal i-links are emphasized; one is a direct link 
from event53 to event and the other is a chain linking balloon51 to physob via balloon. 
In descriptional terms, the two p-links specify that (RISE "balloon51" "event53") 
is well-formed if (PHYSOB "balloon51") and (EVENT "event53") are knO'Nn 
literal descriptions. The matching operation reveals literal chains corresponding to just these 
descriptions, so the original description is indeed judged well-formed and the i-link marked 
as literal.211 
This is the most basic form of argument restriction, more complex forms are possible using 
wider p-links and these are of great importance in metaphorical interpretation, as hinted at 
earlier. This is perhaps most easily seen by considering the frame interpretation of DREP: 
rise-ev and rise-pat label slots in the 'rising' frame, and p-links specify well-formedness 
conditions for an instance of that frame, i.e., the filler of the rise-ev slot should be an event 
and the filler of the rise-pat slot should be a physical object. Now, the rising frame has 
more than just two slots, there is, for example, a third called rise-pat-ht which is to be 
filled by the height (in the sense of altitude, rather than tallness) of the fille r of the rise-pat 
slot. An additional well-formedness condition on an instance of the rising frame is that the 
fillers of the rise-pat · and rise-pat-ht slots should be related as a physical object to its 
height. 29 This complex well-formedness condition is easily represented in DREP by a width 
two p-link as shown in figure 37. For clarity, the p-link up from rise-ev has been omined, 
and it should be noticed that the original well-fonnedness condition on rise-pat has been 
Recall the working assumption that ill-formedness is due only to metaphor. 
211 The apparent discrepancy between well-formedness and literalness here is due to the fact that at any given 
time the network represents a particular inlerpretaJion of an input. Well-formedness is actually judged 
relative to this interpretation, and so if a description is judged well-formed with resect to this 
interpretation. it can be regarded as intended literally in this interpretaJu:m. This point is dealt with further 
in the next chapter. 
29 Such complex argument restrictions would appear relatively rarely in English predications, as they require 
a certain redundancy in the expression, but an example might be "John gnashed his teeth", where there is 
a requjrernent that the agent and patient of this expression be related as a man to his teeth. It is , however, 
~asy to come up with examples in artificial languages such as logical form, or frames . 
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subsumed by the new, wider p-link. 30 
increasHe-ev increase-pat . ~eight . p~ysob 
•····· ···· ·· ····· • . . 
riTev rise-pat'ht ristpat 
event53 balloon51 
Figure 37: Complex well-formedness conditions 
These wide p-links are used crucially in MINT to direct processing: continuing with the 
frame interpretation, input utterances lead to instances of frames which have only a limited 
number of their slots filled. Using p-links which specify how slot fillers are related to each 
other, it is possible to flesh out these initial frames by filling more of their slots, in a sort of 
reference resolution process. P-links are similarly used in definite reference resolution. These 
mechanisms are discussed fully in the next chapter. 
5.9 Summary 
This chapter has been an outline of the DREP knowledge representation formalism, which 
has been specifically designed to cater for the needs of descriptional analogy and which 
forms the heart of the MINT system. 
Noteworthy features of DREP are: 
(1) DREP is a fully intensional, homogeneous semantic network. It can be given a natural 
intensional semantic~ in terms of guise theory. 
(2) There is just one sort of node, called a 'concept ', which represents intensional 
individuals, i.e., the c-entities of descriptional analogy. 
(3) Some concepts (those corresponding to definitive entities) are associated directly with 
the lexicon, and this constitutes the interface between DREP and the 'outside world'. 
(4) There is just one basic sort of link, the 'd-link' , which is used to represent analogies 
between c-entities. 
30 It should also be noticed that the piece of network shown in fig ure 37 encodes the dictionary-like knowledge that rising implies an increase in height 
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(5) Basic operations on DREP structures are composition of chains, widening of d-links, 
and matching of templates. 
(6) DREP is intended to represent descriptional knowledge and description inheritance, but 
could equally well be used to represent conventional properties and property inheritance 
while retaining its analogical semantics. 
(7) Because of the interpretation of d-links as specifying analogies between individuals, 
there is no need to have ' instantiation' links. This results in significant simplification 
over other semantic network formalisms. 
(8) DREP supports multiple perspectives. 
(9) There is no formal notion of domain in DREP, but there is an implicit, and very 
flexible, notion of frame: concepts can be seen as labelling the slots of frames. 
(10) The knowledge represented in DREP is intended to be broad and shallow: it is intended 
to represent descriptional knowledge, in other words, lexical semantics extended to 
cover metaphor. 
(11) There is no essential difference made between ' literal' and 'metaphorical' knowledge -
all knowledge is represented in the form of analogies. 
(12) DREP is ideally suited for descriptional analogy as analogies are represented in a way 
that is both natural and cheap. This is why it is used in preference to existing 
formalisms, and in particular, logical form. 
(13) The analogies of DREP can be seen to correspond to descriptions of their targets. 
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6. MINT 
This chapter describes the MINT system, a Lisp system capable of metaphorical 
interpretation using the principles of descriptional analogy and having at its heart the DREP 
semantic network. 
Overview 
6.1 is a general overview of the MINT system. 6.2 describes the logical form used as input 
to MINT, how it is converted to DREP structures, and how initial reference resolution is 
done. 6.3 describes the main process of 'redescription'. 6.4 shows how redescription is used 
to interpret metaphors by abstraction and metaphorical reference resolution. 6.4 describes the 
process of • construal', which effects generalized metaphorical reference resolution. 6.5 
covers the last of MINT's three major interpretive processes - 'consolidation' . 6.6 describes 
how MINT handles multiple interpretations of input utterances. Finally, 6.7 describes 
MINT's overall control mechanism and gives a detailed example of metaphor interpretation. 
6.1 Overview of MINT 
The MINT system described in this thesis and implemented as a computer program in 
Common Lisp is not a complete system in itself. Figure 38 shows an overall view of how 
MINT is envisaged in its r6le as a component of a more comprehensive natural language 
processing system. 
The figure shows the system divided into three major components as follows. Firstly there is 
a simple 'muve' parser which takes English utterances and converts them into logical form 
with minimal semantic processing. Metaphorical utterances are taken at face value, 
producing, in general; semantically ill-formed logical translations. Secondly there is a pre-
processing component which takes nai"ve logical forms from the parser and attempts to 
interpret them by performing reference resolution, and by prodµcing a literal paraphrase (in 
logical form) which will be meaningful to the third and final component: the application. 
This application might be, for example, a data,base front end, or an expert system. 
As an example of this line of processing consider the following simplified example 
"Inflation is rising". The narve parser would produce a face-value translation of this as the 
logical form 1 
. This ·logical notation is described fully in due course. 
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Figure 38: MINT in a Natural Language Processing system 
(1) (RISE "inflation" "sk-1") (EVENT "sk-1"). 
Given the assumption that the 'core' literal sense of RISE is physical rising of physical objects, the output of the parser would be . meaningless to an application which has knowledge only of core senses. It is MINT's task to transfonn this input into a paraphrase which is meaningful to the application, namely 
(2) (INCREASE "inflation" "eventO" ) (EVENT " e ven t O" ). 
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This logical paraphrase would then be used by the application for its own ends. 
The pre-processor is shown in the figure as being divided into two components: MINT and 
the Acceptance Component. The function of the Acceptance component is twofold. Firstly, it 
decides between competing interpretations thrown up by MINT, on pragmatic and deep 
semantic grounds. Secondly, it acts as a deep semantic filter on the chosen paraphrase by 
rejecting portions of the paraphrase at odds with the Acceptance Component's deeper 
knowledge of the subject area in hand. This second role of the Acceptance Component is 
required because of MINT's assumed broad and shallow knowledge base - MINT has to 
cope with metaphors which might have sources in many domains, whereas the Acceptance 
Component could be a great deal more specialized. Given this specialized knowledge, MINT 
could achieve the semantic filtering functions internally. 
In this project, the presence of the parser and the acceptance mechanism are simulated. 
Implementing the parser could be done using existing technology (in fact the logical form 
was modelled on the output from an existing parser), but the acceptance mechanism with its 
deep semantic and pragmatic processing is beyond the current state of the art. 
This breakdown of processing has been devised to enable MINT to operate as a realistic, 
manageably sized, and self-contained component of the whole system. There would of 
course be advantages in a greater integration of all the components, such as in the sharing of 
knowledge bases, but the illustrated structure allows attention to be focused on the business 
of producing literal paraphrases from metaphorical inputs. 
6.1.1 The internal structure of MINT 
Figure 39 shows a schematic expansion of the box labelled: MINT in figure 38. The various 
functional components of this diagram are described briefly here and in greater depth in 
subsequent sections of this chapter. As can be seen, all these stages of processing involve 
reference to and manipulation of ' the network', which encodes both background knowledge 
(commonsense and dictionary-like knowledge) and input knowledge. 
Network building 
The principal input to MINT is a nai've logical fonn representation of the input utterance. 
This input is firstly converted into a number of concepts and d-links by reference to a 
simple lexicon containing translation rules for each logical predicate. 2 The DREP structures 
2 The 'lexicon' contains only rules for translating logical forms into DREP structures. The semantic definitions of words (predicates), and the well-fonnedness criteria alluded to in chapter 3 are stored in the 
network. 
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generated by this phase of processing are immediately incorporated into the network. 
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Reference resolution 
The next phase considers these new DREP structures and perfonns simple reference 
resolution by matching definite descriptions of entities against descriptions of previously 
encountered discourse referents, as they are represented in the network.3 Reference resolution 
is achieved in a number of stages, roughly according to the complexity of the reference -
for example the DREP representation of "the man" is resolved before relational referents 
such as "the man's mother". Indeed, the most complex reference resolution is achieved as a 
by-product of the next phase of processing - descriptional analogy processing. This is 
unsurprising, as both phases involve processing descriptions of entities. 
Descriptional analogy processing 
The output from reference resolution is a single 'sentence i-link' , which links resolved 
references (and newly created concepts corresponding to the indefinite entities in the input) 
to the rest of the network. This sentence d-link is then used as the initial item on an agenda 
of chains to be considered in the next and principal phase of processing. 
Each chain on this agenda is considered as representing a description of its target entities, 
and is matched against the rest of the network in an attempt to detect and interpret the use 
of metaphorical descriptions using the three basic techniques of 'redescription', 
'consolidation', and 'construal'. This procedure continues recursively until the agenda is 
exhausted. 
If during one of the matching operations more than one match is found, then processing 
branches, each branch corresponding to a different interpretation of the input. What is judged 
heuristically to be the most likely branch is pursued first, until a satisfactory set of literal 
descriptions is reached. The result is an 'interpretation' structure, which is passed to the 
(simulated) Acceptance Component after translation back to logical fonn. If the 
interpretation is accepted, processing ceases. If not, processing backtracks to follow an 
alternative branch, corresponding to an alternative interpretation. 
Logical form generation 
The output of the descriptional analogy processing phase is an interpretation structure, which 
is principally a list of d-links corresponding to descriptions of the entities mentioned in the 
input. These descriptions are filtered to pick out those that are literal according to the 
Actually, it is not necessary for definite entities to be discourse referents (entities that have cropped up in 
previous input) - it is enough that they should be identifiable. 
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interpretation, and converted into literal logical form notation in a straightforward reversal of 
the network building operation at the start of MINT's processing. 
The overall operation of MINT, then, is to generate many descriptions of the input concepts, 
passing on those which it judges to be literal with respect to a particular interpretation, thus fanning a literal paraphrase of the input utterance. 
6.2 Network building and reference resolution 
This section describes how input nai"ve logical fonns are converted by MINT into their 
DREP representations. But first, it is necessary to give a brief description of the nature of 
this logical form. 
6.2.1 Logical form 
The logical form notation delivered by the notional parser to MINT is a fairly 
straightforward and standard representation of English, and is not so different from (although 
much simpler than), for example, the intermediate logical forms handled in SRI's Core 
Language Engine [Alshawi et al. 89], particularly in regard to the treatment of event and 
state variables and definiteness. One outstanding difference though, is that the nai've logical form used as input to MINT does not distinguish between polysemous word senses - it is 
very uncritical in that minimal semantic considerations are seen as having been applied during the parsing process, and as a result the metaphorical use of English words is preserved as either semantically ill-formed predications or well·formed predications not intended literally. It is MINT's task to perform the disambiguation of metaphorical word 
senses. 4 This logical form is capable of representing simple declarative sentences, including 
simple adjectives, adverbs, and prepositions, but tense is ignored. 
The logical forms use.d by MINT, both nai"ve and literal, are written as Li sp lists; predicates 
are written as Lisp atoms, constants are written as strings, and predications are written as lists, with the predicate and arguments within parentheses, as, for example, in (TALL 
"John" ) . 
There are no variables in this notation: the logical forms are seen as having been 
skolemized, that is, existentially quantified variables have been replaced by skolem constants, 
typically written " sk-N". For example, "a poem" is rendered as (POEM "sk-1 "), rather 
than 3x ( POEM x ) . Universally quantified variables are not considered. 
4 In accordance with the simplifying assumptions made in this work, word senses arising by mechanisms other ·than metaphor or abstraction are not considered. 
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The simplest logical fonn representation is accorded to proper nouns, which are rendered as logical constants. "John", for example becomes "John". A similar treatment is given for 
mass nouns and bare plurals, so "eggs" becomes "eggs" and "water" becomes "water" . 
Common nouns, as has already been seen, are represented as predications, as are predicate 
nominals. For example, "John is a man" is represented as 
(3) (MAN "John"). 
The situation is a little more complicated for relational nouns, where the higher order predicate OF is used. For example, "the price of eggs" and "John's mother" are rendered as 
(4) 
(5) 
(OF "sk-2" "eggs" PRICE) (OF "sk-3" "John" MOTHER) 
(PRICE "sk-2") 
(MOTHER "sk-3") 
where "sk-2" and "sk-3" are suitable skolem constants, and there is implicit conjunction between predications. The second conjunct in each of these is perhaps redundant, but they 
are there to represent explicitly that "" sk-2" is a price" and "" sk-3" is a mother", both 
of which are only implicit in the first conjuncts.5 
Adjectives and verbs both give rise to predications involving state or event variables (following Davidson [Davidson 67]): "John sleeps", "John is tall", and "John hit Mary" are 
represented as 
(6) (SLEEP "John" "sk-4") (STATE "sk-4") (7) (TALL "John" "sk-5") (STATE "sk-5") (8) (HIT "John" "Mary" "sk-6") (EVENT "sk-6") 
Note the convention that event and state variables appear in the final argument place. 
These event and state variables could be used as a handle on predications allowing the 
representation of tense information, but this is not done in this project. They are, however, 
used to attach adverbs, for example "John slept fitfully" 
(9) (SLEEP "John" "sk-4") (STATE "sk-4") (FITFUL "sk-4") 
and also prepositional arguments; for example, "Mary hit John with a rolling pin" is 
translated as 
(10) (HIT "Mary" "John" "sk-7") (EVENT "sk-7") (ROLLING-PIN "sk-8") (WITH "sk-8" "sk-7") 
This attachment of prepositional arguments via event variables is imperfect and should not be regarded as a theoretical commitment - it is simply a convenient way of handling such 
arguments. 
This apparent redundancy is inherited from the parser on which this was modelled. 
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There is an inherent problem in logical form in that predicates require fixed numbers of 
arguments, this problem manifests itself when verbs can be used with variable numbers of 
objects, i.e., ditransitively, transitively, or intransitively. One solution would be to create two 
versions of a predicate with differing numbers of arguments, but the solution adopted in 
MINT's logical form is to use dummy argument fillers. For example, "Bill paid a pound" 
and "Bill paid John a pound" are represented as follows: 
(11) (PAY "Bill " = durmny= "sk-9" "sk-10") (EVENT "sk-10 ") (POUND "sk-9 " ) 
(12) (PAY "B i ll" "John" "sk-1 1 " "sk-12") (EVENT "sk-12") (POUND "sk-11") 
A similar situation arises during passivization, where the subject of the active sentence is 
omitted in the passive form. These dummy arguments are discarded on translation into 
DREP structures. 
Definiteness and indefiniteness 
So far no distinction has been made between indefinite expressions and definite expressions, 
for example, the distinction between "a man" and "the man". In MINT, this distinction is 
seen as one between known and unknown predications (although this knowledge need only 
be implicit). Hence the logical form is split into two parts, one labelled as indefinite, which 
conveys new6 information, and the other labelled as definite, which conveys known or 
accessible information. For example, "a man" and "the man" both translate as (MAN "sk-
13"), but in the former case the predicate is labelled as indefinite, whereas in the latter it is 
labelled as definite. This treatment is not unlike, for example, the use of a-term in the 
Core Language Engine [Alshawi et al. 89] (the main difference being that here, logical 
forms are skolemized). 
The motivation behind this labelling of predications, rather than entities, is that only a 
certain subset of the <!ttributes of entities in an utterance are assumed to be known. Consider, 
for example 
(13) The man snored. 
Here there is mention of two entities, the man and the event of his snoring. The fact that the 
former is a man is known information, and the fact that he snored is new information. In 
MINT's nai've logical form, (13) is represented as 
6 The use of the word 'new' here should not be confused with the somewhat misleading psychological term 'new' meaning roughly 'not uppermost in the hearer's mind'. See for example [Chafe 76) . 
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(14) definite: .(MAN "sk-13") 
indefinite: (SNORE "sk-13" "sk-14") (EVENT "sk-14") 
which is to be contrasted with the representation of the sentence 
(15) A man snored, 
namely, 
(16) definite: 
indefinite: (SNORE "sk-13" "sk-14") (MAN "sk-13") (EVENT "sk-14") 
The fact that " sk-13 " appears within a definite predication in (14) is what tells the 
reference resolution component to attempt to identify it with an entity already encountered, 
and because (MAN " sk-13") is labelled as definite, this description is used to find the 
correct referent. The forms labelled as indefinite are assumed to be new information and so 
not matched against the existing network, for example, it is not expected that ( SNORE 
"sk-13" "sk-14") would play any part in identifying the referent of "sk-13" . Entities 
mentioned only in indefinite predications, such as the referent of "s k-14 ", are asswned 
new and so new discourse entities (with more mnemonic names) are created for them. 
This is only a sketch of the reference resolution process, more detail is given later in this 
section. 
More complex definite descriptions can also be accommodated in this scheme, for example, 
(17) The man's mother died (18) The rabbit in the hat is white 
are represented as follows: 
definite: (OF "sk- 15" "sk-16" MOTHER) (MOTHER " sk-15 " ) (MAN "sk-16") indefinite: (DIE " sk-15" "sk-17") (EVENT " sk- 17") 
definite: (RABBIT "sk-18 ;' ) (HAT " sk-19 " ) (IN " sk-18 " " sk-19 " ) indefini te: (WHITE " sk - 19 " " s k- 20 " ) (STATE " sk- 20 ") 
Two points come out in these latest examples. The first is that referents of definite descriptions are not necessarily discourse entities, i.e., entities that have been encountered in previous input - the man's mother need not be a previously encountered discourse entity, it is enough that the man is. 7 The second point is that referents need not be unique under all of 
7 lb.is is in agreement with Chafe' s view of definiteness - that definite descriptions indicate identifiable entities, not just discourse entities [Chafe 76] . 
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their descriptions (there may be more than one rabbit and more than one hat, resolution 
should work as long as there is only one rabbit that is in a hat). 
6.2.2 Translation to network structures 
MINT's first step in processing its logical form input is to translate it into DREP notation. This translation is achieved by taking each conjunct in tum and comparing it with entries for its predicate in the system's lexicon. Each of these entries takes the form of a rule whose left hand side unifies8 with a predication, and whose right hand side uses the results of the 
unification to specify a corresponding d-link. 
A simple example of such a rule would be that for the predicate MAN shown in figure 40, 
together with an example of its use. Here (MAN "sk-1") unifies with (MAN ?x) (with 
the variable ?x being bound to "sk-1"); the variable binding is then used in the generation 
of the width one d-link, where it has been coerced into a DREP concept of the same name. 
man 
(MAN ?x) ~ t 
?x 
(a) rule for MAN 
(MAN "sk-1") 
(b) example for MAN 
Figure 40: Translation rule for MAN 
man 
t 
sk- 1 
A more complex example would be the rule for KICK as shown in figure 41. Note that the 
variables used are given mnemonic names, but a similar disclaimer to that for concept 
naming must be given: ? subj does not necessarily correspond to the subject of the English 
sentence input (it would not be the case if, for example, the original sentence had been in 
the passive voice). These variable names, like concept names, are generated semi-
automatically and are of no significance in processing. 
The unification mechanism is exploited to the full in the case of OF, where many transl ation 
rules are given. Given a particular input predication, only one of these rules will actuall y 
unify with it. Two such rules for OF are shown in figure 42 . 
See for example [Chamiak et al. 80]. 
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(a) rule for KICK kick-ev kick-ag kick-pat 
(KICK ?subj ?obj ?ev) ~ t t t ?ev ?subj ?obj 
(b) example for KICK 
kick-ev 
--t kicr (KICK "John" "Mar y" "sk-2") 
sk-2 John 
Figure 41: Translation rule for KICK 
mother chi ld 
(OF ?prop ?owner MOTHER) H 
?prop ?owner 
(OF ?prop ?owner PRICE) 
p,Hodity 
?prop ?owner 
Figure 42: Translation rules for OF 
Dummy arguments 
It was seen above how some predications involved dummy argument fillers where, for 
example, the subject of a predicate was missing as a result of passivization or an object was 
missing where a verb was used intransitively. These dummy arguments give rise to maps 
with dummy targets during translation, and such maps are r~moved before any further 
processing occurs (to avoid possible conflict with the correct filler of that argument). Figure 
43 shows this dummy map removal for the translation of "John was hit". 
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(a) rule for KICK kick-ev kick-ag kick-pat 
(KICK ?subj ?obj ?ev) ~ t t t 
?ev ?subj ?obj 
(b) example for KICK 
kick-ev 
(KICK "John" "Mary" "sk-2") 
-t 
sk-2 
Figure 41: Translation rule for KICK 
mother chi ld 
(OF ?prop ?owner MOTHER) 
-H 
?prop 'owner 
(OF ?prop ?owner PRICE) 
Figure 42: Translation rules for OF 
Dummy arguments 
It was seen above how some predications involved dummy argument fillers where, for 
example, the subject of a ·predicate was missing as a result of passivization or an object was 
missing where a verb was used intransitively. These dummy arguments give rise to maps 
with dummy targets during translation, and such maps are rem,oved before any further 
processing occurs (to avoid possible conflict with the correct filler of that argument). Figure 
43 shows this dummy map removal for the translation of "John was hit". 
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hit •-ev ___ h-il;t .... -a-g---h-rt 
sk-3 =dummy= John 
Figure 43 : Dummy map removal 
Amalgamation of d-Iinks 
The result of applying these translation rules, then, is a collection of d-links. It is possible 
that there is some duplication of information in these d-links, and this is removed by 
'amalgamating ' those d-links which 'overlap' (those that have maps in common). This 
situation tends to arise with OF predications and with multiple prepositional attachment. 
Figure 44 shows the results of amalgamation after translation of the following predications: 
(the common maps are emphasized) 
(19) John's mother: 
(OF "sk-3" "John" MOTHER ) (MOTHER sk-3") 
(20) John gave a pound to Bill for a book: 
(a) 
(b) 
(GIVE "John" "=dummy=" "sk-4" "sk-5") 
(EVENT "sk-5" ) (POUND "sk-4") (BOOK "sk-6") 
(TO "Bill" "sk-5") (FOR "sk-6" "sk-5") 
T chi ld t mother ch il d H 
_sk-4 John sk-4 John 
~-r John sk-6 Bill 
gir·ev--gi-ve .. f-g--g-iv-.Ta/und pp-rchor 
sk-6 sk-6 John sk -5 
t o 
t 
Bill 
Figure 44: Amalgamation of d-links 
6.2.3 Indefinite YS. defi nite predications 
for book 
t/ 
sk- 7 
Both indefinite and definite predications are translated as d-links as outlined above, but the 
d-links arising from definite predications are marked as being of type 'p' (p-links). Indefinite 
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predications result in type 'i' d-links (i-links). The different ways in which these are used in 
reference resolution are discussed later in this chapter. This use of i-links and p-links fits in 
with the philosophy underlying their use for representing (complex) argument restrictions -
i-links represent novel information, whereas p-links represent known information, i.e., 
information to be matched against the rest of the network - this is exactly the distinction 
made between indefinite and definite predications. 
An example of the use of i-links and p-links in the representation of input unerances is 
shown in figure 45, where p-links, as before, are dotted. This is the d-link representation of 
(21) The man's mother died, 
which has the logical form: 
indefinite: (DIE "sk-15" "sk-17") (EVENT "sk-17") 
definite: (OF "sk-15" "sk-16" MOTHER) 
(MOTHER "sk-15") (MAN "sk-16") 
mother child man 
•· ...... . . . ····~ .. 
Figure 45: "The man's mother died" 
6.2.4 Reference resolution 
MINT has a basic ability to resolve references in its input, an ability which is sufficient to 
cope with a 'discourse' consisting of a few sentences. The resolution process will not be 
described in any detail here, apart from two features of interest: its methods of dealing with 
metaphorical and relational references. 
The input to the reference resolution component of the MINT system is a collection of 
i-links and p-links, the former corresponding to indefinite pr\!dications and the latter to 
definite predications. The overall action of reference resol ution is to set up a 'sentence 
i-link' which has the concepts mentioned in the input d-links as sources and their resolved 
referent concepts as corresponding targets. New concepts with unique mnemonic names are 
created to serve as the referents of indefinite entities. 
Figure 46 shows the sentence i-link (emphasized) arising from the input 
(22) The red balloon is rising 
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II' 
II' 1 1 
I 
whose logical form is 
indefinite: (RISE 11 sk-l 11 11 sk-2 11 ) (EVENT 11 sk-2 11 ) 
definite: (BALLOON 11 sk-l 11 ) (RED 11 sk-l 11 11 sk-3 11 ) 
(STATE II sk-3 11 ) 
Here, the definite entities II s k-1 11 and II s k- 3" have been resolved by looking in the 
network for discourse entities (concepts previously used in the current discourse) which can 
be described in the appropriate ways (i.e., which are the targets of chains to the source 
concepts indicated by the p-links). A new concept, event616, has been created to be the 
referent of the indefinite entity II sk-2 11 • 
P-links used successfully in the identification of definite referents are deleted from the 
network, as they have no further part to play in processing. 
T 
event rise·ev rise-pat balloon red:thing re d-st state 
~ t ~ • •... • . . ~ 
sk-2 sk- 1 sk-3 
event616 balloon61 state64 
(a) inpuld-links (b) output cl-links 
Figure 46: Reference resolution 
Non-anaphoric descriptions 
It is not always possible to find suitable referents among discourse entities, and in such 
cases 'unused' p-links are left in the network, where they are used in subsequent processing 
in the same way as other relational p-links, as described later. 
An example of this son of unused p-link occurs in the processing of 
(23) The price of gold is rising 
which is shown in figu re 47.9 
'Proper' concepts in both i-links and p-links, i.e., concepts like John, go ld, and eggs. are replaced to fit into this resolution scheme. This is as if instead of "gold" etc. appearing in the input, a skolem constant 
"goldO" .were used along with a definite predication (GOLD "goldO"), a notation that would perhaps be more consistent. 
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event rise-ev rise-pat price commod ity 
~-t -~ •····· ·• 
sk-2 sk-1 gold 
eve~sHpat • · price ······c:mmodity 
sk-2 sk-1 
t 
event617 
(a) inputd-links (b) output cl-l inks 
Figure 47: Partial reference resolution 
Metaphorical descriptions 
The process of matching descriptions is done by matching the p-links in the input against 
the existing network, and there is nothing to prevent metaphorical matches being found. 
Thus, for example, John could be identified as the referent of 'the monster' if he had 
previously been described as an ogre, and an event of criticism could successfully be 
referred to metaphorically as 'the attack'. 
Summary 
MINT's first phase of processing takes its input as nai've logical fonn and translates it into 
DREP notation by looking up translation rules for each predicate in its lexicon. The final 
fonn is a collection of d-links which have been stripped of dummy maps and have 
redundancy removed by amalgamation. Indefinite logical forms are translated to i-links and 
definite forms to p-links. 
These d-links are used as input to the reference resolution phase of processing, which 
resolves the simpler definite references and renames indefinite entities with unique 
mnemonic names, so as to avoid name clashes with future inputs. These resolutions are 
encoded in a single 'se!}tence' i-link. More complex definite references are resolved as a by-
product of the main descriptional analogy processing, which is presented in the next few 
sections. 
6.3 Redescription 
We now tum to the main processing in MINT, where metaphorical interpretation is actually 
achieved. The next few sections describe the principal methods used in descriptional analogy 
processing; how they are combined in the overall control structure is described in later 
sections. This first section presents the process of ' redescri ption ' . 
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6.3.1 Redescription 
In the rough outline of processing given in chapter 3, much was made of the idea of 
redescribing target entities until a description was found which could either be taken at face 
value, as an ' abstraction' , or was susceptible to recursive metaphorical interpretation. In 
MINT, this redescription operation is realized as the generation of new i-links by successive 
composition of chains of existing i-links. 
Consider the fragment of network shown in figure 48. This fragm ent is a · chain of length 
three up from the concepts event65 and balloon61. Successive composition of subchains 
yields the three composite i-links shown on the right,10 each of which corresponds to a 
description of its target entities, as indicated. In this way it is possible to build up a 
succession of such descriptions, typically in progressively more general tenns. 
movR-pat 
ri1Hpat 
1oaRat 
event65 balloon61 
1oaRat 
event65 balloon61 
(SOAR "b61" "ev65") 
''"HP" 
event65 balloon61 
(RISE "b6l" "ev65" ) 
movR·pat 
event65 balloon61 
(MOVE "b6l" "ev65") 
successive compositions and corresponding redescriptions 
Figure 48: Redescription by successive composition 
A more complex example involving a branching structure is shown in figure 49. In this case, 
the composite i-links have been omitted and the successive descriptions drawn in a tree 
structure to indicate their derivation. 11 
6.3.2 Richer redescription 
The process of redescription outlined above is rather restricted in that it will never introduce 
more target entities into its descriptions, since composite i-links can never have more targets 
than their parent chain. A much richer variety of redescriptions is allowed through the use of 
wide p-links to specify how definitive entities in a frame are related. These related entities 
can then be 'drawn into' the redescription process. As explained at the end of the last 
chapter, the use of p-links here can be seen as an extension of their use in specifying 
10 The first of these is the trivial case of composing a chain of length one. 
11 In ac.tual MINT processing. such a chain would start with the sentence i-link. This is omitted here for 
. simplicity. 
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\OUr·eV \OUr·ag \OUr·pa\ 
(TOUCH "Mary" "Dick" "event66" ) 
t t t 
(HIT "Mary• "Dick• •event66"} 
~ ~IDE "Mary• "Dick" 
(SMAC K "Mary• "Dick" "event 66 ") 
"··~·v·/'···:,7,·· 
X 7 
smack -ev smack-a.g smack-pat 
•event66") 
event66 Mary Dick 
successive descriptions 
Figure 49: Branching redescription 
argument restrictions, these relationships can be seen as complex argument restrictions 
specifying required relationships between (in the frame interpretation) the fillers of slots in 
the same frame. 
Consider again the i-link corresponding to (RISE "balloon61" "event 67"). Figure 
50(a) shows this i-link in a chain whose top element is a p-link relating rise-pat-ht to rise-
pat. 
The presence of this p-link directs 11INT to widen the i-link to include a concept 
corresponding to the height of balloon61 among its targets. The required concept is found 
by composing the chain to fonn a template and matching this template against the rest of 
the network, as shown in figure 50(a). 
The match shows which concept corresponds to the height of balloon61, and this can be 
used to widen the original i-link, thereby increasing the number of target concepts available 
to redescription. This widening is shown in figure 50(b), together .with an example of how 
the extra concept can be used in redescription. 
This process can be seen to be one of reference resolution: an (albeit implicit) reference to 
the height of balloon61 has been resolved to height61. Indeed, this processing effects, as a 
by-product, the more complex definite reference resolution deferred from the earlier phase of 
processing, since these ·definite relationships were left in the network as p-links. 
6.3.3 Concept evocation 
The network created during processing is inevitably incomplete. There is to all intents and 
purposes no limit to the number of concepts and links relating them to other concepts that 
ought to be present. For example, whenever a concept corresponding to some physical object 
is present, there really ought to be more concepts corresponding to its size, its colour, its 
weight, its density, and so on. Having so many concepts and links around is clearly 
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\1\ 
I 
(a) height physob 
•·· .. .. .. ...... . 
rise-e-v rise-pat-ht 
t 
eaent67 
wi de 12-link 
(b) 
widening 
and 
redescri12tion: 
rise-pat 
t 
balloon61 
'T' height co lour physob t t 
• bal loon =dummy= =dummy= 
bal loon61 I t t balloon61 height61 colour61 
com12osed tcm12laLe matching chain 
(R ISE " balloon6l" "event67") 
Figure 50: Richer redescription by matching and widening 
impractical, so the solution adopted is to leave the existence of such concepts implicit, only 
creating them by 'concept evocation' as and when necessary, that is to say, as directed by 
p-links. 
Suppose, for example, the matching process described just now found the matching chain 
shown in figure 51 (a). This matching chain fails to provide an existing concept for the 
height of balloon61. To rectify this absence, a new concept with an appropriate name, 
height61, is created, and the matching chain widened to accommodate it, as shown in figure 
51 (b). Processing can then continue just as before, with the newly evoked concept being 
included in the redescription process. 
physob 
tem12late: • matching chain: 
bal loon61 
(a) finding the match 
phrb 
balloon 
t 
bal loon61 
phr~-----~rht 
balr~--:-~~tmy = 
bal loon61 height61 
(b) evoking and incorporating height61 
Figure 51: An alternative match requiring concept evocation 
6.3.4 Summary of redescription 
We now have a mechanism for obtaining successive redescriptions of target entities, which 
can involve the inclusion of other related enLities, evoking them if they do not already exist 
in the network. The overall approach is to search through the network, working up (possibly 
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branching) chains of i-links and using wide p-links to direct the inclusion of the extra 
entities. 
6.4 Metaphor interpretation 
We now have the machinery to do some real metaphor interpretation. The three mechanisms 
of chapters 3 and 4, viz abstraction, metaphorical reference resolution, and generalized 
metaphorical reference resolution are all represented in MINT. 
6.4.1 Abstraction 
The simplest of the interpretation methods is abstraction, where successive descriptions are 
generated until one or more is found that is well-formed. These well-fonned descriptions can 
then be accepted as literal. In MINT, all such well-formed descriptions (with respect to the 
current interpretation)12 are marked as such and passed through to the interpretation 
acceptance component en bloc, where those that are considered semantically unacceptable, or 
pragmatically unlikely, are filtered out. 
An illustration of this interpretation process at work on the example 
(24) *The car drinks petro/13 
is shown in figure 52, where, for clarity, argument restrictions represented by p-links are 
only shown for the -ag concepts. 
The bottom i-link represents the original description of the car, (DRINK "car61" 
"petrol" "event69") , which is judged metaphorical, as there is no matching chain 
linking car61 to animal. For just the same reason, the next description of the car, 
(INGEST "car61" "petrol" "event69"), is also judged metaphorical. The third 
description, (USE "car61" "petrol" "event69") , however, is judged literal, since 
there is a matching literal chain.14 This literal description is passed on by MINT to the 
interpretation acceptance component. 
This processing can be related to the theoretical ideas of chapters 3 and 4 in two ways. In 
the informal notation, which gives a better idea of dynamic processing, the sequence of 
events above would be written 
12 Interpretations will be discussed in due course. 
13 This example is represented as an event, whereas the utterance should really be given a habitual reading . The representation of event semantics implemented in MINT is not capable of making this distinction. 
14 
'System' is a description intended to cover both animals and machines. 
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(INGEST "car6l" "petr ol " "event69") 
(DRINK "car6l" "petrol" "event69") 
Figure 52: "The car drinks petrol" 
*The car drinks petrol 
~ *The car ingests petrol 
~ The car uses petrol. 
In the analogical notation of chapter 3, which is better suited for a static view of description 
inheritance, the final, well-fanned description is derived as follows 
1l 
1l 
1l 
(event68), (the car), (petrol) 
(drink-ev), (drink-ag), (drink-pat) 
(ingest-ev), (ingest-ag), (ingest-pat) (use-ev), (use-ag), (use-pat) 
(use-ev) is the using by (use-ag) of (use-pat) 
t(ingest-ev) is the using by (ingest-ag) of (ingest-pat) 
t(drink-ev) is the using by (drink-ag) of (drink-pat) 
t(event68) is the using by (the car) of (petrol). 
This abstraction process allows literal input to pass through MINT unscathed, since such an 
input will be translated into literal i-links, which will be accepted and passed on without any 
redescription taking place. 
6.4.2 Metaphorical reference resolution 
The abstraction process- just described tends to deliver rather vague interpretations of input 
metaphors, which is useful as a ' fall-back' when more specific interpretation is not possible. 
More specific interpretation is possible when the richer redes9ription process encounters 
d-links representing core analogies in its matching chains, a pattern of processing which is 
equivalent to the metaphorical reference resolution of chapter 4. 
As an example, consider the MORE rs cp systematic metaphor, where increasing and 
decreasing quantities are spoken of as if they were rising and falling objects. The analogy 
underlying this systematic metaphor is shown in its i-link form in figure 53. This analogy 
may at first seem a little unusual in that quantity is seen as playing the r6le of both physical 
object and. its height, but the sharing of targets is quite legal in d-links (c.f. "John kicked 
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himself ') and this does seem accurately to reflect the use of MORE rs L'P in describing 
quantifiable entities. 15 The underlying analogy for MORE IS UP is expressed by the 
(metaphorical) i-link in figure 53. It might be summed up as follows: 'a quantity (such as a 
temperature) can be spoken of as a physical object (which goes up and down) as long as its 
height is interpreted as the quantity itself'. 
phy~ght 
quantity 
Figure 53: MORE IS UP 
Just how this metaphorical i-link is used in processing the example 
(25) The temperature is soaring 
· is illustrated in figure 54. It can be seen that processing proceeds very much as it did in the 
earlier literal examples of soaring, the only difference being that the chain found to match 
the p-link relating rise-pat to rise-pat-ht is this time metaphorical rather than literal. 
The processing in this example16 can be written in the informal notation of chapter 3 as 
*The temperature is soaring 
~ *The temperature is rising 
~ *The height of the temperature is increasing 
*~ The temperature is increasing. 
In the. more formal notation, the matching chain is used to derive a metaphorical description 
of (temperature61) as follows : 
(temperature6 l) 
(temperature) 
(quantity) 
(physob) 
(height) is (physob)' s height 
tt (quantity) is (quantity)' s height 
tt (temperature) is (temperature)' s height 
tt(temperature61 ) is (temperature61 )' s height 
and this metaphorical description is then used in metaphorical reference resolution: 
15 This double role of quantity could be put down to a metonymic effect, whereby a quantity is used metonym ically to refer to its value. There will be more discussion of metonymy in chapter 7. 16 This is. a rather simplified account of this example - MINT actually represents, in addition, that soaring is rapid rising lo a greal heigh/. 
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(temperature61) 
ft (temperature) 
ft (quantity) 
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,ncrease~ •~eight .. :hysob 
risrev rise-pa t-ht risrpat. physob 
soTev soarpat 
event69 tem perature6 1 
matching 
chain: 
~ 
T 
temperture 
temperature61 
afler widening: qu ant it y 
• 
increase~ / •he_i ght .. . :hysob 
riste-ev rise-p+
1
r-ht riste-pat Prvsob 
(INCREASE "t emperature61 " "euent69") 
_ 
_ 
_ ~ 
n 
n 
~ 
il 
il 
(t) 
,or· ,do~~::' '°T'" 
event69 temperatu re61 
Figure 54 : "The temperature is soaring" 
(event69), (temperature61) 
(soar-ev), (soar-pat) 
(rise-ev) , (rise-pat) 
(rise-ev) is the increasing of (rise-pat)' s height 
t(soar-ev) is the increasing of (soar-pat)' s height 
tt(event69) is the increasing of (temperature61 )' s height 
t(event69) is the increasing of (temperature61) 
The same metaphorical description of (temperature61) can be used to interpret other 
examples of MORE rs UP, such as 
(26) The temperature is low, 
which is illustrated in ~gure 55. Unfortunately, it is very hard to come up with literal terms 
to describe quantities, so it is presumed here that the application would require 'high ' and 
'low' to describe physical objects, whereas 'great' and 'little', in their core senses, would be 
presumed to describe quantities. 11 The process~ng runs as follows : 
17 
*The temperature is low 
*The height of the temperature is little 
The temperature is little. 
It would of course be possible to use coined predicates such as 'Qgreat' and 'Qlittle' to avoid the clash with English words. 
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.. · ~~ 
matching quatntity 
chain: 
temper t ure 
temperature61 
'" '"~. ·""" ... ~ 
lorst low-th ing-ht lowrhing 
state61 temperature61 
Figure 55: "The temperature is low" 
6.4.3 Generalized metaphorical reference resolution 
It was seen in chapter 4 that a more general idea of metaphorical reference resolution was 
required to deal with instances of systematic metaphor that did not rely on the metaphorical 
interpretation of functional attributes of entities, such as the height of a quantity, or the 
temperature of a person. This extended metaphorical interpretation is achieved in MINT 
through the use of ' associated d-links'. Here, descriptions of predications are reinterpreted, 
rather than descriptions of simple anributes. 
Consider the example of UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING 
(27) John saw the idea. 
It is not clear that there is any particular property of (the idea) which is being alluded to 
here, and which would enable the sort of processing described above to be applied usefully. 
Instead, it is necessary to interpret 'see ' as 'understand' , and this can be done by noticing 
and exploiting the association of the systematic metaphors lNDERSTAATIING Is SEEL\'G and 
IDEAS ARE OBJECTS. 
Figure 56 (a) shows the fragment of network relevant to this example; the double horizontal 
line indicates the association of two i-links. The processing of this example proceeds as 
before, i.e ., the p-link up from see-pat prompts a search for a matching chain (one with 
idea61 as a target and ·physob as a source) and a suitable (metaphorical) chain is found, as 
shown. 
Here, though, there is a difference. The top i-link of the matching chain is seen to have an 
associated i-link, and an attempt is made to interpret the original description as a 
manifestation of the systematic metaphor encoded by this associated i-link, i.e ., by replacing 
occurrences of see-ev etc. with understand-ev etc. In this case it is possible to ' interpret' 
the original chain in this way, and the resul ting i-link (dashed) is shown in figure 56 (b). 18 
This new description is seen to be well-formed, so is passed on to the acceptance 
18 Actually, a new i-link is created, rather than the sources of the old chain being replaced. 
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component. This process of interpretation guided by an associated i-link is called 'construal '. 
(a) origina l description: 
• T 1=--ev -~ -r-
seer 
~r 
matching 
chain: idea understand-ev understand-ag understand-pat 
t 
even t610 John idea61 idea61 
(b) construal: 
s:Tv slag seer:t 
underst~nd-ev unders,tand-ag unde,rstand -pat 
I I I (UNDERSTAND "John" "idea61" "event61 0") t ------- --- -+-----------+ 
I I I 
event610 id~a61 
Figure 56: "John saw the idea" 
Informally, the construal runs as follows: 
* John saw the idea 
*~ John understood the idea. 
idea 
.. 
A slightly more complex example of construal occurs in the processing of an instance of 
ARGUMTh'T IS WAR: 
(28) John shot down Bill's theory 
The processing of this19 is shown in figure 57, and runs as follows: 
* John shot down Bill's theory 
~ * John attacked Bill's theory 
*~ John criticized Bill's theory. 
Notice that, as with .widening in redescription and concept evocation, construal is controlled 
by the presence of p-links representing argument restrictions - it is not the case that any 
chain with see-ev etc. as sources will be construed to be an i-link with understand-ev etc. 
for sources - this construal will only happen when the patient ·of the seeing is some sort of 
idea. 
Notice also that there is nothing different about the d-link representing t.:xoERSTA-'\TI[J';G IS 
sErn-;G apart from its association with that representing IDEAS ARE OBJECTS - the first 
represents the fact that an understanding can be described (metaphorically) as a seeing, and 
19 Note that this is a much simplified account of MINT's treatment of this example - Another branch of 
redescription has it that shooting down is destroying, and the destruction of an argument is interpreted (by 
metaphorical reference resolution) as the reduction of its 'convincingness' LO nothing. 
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(a ) original description: 
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s-d-ev 
t 
event611 John 
(b) construal : 
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attr·pat. physob 
S·drt 
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matching 
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argulent cr itic ize-ev criticize-ag cr 1t1c1ze-pat 
thTy 
theory61 
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criticize-ev criti~ ize-ag cr iti cife-pat 
' ' (CRITICIZE "John" "theory6l" "event6ll") t --------- --+------ -----; 
' ' ' 
event611 theory61 
Figure 57: "John shot down the theory" 
the second that an idea can be described (metaphorically) as an object. 
Literal associations 
Up until generalized metaphorical reference resolution, the Mll\1T interpretation described 
took no account of whether i-links were labelled as literal or metaphorical, except in making 
the final judgement as to the well-formedness of a description. In construal, however, it 
might appear that special treatment is being given to metaphorical i-links in that they can be 
associated with other metaphorical i-links. This, however, is a misleading impression - it 
would be quite possible, and indeed useful, to associate literal i-links, a tactic which would 
enable the interpretation of general predicates to more specific predicates. An example 
parallel to the Ul\'DERSTA.1'-,'DING rs SEEING example is shown in figure 58, where the general 
predicate 'steer' is construed to be the more specific 'pilot' in the case of an aeroplane. It is 
easy to see how similar interpretations could be generated for other modes of transport. 
There will be further discussion of the r6le of associated d-links in chapter 7. 
6.5 Matching i-links and consolidation 
The matching operations described above have all matched templates generated from p-links 
- either as part of the well-formedness checking process, or as a way of identi fying more 
targets to include during redescription. ?vflNT processing, however, also matches i-links, or 
rather chains of i-links, directly. This is the basis of the final technique described used in 
147 6.5 
l 
(a) original description: 
T T 
event612 John 
(b) construal: 
.. · 
r 
plane61 
matching 
chain: 
steer-ev 
t 
pil ~t-ev 
I 
verl=e==~=te= 
pljne pilot-ev 
plane61 
steer-ag steer-pat 
t t 
pil ~t-ag pil~t- pat 
I I (PILOT "John" "plane61" •event612") +--------+--------~ 
I I I I 
' event612 John p lane61 
• 
Figure 58: "John steered the aeroplane" 
MINT's main processing - 'consolidation'. 
T r pi lot-ag pi lot-pat 
plane 
The prime motivation behind this matching is to detect and reduce duplication of 
descriptions in the network, and at the same time to consolidate distributed information, by 
combining matching chains. There are, however, other beneficial effects, such as the 
interpretation of certain metaphors and the attachment of prepositional arguments. 
Consider the situation depicted in figure 59(a). Here a description of the relationship 
between John and colour62 is found to match (partially) an existing chain. The two chains 
are 'consolidated' by widening (figure 59(b)), and one of them is made 'invisible' to the 
matching algorithm to prevent unnecessary extra matches being found in subsequent 
matching operations.20 
6.5.1 Metaphor interpretation by consolidation 
Occasionally, consolidation can effect metaphor interpretation. Figure 60 shows how this 
works in the case oC"The summer rolled by", an instance of the systematic metaphor TNE IS 
A MOVING OBJECT. The bottom i-link in each chain arises from initial processing of the input 
utterance, the upper i-links or the chains are part of the ' background ' knowledge encoded in 
the network. 
That this example can be interpreted by consolidation is a result of the fact that a time 
interval has a unique elapsing event associated with it (time intervals only elapse once!). 
20 The reason for widening both chains is thaJ both widening operations can cause subchains to be put on the processing agenda, as described later. 
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'F-~" (O~-~:r-b- __ -i~~~ry 
colou,62 John colour62 John inteq,ity61 
(a) partially matching chains (b) after consolidation 
Figure 59: Consolidation 
,lap,F'-_ HmT""' 
·T·· _T" 
event614 summer61 
Figure 60: "The summer rolled by" . 
6.5.2 Attachment of prepositional arguments by consolidation 
The consolidation mechanism enables the proper attachment of prepositional arguments to 
input predications in the scheme employed by MINT.21 
For example, the input 
(29) Mary strucf John with a rolling-pin 
which has the indefinite logical form 
(STRIKE "Mary" "John" "sk-21") (EVENT "sk-21" ) (WITH "sk-22" "sk-21") (ROLLING-PIN "sk-22") 
results in four i-links, two of which have the event concept event615 as a target (as shown 
in figure 61).22 When processing these input i-links, MINT finds that the one matches a 
21 
22 
There is no theoretical commitment to this representation of prepositions implied - this is just a simple, but effective way to allow prepositions to be used in input examples. The concept renaming is done during reference resolution. 
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chain involving the other, and when these two chains are then consolidated, rolling-pin61 
gets incorporated as a target of the right hand i-link as a result of widening. 
"T" r 
event615 roll ing-pin61 
hrg 
str ir ·ag 
Mary 
stri)e-pat 
John 
pp-Thor Th 
hit-ev hit-i nst 
I t 
str ik e-ev str ike-inst 
1--------r 
event6 15 ro lli nq -pin61 
Figure 61 : Prepositional attachment by consolidation 
An interesting feature of this example is that strike-inst inherits its description as the ' with ' 
role of strike-ev from hit-inst. In general, this inheritance of prepositional roles allows a 
significant saving in i-links in the network. 
6.6 Multiple perspectives and interpretations 
The various forms of processing d·escribed above have depended to a large extent on finding 
matches in the network and usirig these matches to achieve interpretation. In the simple 
cases considered, there has only ever been one match for each query, but in general , more 
than one match can be found. These differing matches can be seen to correspond to different 
perspectives on their target concepts, and choosing between matches is M~'T 's method of 
choosing between interpretations. 
Consider the processing of 
(30) Bill was shattered. 
This has at least two interpretations. The first of these is literal - Bill was physically 
shattered - and the second is metaphorical - Bill was psychologically shanered. The 
fragment of network relevant to MINT's processing of this example is depicted in figure 62. 
1n this figure, it can be seen that there are two matching chains (emphasized) with Bill as 
target and structure as source; the two chains diverge when they reach person, one 
continuing through body (the physical object), and the second through ego (roughly, the 
thinking mind). These two alternatives correspond to different perspectives on Bill - the 
physical and the psychological, and it is easy to see how the choice of perspective dictates 
the interpretation: in the physical case , a concept is evoked for the physical integrity of 
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reduce-to- r-to-n-p.a\ 
noth,ngH .inte~n\~- :t,uctu,e 
destrr-ev d-pat-integ desr oy-pat 
·"·'T" '"f '·O•' 
event6 13 ~ 
T 
Figure 62: Network for "Bill was shattered" 
Bill's body, the initial chain of i-links widened to include this concept, and interpretation 
proceeds to yield the description "Bill 's physical integrity was reduced to nothing" (figure 
63(a)); in the psychological case, the evoked concept is for Bill's confidence, and the final 
description is " Bill's confidence was reduced to nothing" (figure 63(b)). 
In MINT, the choice of which perspective to prefer over the others is made by following a 
number of heuristics, the most notable being that literal matching chains (such as the 
physical interpretation in the last example) are preferred over metaphorical chains. 23 Having 
made a choice, the corresponding interpretation is pursued and the results passed on to the 
Acceptance Component of the system. This component (which is currently only simulated) 
may reject the interpretation, in which case processing backtracks and the second perspective 
is pursued (and so on, if there are further matches). Thus there is a depth first investigation 
of interpretations. 2' 
Suppressing alternative perspectives 
Whilst focusing on a_ particular choice of perspective, the other perspectives are suppressed 
by making the alternative matching chains ' invisible ' to the matching algorithm; this is to 
ensure consistency within an interpretation, especially with regard to the determination of 
well-formedness: 
23 In fact, the situation is .somewhat complicated by the fact that for some matches, alternative chains can be found which correspond to the same perspective. To deal with this, MINT requires that chains be 
significanJly different before they are treated as different perspectives. This complication cm be put down to the large size of the network and a concomitant redundancy in knowledge represented. 
Of course, there is nothing to prevent sub-branching of interpretations if subsequent matching operations 
also throw up alternatives . 
151 6.6 
l 
(a) physical interpretation: 
.. ·
reduce-to- r-to-n-pat 
nothingH .:.?~rity • :.tructure 
destrr-ev d-parnteg deloy-pat 
shatte ... f -e-v _=_d-u ..... :_m_y _= _sh ..... arer-pa t 
event613 inteqrity61 fill! 
(b) psychological interpretation: 
.. · 
reduce-to- r-to-n-pat 
nothinH / .:?~~rity :tructure 
destrr-ev d-parnteg desroy-pat 
'""l" "'Tm'° '"r·P" 
event613 confidence61 fill! 
r I "T"' 
ph-ileg phrob 
= du~~:;_~--:~~ 
= dumF_: __ _ ::rn 
i nteqrity61 fill! 
Figure 63: Two interpretations of "Bill was shattered" 
r 
The suppression of alternative perspectives has the effect of making the process of well-
formedness checking a rather stronger process, i.e., one of checking for well-formedness 
with respect to the current interpretation. For example, in the psychological interpretation of 
the "Bill was shattered" example, the description "Bill was destroyed" would be judged ill-
formed, since a literal matching chain from Bill to structure would not be found (the 
original literal chain having been suppressed). This strengthened idea of well-formedness 
with respect to the current interpretation has moved closer to the idea of 'literalness' in that 
it rejects otherwise well-formed predications which are inconsistent with the current 
interpretation. This strengthened well-formedness test is what enables MINT to pass on only 
good candidates for literal paraphrases of its input. 
6.7 Overall control of descriptional analogy processing 
The processes described above are the essential mechanisms by which metaphor 
interpretation is achieved in MINT, the control issues, however, have so far only been 
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touched on, and it is the purpose of this short section to describe these issues. The next, and 
final section of this chapter gives an example showing this control mechanism at work. 
The two main problems of control are the ordering of redescription, due to branching 
structures in the network, and the branching of interpretations, due to multiple matching 
chains found during the matching of i-links and p-links. 
6.7 .1 Control of redescription 
The control of redescription is handled by means of an agenda. Each agenda item is a chain 
of i-links. As seen earlier, each of these chains corresponds to a description of its targets. 
The agenda is initially set to the chain of length one comprised solely of the sentence i-link 
resulting from reference resolution, but more chains are added as agenda items are processed 
(a) as successive redescription proceeds up chains, (b) as a result of widening operations, 
and (c) as a result of construal using associated d-links. When a new chain is added to the 
agenda, it is inserted in a position such that the shortest chains are processed first. This 
ensures an essentially breadth first ordering to redescription. 
6.7.2 Control of interpretations 
If a matching operation results in more than one matching chain, each chain is taken to 
correspond to a different perspective on its targets, and hence a different interpretation. At 
such a point, a record is kept of the current state of processing, and the heuristically 
determined 'best' match is pursued, while the other matching chains are suppressed, as 
explained above. Further branching of interpretations may occur as a result of subsequent 
processing. If, ultimately, this interpretation is rejected, processing backtracks to last of these 
branch points, and the next best branch is selected, and so on. In this manner, interpretations 
are processed depth first. 
6.7.3 Agenda item processing algorithm 
Items on the agenda (chains of i-links) are processed one by one. Each item is processed as 
follows: 
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Phase 1: 
attempt to match this chain of i-links against rest of network if there is a match*, consolidate 
if not, 
Phase 2: 
for each p-link up from the sources of this chain 
attempt to match the composition of the chain and this p-link 
if there is a match*, widen chain to include more targets**, 
evoking concepts if necessary*** 
assign well-farmedness to this chain 
if well-fanned, accept this description (and go on to next item on agenda) if ill-fanned 
if there are associated i-links, attempt construal 
if successful, put construal on agenda and go on to next item put extensions up literal i-links of this chain on agenda 
*If there is more than one match, choose the ' best' and suppress the others, backtracking to this point if interpretation rejected. 
**This widening operation may result in the addition of subchains to the agenda, in which case processing of the current chain is abandoned. 25 
***Concept evocation may result in more chains being added to the agenda. 
As can be seen, interpretation of an agenda item proceeds in two phases, the first effectively 
chooses the current interpretation, since it is in the first phase that all the relevant matching 
is done. The second phase assigns well-fannedness with respect to this interpretation; if the 
judgement is that the current description is well-formed, then it is accepted (passed on to the 
interpretation acceptance component), otherwise, the current chain is interpreted further, 
either by construal, as described above, or, failing that, by simple redescription. Processing 
stops when the agenda is finally exhausted, which happens when all the branches of 
redescription can no longer be extended, or they reach a well-formed description, or they are 
interpreted by construal. To ensure tennination, there is also a check to trap cycles and a 
limit.on the length of chain considered (currently 8). 
Widening operations on a chain generally augment the information represented by subchains 
(figure 64). To take account of this new information, these subchains are added to the 
agenda, as indicated. This results in a sort of backtracking of redescription, as these 
subchains may well ~ave been processed before. 
These control processes can be seen at work in the simple example in the next section. 
6.7.4 A short example 
This section describes in some detail the overall processing involved 'in interpre ting the 
manifestation of ARGUMENT rs w AR 
25 The augmented version of the curren t chain will be processed in due course. 
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widened 
chain 
physob height 
. . ··· ··• 
I augmented subchain put on agenda 
Figure 64: Widening leads to new agenda items 
(31) John assailed Bill's theory. 
This simple example shows much of the operation of the control mechanism, without involving too many steps. The input nai've logical form equivalent is 
indefinite: 
(ASSAIL "John" "sk-1" "sk-2.") (EVENT "sk-2") definite: 
(OF "sk-1" "Bill" THEORY) (THEORY "sk-1") 
and the d-link version of this after reference resolution is shown in figure 65. 
str,ategic-obj 
.. 
atta ... r-·e_v_a_t_ta·t-k--ag--at-ta__.j"'' • ,,.,,.,;, obj 
... ~<r·· "'T' "'f" .. ,h ,o,, ...• '" ,,o,oo,o, 
sk-2 JohnO sk-1 BillO · 
t t t event620 John Bill 
Figure 65: Network for "John assailed Bill's theory" 
Processing then proceeds as follows: (emphasis in the figures shows the chain being processed and matching chains) · 
Figure 66(a) shows the first agenda item, the sentence i-link, being processed. No match for this chain is found in the rest of the network, so p-links up from its targets are checked. Here, a match is found, 26 the concept theory61 evoked, and the two chains widened 
accordingly (figure 66(b)). The result of this widening is to put the newly augmented 
26 Actually, the match is created specially because this p-link corresponds to a definite predication. This is necessary to cope with definite reference being used to introduce previously unsuspected entities. 
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sentence i-link on the agenda. 
(a) matching: str_ateqic-obi 
.... 
a tta•r- -e- v--at-ta .. f -k -ag--a-tt ... rpa< 
0 
m,a>egk ·O bj 
ev\llr·ev assarag assarp.at • . ?eory .. _. -th- proponent 
sk-2 JohnO sk-i BillO · 
eveL20 1n 1 
(b) evocation and widening: 
stra teqic-obi 
-· 
atta•r-·e_v __ at-ta .. / _k--ag--at_t ... f p" ."'"'''' obj 
ev\lr·ev as~rg a11Tpat. theory .th:proponent 
sk-2 JohnO sk-1 BillO · 
t t t t 
event620 John the~ry61 fill! 
"·''"T"' 
fill! 
th-proponent ~ 
t------- r 
fill! theory61 
Figure 66: Processing of the sentence i-link 
Figure 67 shows the augmented sentence i-link being processed. Again, there is no direct 
match, and so the p-links are checked for matches. The same match as before is found, but 
no new widening is necessary. Phase 2 is then invoked: the chain is not judged well-
forined,Z7 so the two extensions of the current chain (corresponding to the two i-links up 
from the sentence i-link) are put onto the agenda. 
Figure 68 shows the processing of the first of these chains, which corresponds to the 
description (EVENT · 11 event620"). This has no direct match, and since there are no 
p-links, it is judged by default to be well-formed, and the corresponding description, 
(EVENT "event620"), is passed on as part of the interpretation. Because of this well-
formedness, no further chains are put onto the agenda from this branch of redescription. 
The next chain to be processed corresponds to the description (ASSAIL "John" 
" theory61" "event620") , as shown in figure 69. There is no match for the chain 
itself, but there is a metaphorical match for the p-link up from assail-pat, though no 
TI The sentence i-link is never considered well-formed, this effectively forces processing of the other input i-links. 
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I 
I 
1, 
......... 
svategic-obj 
.• 
attack-ev attack-ag attack-pat str,ategic-obj 
t t t • 
event assail-ev assail-ag assail-pat theory th:12ro12onent ~ t t t .. .. . ···• 
sk-2 JohnO sk-i BillO I I I I event620 John theory61 fu..!.! 
Figure 67: Processing of the augmented sentence i-link 
strategic-obj 
• 
a tta .... r -·e_v_ a_tt_.af~k--a-g_ a_tt .... rp•, . _,,.,.,;,.,b; 
""T .. "'T' "'T'" 
'T T'T T 
event620 John theory61 Bill 
Figure 68: (EVENT "event620") 
widening is needed. Phase 2 finds the description ill-formed (because of the metaphorical 
match), but construal is not possible. The longer chain formed by adding in the next i-link is 
therefore put onto the agenda. 
Next, the chain shown in figure 70, corresponding to (ATTACK " John" "theory61" 
"event 6 2 O") , is processed. Again, there is no direct match. The same match as before is 
found for the p-link, but again no widening is called for. In phase 2, the description is found 
to be ill-formed, but this time construal is possible, as shown. The resulting interpreted i-link 
( (CRITICIZE "John " "theory61" "event620")) is put on the agenda. 
Finally, when this construed i-link is processed (figure 71), a literal matching chain is found 
for the p-link up from criticize-pat and so the description is judged well-formed and passed 
on. This completes the MINT processing. 
A summary of the processing of this example, as produced by the system, is as follows : 
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str a teg ic -obj 
• 
attar·ev + 
attack-i;>at 
t • 
strateq ic-obj 
event assail-ev assail-ag 
I JnO "'T'" 
propoHent 
th -propoHory 
cr iti cize-ev cr rti cize-ag cr itic ize -pat ~ 
sk-2 sk-1 Bil!O I I I event620 John theory61 1 fil.!.! theory61 
Figure 69: (ASSAIL "John" "theory 61" "event 620") 
strategic-obj 
. 
attack-ev I attack-oat strategic,obj ~ attack-ev 
~.__.,__,~I · · r = • t 
ev\11 .. ,_'·_e_v--a-11-a+i-a-g--a-1-sa,tr" p,opTo< "'T"' u ,<,<; ,e.,-
'T ,r T T ,hp,op~~r 
event620 Joh n theory61 fil.!.! fil.!.! theory61 
T attaFi;>at 
cr iti cJZe-ag cr it icize-pat 
construal: attac k-ev 
* t 
criticize-ev criti~ ize-ag criti~ ize-pat 
' ' t--------+--------~ 
' ' ' 
the~ry61 
Figure 70: (ATT ACK "John" "theory61" " event620") 
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att ack-ev 
* t 
";l,. ... ";,;r··, ";,r·-, .. 
event620 John theory61 
Figure 71: (CRITICIZE "John" "theory61" "event620") 
sentence: 
(John assailed Bill's theory) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: ( (ASSAIL "John" "sk-1" "sk-2") (EVENT "sk-2")) 
skolemized definite logical form: ( (OF "sk-1" "Bill" THEORY) (THEORY "sk-1")) 
literal form: 
(THEORY "theory61") 
(OF "theory61" "Bill" THEORY) (EVENT "event620") 
(CRITICIZE "John" "theory61" "event620") 
interpretation acceptable? YES 
The output of the system consists of a number of literal logical forms; there is no need to 
distinguish between definite and indefinite forms, as reference resolution has already been 
performed. The skolem constants of the input to MINT have been replaced by definite entity 
names , uniquely identifiable by the application system. Where entities are new to the system, 
either because they were indefinite in the input or because they have been evoked, they have 
been given appropriate names; evoked concepts are also mentioned in predications which 
indicate their relationships to other entities. These literal forms are then accepted or rejected 
en bloc. 
More examples are presented in Appendix C, most of which are more complex than the one 
shown above. 
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6.8 Summary 
This chapter has outlined the operation of MINT in processing both literal and metaphorical 
input utterances. Input to MINT is in nai've logical form, which is translated into network 
structures by following rules in a simple lexicon of predicates. After initial reference 
resolution, processing is achieved by a combination of three major techniques: redescription (including widening and concept evocation), consolidation, and construal. All these 
techniques can be used during the interpretation of both literal and metaphorical input; 
metaphor interpretation can be achieved by straightforward abstraction (when redescription 
throws up well-formed descriptions of the input entities), metaphorical reference resolution, (when metaphorically related entities are introduced into redescription as a result of 
matching complex argument restrictions, or, in some cases, of consolidation), and construal (where a metaphorically matched argument restriction reveals an appropriate associated 
d-link). 
During matching operations, if more than one match is found, this is interpreted as a choice 
of interpretations, and these choices are explored depth first. Well-formedness judgements 
are made relative to the current interpretation, which ensures that the descriptions passed on 
to the Acceptance Component are consistent with each other. Processing is controlled by 
means of an agenda. 
The result of this processing is a series of interpretations, each consisting of a package of 
literal logical forms constituting a. literal paraphrase of the input. These interpretations are 
offered one by one to the (simulated) Acceptance Component, until one is accepted 
according to deep semantic and pragmatic criteria. 
The performance of MINT in interpreting metaphors is discussed in the next and final 
chapter. 
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7. Discussion 
This final chapter is a discussion of descriptional analogy, how it fits in with previous 
theories of metaphor, its strengths and weaknesses, and directions for future research. 
Throughout this discussion it is important to bear in mind the distinction between the theory 
of descriptional analogy, as presented in chapters 3 and 4, and its implementation in the 
MINT system, as described in chapters 5 and 6. The theory is rather general and leaves 
many details underspecified, whereas the implementation has filled in the details, but only to 
a first approximation - deficiencies in the implementation should not be assumed to be 
deficiencies in the theory, they are indicative of shortcomings in the approximations 
employed. 
Overview 
This chapter is divided into four sections. 7.1 discusses the performance of the MINT 
system. 7.2 discusses issues arising from the implementation of MINT, including possible 
fruitful directions for further research. 7.3 discusses issues arising from the theory of 
descriptional analogy. 7.4 sums up the overall conclusions of the thesis . 
7 .1 System performance 
7.1.1 Examples covered 
MINT is successful in dealing with quite a variety of metaphorical input, covering nominal 
metaphor, such as1 
(I) John is a carrier of AIDS 
[John is infected with AIDS] 
predicative metaphor, 
(2) John gave Bill an idea 
[John communicated an idea to Bill] 
and sentential metaphor, 
(3) John destroyed Bill 
[John reduced Bill's confidence to nothing]. 
English glosses of the paraphrases produced by MINT are given in square brackets. 
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MINT processes, using the same mechanisms, both firmly established metaphors (involving 
word senses that might be found in standard dictionaries), such as 
(4) The price of gold is rising, 
[The price of gold is increasing] 
(5) The crime rate is soaring, 
[The crime rate is increasing rapidly to a great level] 
(6) John felt low, 
[John's happiness was little] 
and the more original kind (involving metaphorical word senses unlikely to be found in any 
dictionary), for example 
(7) Mary poured her sorrow into a letter, 
[Mary expressed her sorrow in a letter] 
(8) John shot down Bill's argument. 
[John criticized Bill'~ argument, reducing its convincingness to nothing] 
The following is a list of some of the examples processed by MINT, and on which more 
details are given in Appendix C. In this list, words interpreted metaphorically are indicated 
by italics. 
MORE IS UP: 
The price of eggs is low 
The temperature is rising 
The crime rate is soaring 
The price of petrol is up 
The price of gold is higher than the price of eggs 
TI!E MIND IS A BRTITLE OBJECT, 
HAPPINESS IS UP, 
FRIENDUNESS IS WARMTH: 
John destroyed Bill 
Bill was shattered 
Bill was a broken man 
John felt down 
John's spirits rose 
John's spirits sank 
John was depressed 
John is a cold person 
ARGUMENT IS WAR: 
John attacked Bill's theory 
John shot down Bill's argument 
Bill's argument is strong 
John's theory is flimsy 
INFECTING IS GIVING: 
John gave Mary a virus 
Mary caught a cold from John 
Mary has flu 
John is a carrier of AIDS 
TOUCHING IS GIVING: 
John gave Mary a kiss 
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Mary sold John a kiss 
John gave Mary a smack 
Mary took a smack from John 
The conduit metaphor: 
IDEAS ARE OBJECTS, 
LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS, 
EXPRESSING IS PUTTING, 
COMMUNICATION IS SENDING: 
Bill put the idea into a letter 
The poem was full of emotion 
The essay was crammed with ideas 
Mary poured her sorrow into a letter 
John gave Bill an idea 
Bill got his argument across to John 
In assessing the performance of descriptional analogy in processing these examples, it must 
be remembered that the extreme methodology was adopted whereby all semantic knowledge 
is represented in analogical form, and all word sense disambiguation is done by 
metaphorical processing. These methodological principles mean that these examples have 
constituted a severe test of the theory of descriptional analogy in terms of its coverage of 
both literal and metaphorical linguistic constructions. Experience shows that the theory is 
well up to coping with these examples, and the most problematic aspect of adding further 
examples is the usual problem of how to represent the required semantics for the core senses 
of words. 
The real power of systematic metaphor in explaining how polysemous word senses are 
derived from core senses is perhaps best demonstrated by the MORE rs UP examples. This is 
because the domain of rising objects is relatively simple, yet well populated with interrelated 
ideas. These examples seem at first sight to be among the least 'metaphorical' of them all, 
but a . single width two metaphorical i-link is what enables MINT to derive suitable 
interpretations for rising, falling, rocketing, plunging, high, low, up, down, higher, lower, 
and more besides, given only the physical senses of these words. It is the very fact that 
these examples seem so commonplace that makes it important to be able to handle them 
properly - there is a . very large number of motion words, and it is almost inconceivable that 
any dictionary would list an appropriate polyseme for all of them, yet such words are highly 
likely to crop up in the input to a realistic natural language system. 
Looking a little more deeply at the examples listed above, there are a number of significant 
points to be made. 
Abstraction 
The examples listed above all involve interpretation which exploits knowledge of systematic 
metaphors. MINT's processing, however, can still be productive when no suitable systematic 
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metaphor can be found, since interpretation then becomes straight abstraction, as seen in the 
last chapter in the case of "my car drinks petrol". 
Semantic complexity 
Some of the examples above require quite complex semantic representations. This is 
particularly true in the case of the conduit metaphor, which relies on ideas of meaning, 
communication, transport, containment and mass nouns. The semantic models used in MINT 
are in reality rather crude, but effective, and it is significant that MINT (and in particular 
DREP) is able to integrate all this knowledge without difficulty. 
Multiple metaphorical senses 
The word 'give' is given three distinct metaphorical senses in addition to its core 'physical 
transfer' sense, corresponding to the three systematic metaphors INFECTING IS GIVING, 
TOUCHING IS GIVING, and COMMUNICATION IS SENDING (part of the conduit metaphor). There is 
no problem of ambiguity between these senses, since they are generated only as required, as 
a result of the nature of their arguments. In other words, processing is tightly directed, by 
focusing on relevant parts of the network, mainly as a consequence of the perspective 
mechanism and the fact that chains on the agenda are firmly anchored to discourse entities. 
A more detailed assessment of MINT's strengths and weaknesses is presented in the next 
section. 
7 .1.2 Some statistics 
The entire MINT system, comprising of some 335 Common Lisp functions, occupies about 
200kb as source code. The lexicon contains around 250 predicates and the network consists 
of about 700 concepts and 450 d-links. 
The example at the end of chapter 6 is a very simple example of MINT's processing, greater 
complexity generally arises from (a) having more than on_e interpretation, (b) having a 
greater branching factor among the i-links, (c) having to redescribe to a greater depth before 
well-formedness is found. (b) is, of course, dependent to an extent on the number of i-links 
present in the input, but for the most part there is no direct connection between the fonn of 
the input and the time required for processing. The above example takes about 45 seconds to 
process on a (heavily loaded) Xerox 1186 (Dove) workstation and the more elaborate 
examples in Appendix C take up to 7 minutes. In considering these figures it must be 
remembered that the system was not written with efficiency as a priority, and so there is 
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considerable scope for optimization, particularly with regard to caching the results of 
matching operations, which are the major consumers of processor time. 
7.2 The implementation 
MINT and DREP together comprise an implementation of descriptional analogy, and as 
pointed out above, they should be regarded as first approximations to the ideal 
implementation. Nevertheless, MINT is very successful in dealing with a good variety of 
metaphorical input, as described above. 
This section reviews a number of areas in which this approximation could perhaps be 
improved, and thus areas suitable for further research. 
7.2.1 Semantic coverage 
The most obvious restriction imposed on the implementation is the quality of semantic 
representation in MINT. The coverage of semantic knowledge in MINT was intended to be 
broad and shallow, so that the general applicability of descriptional analogy could be 
demonstrated; however there is no doubt that the system would benefit from a greater 
sophistication in this knowledge. 
DREP is a very general formalism intended to be particularly suited to descriptional analogy, 
and it shares features with formalisms more ambitious in their representational power, 
features such as multiple perspectives, property inheritance, and structured links. In being so 
general it makes few semantic commitments, and as a consequence offers little help to the 
programmer in the form of short cuts for the representation of particular forms of 
knowledge. An example that springs to mind is event semantics - the event semantics 
employed in MINT is very simple, and a more detailed account would increase the range of 
examples that could be tackled. DREP offers no built-in mechanisms that would help in this 
enterprise, so information about events must be encoded as unexceptional knowledge. 
There is no doubt that improvements could be made within the present limitations of the 
DREP formalism, and perhaps future developments that would be particularly profitable, in 
terms of increasing the range of examples that MINT could tackle, would be to improve 
event semantics and the handling of adverbs, and to include a treatment of tense. 
The handling of adverbs would be of particular interest in the context of descriptional 
analogy: 
At present, MINT produces different literal paraphrases for 
165 7.2 
''I 
, 1, 
(9) The crime rate is rising, 
(10) The crime rate is soaring, 
the first is paraphrased as "the crime rate is increasing", or rather its logical form equivalent, 
and the second to "the crime rate is increasing rapidly". 2 It can be seen from these examples 
that adverbs have an important part to play in capturing the nuances of a metaphor -
although both metaphors would be usefully interpreted as "the crime rate is increasing", the 
information conveyed by the adverb adds significantly to the interpretation. These nuances 
might well be the reason a metaphor was used in the first place, as was observed in chapter 
2. 
This present handling of adverbs is quite straightforward using DREP: an adverb is attached 
directly to the event variable using an i-link equivalent of (RAP ID "soar-ev") . 
Unfortunately, this treatment is a little crude. Consider the two utterances 
(11) John led Mary reluctantly 
(12) Mary followed John willingly 
which describe the same event, but from different points of view. Oearly it is not acceptable 
to describe the event as reluctant or willing, rather the relationship between the actor and the 
event is what seems to be at issue. 
The semantics of adverbs are notoriously difficult (see, for example [McConnell-Ginet 82]), 
but a more sophisticated treatment is likely to be possible without modification of the DREP 
formalism per se, and is likely to be most profitable in terms of enhancing the quality of 
paraphrases produced by MINT. 
In addition to such enhancements to the semantic knowledge of MINT, DREP itself could 
be extended by incorporating treatments of negation and quantification. Such improvements, 
however, would not be of immediate interest in the study of metaphor. 
7.2.2 Well-formedness conditions 
Strongly related to the issue of semantic representation is the question of well-formedness 
conditions. The implementation of well-formedness conditions in MINT is effected by the 
use of p-links. These p-links often have width one, in which c~se they correspond roughly to 
the simple unary sortal restrictions on predicate arguments which are common in 
computational linguistics. They may on the other hand be more complex, specifying required 
relationships between various arguments of a predicate. 
2 In fact. " ... to a great level" is also part of the second paraphrase, but this is not of direct concern in the present discussion. 
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This implementation of sortal restrictions, however, can be seen to differ from the standard 
approach in that there is no distinct hierarchy of sorts; instead of a specific notion of 'sort', 
normal DREP concepts are used to specify argument restrictions, and whether a particular 
argument restriction is satisfied or not is determined by matching in the mairi network. If a 
literal matching chain is found, the restriction is deemed to be satisfied, if not, then the 
restriction is violated. This mechanism is much more flexible than the usual approach to sort 
hierarchies. 
It can be seen that the argument restrictions operate by specifying that a description is well-
formed provided that the arguments of the description can literally be described in the way 
specified by p-links. 3 For example, in the determination of the well-formedness of (RISE 
"balloon51" "event57") presented at the end of chapter 5, the width 1 p-links 
require that (EVENT "event57") and (PHYSOB "balloon51") be literal descriptions 
known to the system. 
This specification of argument restrictions as required descriptions is in line with the 
philosophy underlying descriptional analogy: entities cannot be said to be of a certain sort in 
some absolute and objective sense, they can only be said to be describable in certain ways 
(because of analogies with definitive entities), and only certain of these descriptions are 
accepted as literal by the dictionary. 
If no literal matching chain can be found for an argument restriction, this could be for one 
of two reasons - either no match at all was available or only a metaphorical matching chain 
could be found. In the latter case the metaphorical chain might contain valuable information 
as to how interpretation can proceed (via widening and / or construal): the matching chain 
represents an analogy between its sources and its targets, and that analogy is assumed to 
underlie, at least in part, the original metaphorical description.4 This analogy is then used for 
metaphorical reference resolution or, if there are associated d-links, construal. In this way 
the well-formedness conditions represented by p-links can be seen to drive the interpretation 
process in a very real sense. This is only to be expected, since the task of literal paraphrase 
is a search for well-formedness, and if a description is ill-formed, it is sensible to investigate 
the cause of the ill-formedness. 
It is a reasonable question to ask whether the well-formedness conditions that can be 
expressed using p-links are adequate for the sort of examples which we might wish to 
process. Experience shows that p-links are capable of representing the restrictions required in 
all the examples presented in Appendix C, and it is easy to represent both the conjunction 
and disjunction of 'sorts'. It is, however, possible to find examples which would not be 
covered. Such examples depend on negative, rather than positive restrictions. Consider the 
4 
Matching literal chains correspond to literal descriptions of their targets. 
Of course, this is all relative to the current interpretation. 
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utterance 
(13) *The man is a pig 
or, in logical fonn, (PIG "man 71"). What is required here is a way of specifying that a 
man cannot also be a pig, i.e., a way of encoding knowledge of mutual exclusivity. This 
problem is, however, common to any system representing sortal restrictions, and not 
specifically a result of MINT's way of doing things. 
7.2.3 Polysemy 
As mentioned earlier, MINT adopts the methodological attitude that it should process as 
much of its input as possible from metaphorical principles. This inevitably means longer 
processing times for metaphorical word senses that in reality are well established as 
polysemous senses in English dictionaries; the example given earlier was the sense of 'to 
rise' meaning 'to increase'. In a more practical system, where processing time is an issue, it 
would be sensible to represent these polysemous word senses directly, and this could be 
done easily in MINT using associated d-links and the construal mechanism. 
Figure 72 shows how such a polysemous word sense would be defined for 'rise'. The 
construal mechanism would then pick up this sense whenever a quantity was described as 
rising,5 without processing having to go through additional steps of redescription, as it does 
at present. 
phy~;g=h=t===== ,:H:' 
quantity increase-ev increase-pat 
Figure 72: Defining a polysemous sense of 'rise' 
It is worth noting that these new i-links representing polysemous senses are perfectly 
consistent with the semantics of DREP - the new link simply represents the fact that the 
definitive event of increasing is analogous to the definitive event of rising\ or equivalently, 
increasing can be described as rising. 
Construal would take place because of the p-link specifying the argument restriction of physical object for the patient of rising. 
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7.2.4 Automatic knowledge acquisition 
MINT as it stands offers a fairly broad, but shallow coverage of the various semantic 
domains it tackles. The coding of the semantic knowledge that enables MINT to process 
instances of systematic metaphor is a laborious task. Some of the work involves a 
painstaking formulation of the fundamental concepts in some domain, but much of it is a 
more straightforward linking together of word senses around these core concepts, in a way 
that is very close to the surface English. This latter coding of knowledge might well be 
susceptible to some form of automation. 
Already, there is a small suite of 'lexis' functions to make this task easier, so that specifying 
only that 'soar' implies 'rise' enables the lexis system to create the appropriate i-link linking 
soar-ev, soar-pat, rise-ev, and rise-pat. It would be very interesting to try to use this sort 
of approach in conjunction with an on-line dictionary. The Longman Dictionary of 
Contemporary English [Longman 78] would seem to be particularly appropriate for this task, 
as it is available in machine readable form and its definitions are given in terms of a 
severely restricted subset of English [Boguraev and Briscoe 89]. 
As was observed in chapter 1, some word definitions in Longman's (as with other 
dictionaries) themselves assume the use of systematic metaphor in their interpretation. This 
observation suggests that MINT's abilities could be put to use in the automated knowledge 
acquisition task in a sort of bootstrapping operation. 
7 .2.5 Scale of metaphors 
In line with the aims of this thesis, attention has been focused here on how individual words 
or collocations can be interpreted metaphorically. In other words, MINT's interpretation has 
been treated as an exercise in lexical semantics - deriving new metaphorical senses for 
words from knowledge of core word senses and core analogies. 
As noted in Chapter -2, however, metaphors can occur on a much larger syntactic scale, 
indeed, entire books can be regarded as metaphors. Extension of MINT's processing abilities 
to larger scale metaphors should be feasible as there is no natural size of semantic unit in 
DREP: word sized semantic units involve up to three or four definitive entities associated in 
a frame, but frames can be envisaged which are much larger than this, and there is nothing 
to prevent analogies arising between such large frames. Indeed one can . envisage a single 
very large frame corresponding to Orwell's book Animal Farm, with slots corresponding to 
each of the characters and events. This frame could then be used as the source 'domain' in 
an analogy with the characters and events of the Russian revolution as targets. Such an 
analogy, represented by an enormous d-link in MINT, would allow statements about the 
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entities in Animal Farm to be interpreted as statements about entities in the revolution. 
7.2.6 Perspectives and interpretations 
MINT uses the idea of a perspective to distinguish between different interpretations of an 
input utterance. The working assumption is that in any single interpretation (a package of 
literal logical forms) the perspectives on the various entities involved must be consistent. 
This requirement for consistency of perspective is of great importance during the process of 
redescription. For example, when processing 
(14) John was devastated 
there are two competing perspectives on John, viz the physical and the psychological, as 
outlined in chapter 6. Early in processing, the system makes a choice between these two 
perspectives, so that (DEVASTATED "John" "state62") is judged ill-formed with 
respect to the psychological interpretation (in which John is seen only metaphorically as a 
physical structure). The next stage of redescription comes up with (DESTROYED "John" 
"state62"), which is also judged ill-formed with respect to the psychological 
interpretation. Thus the inconsistent judgement of one as metaphorical and the other as 
literal is prevented. 
This example demonstrates the importance of maintaining a consistent perspective on a very 
local level, but it is interesting to .consider the implications of this policy when operated on 
a wider scale, for example across more than one clause in the phenomena of 'mixed' and 
'coherent' metaphor. 
Mixed metaphors 
The consistency of perspective requirement may account for the apparent unacceptability of 
mixed metaphors.6 Consider the example 
(15) ? John felt Low in his elevated position. 
Here there are two of Lakoff and Johnson's systematic metap~ors at work: HAPPY IS UP and 
HIGH STATUS Is UP. The two metaphors seem to work against each other in that they interpret 
the metaphorical height of a person in different ways. This would not be allowed with 
MINT's consistency of perspective requirement. Nevertheless, it is possible to make sense of 
(15), even if it does sound a little forced, and perhaps there should be a preference for 
consistency, rather than an absolute requirement. It is even possible to find examples that 
6 This is a more general view of mixed metaphor than the usual clash of idioms. 
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actually exploit this mixing of perspectives, such as 
(16) John felt physically and emotionally bruised. 
Coherent metaphors 
In mixed metaphor, there is generally some sort of contradictory image which gives rise to 
infelicity, but it is possible for two metaphors corresponding to different perspectives to sit 
comfortably together when no actual contradiction arises. Such metaphors are termed 
'coherent' in [Lakoff and Johnson 80]. Consider, for example 
(17) John felt low and frosty. 
This example seems perfectly acceptable, despite the presence of two separate metaphors 
which ooth see John as some sort of physical object. :MINT avoids the contradiction in this 
example by combining the two separate metaphors, HAPPY IS UP and FRIEJ,mLY IS w AR..c\.1, in a 
single i-link (along with THE MIND IS A BRTITLE OBJECT and INTELLIGE."i'CE IS BRIGHTh"ESS) as 
shown in figure 73. This means that all these metaphors are treated as being associated with 
the same perspective on a person. 
ph-integrity height temperature brightness j j j l· confidence happiness friendliness i ntel I igence ego 
Figure 73: Combining coherent metaphors in a single i-link 
There is a deficiency in this approach, however, which is that this is not a 'natural' grouping 
of systematic metaphors, so while (17) and 
( 18) John felt frosty in his elevated position 
are acceptable, (15) is not. It would seem that coherence of i:netaphors is not a transitive 
relation. Clearly a more subtle approach to consistency of perspectives would be a 
worthwhile area for development in the system. 
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7.3 The theory of descriptional analogy 
The last section dealt with the computational side of this work, but we finish with a 
reassessment of the broader theoretical underpinning of MINT - the theory of descriptional 
analogy. 
7 .3.1 Assessment of descriptional analogy as a theory of metaphor 
The theory of descriptional analogy was developed in the light of a number of observations 
on metaphor, and descriptional analogy can perhaps best be seen as a generalization of 
Black's interaction theory of metaphor as it was described in chapter 2. For convenience 
Black's own description of his theory is reproduced here: 
(1) A metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects, to be identified as the "primary" 
subject and the "secondary" one. [these are what have been described here as the target 
and the source domain] 
(2) The secondary subject is to be regarded as a system [a conceptual domain] rather than 
an individual thing. 
(3) The metaphorical utterance works by "projecting upon" the primary subject a set of 
"associated implications," comprised in the implicative complex, that are predicable of 
the secondary subject. [i.e., implications, or statements, that can be made about the 
source are applied to the target via some 'projection' mechanism] 
(4) The maker of a metaphorical statement selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes 
features of the primary subject by applying to it statements isomorphic with the 
members of the secondary subject's implicative complex. [Since statements about the 
source are applied to the target, the metaphor maker, in his choice of source, 
effectively selects features of the target to highlight and conversely plays down others] 
(5) In the context_ of a particular metaphorical statement, the two subjects "interact" in the 
following ways: (a) the presence of the primary subject incites the hearer to select 
some of the secondary subject's properties; and (b) invites him to construct a parallel 
implication-complex that can fit the primary subject; and (c) reciprocally induces 
parallel changes in the secondary subject [such changes are due to the highlighting and 
downplaying of source and target features in the hearer's mind]. 
It can be seen that the mechanisms used in descriptional analogy correspond well with those 
described in (3) and (5) and the comments in (4) remain valid. Neither theory involves a 
formal notion of domain: Black's 'implicative complex' seems deliberately vague and is 
suggestive of just the sort of implication procedure as is involved in the process of 
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redescription. A notable difference, though, is that descriptional analogy is more general in 
allowing multiple sources and targets. 
Recursive processing 
The most pertinent difference, though, is the shift in emphasis away from the consideration 
of a single, isolated metaphor, to combinations of interacting metaphors, or analogies. 
Descriptional analogy is seen as operating at a much lower level than was considered in 
Black's theory, and as a result it is much more pervasive in linguistic processing. Rather 
than straightforward logical reasoning, this linguistic processing is seen as reasoning with 
descriptions, and since all descriptions are potentially metaphorical, the interpretation process 
becomes highly recursive. The metaphorical interpretation of intermediate fonns would be 
extremely difficult to justify in a conventional (rather than analogical) setting, and it is 
precisely this low level, recursive processing that enables descriptional analogy to deal 
effectively with systematic metaphor. This contrasts particularly with the semantic marker 
processing versions of the interaction theory described in chapter 2, where it was seen that 
the properties represented by markers were too simple, and their atomic nature meant that 
they were not susceptible to the 'recursive' interpretation process that the evidence of 
systematic metaphor seems to require. 
Literalness 
Another observation from chapter 2 that had a strong influence on the theory was that the 
dividing line . between literal and metaphorical processing did not · seem at all well defined, 
and indeed the judgement of whether an individual utterance was literal or metaphorical 
seemed highly subjective and synchronic - the death of metaphors seemed to involve a 
smooth transition between metaphoricality and literalness. Metaphor, it seemed, should not 
be seen as deviant, but as an integral part of natural language. This observation is accounted 
for very neatly in descriptional analogy: literalness is seen as a relative term, dependent on a 
particular dictionary's specifications of well-formedness, and not rooted in any objective and 
absolute fact. Metaphor is not seen as some bizarre abuse of . linguistic resources, it is an 
integral part of natural language. This is very much in line with George Lakoff's attacks on 
'objectivism' in [Lakoff and Johnson 80] and [Lakoff 87], where he sees cultural influences 
as the primary means of deciding what is literal. 
The similarity of literal and metaphorical processing runs very deep in descriptional analogy. 
All descriptions are seen as arising through analogy with definitive entities in definitive 
relationships, and whether they are labelled as literal or metaphorical is a matter of taste, as 
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determined by the dictionary.7 Descriptional analogy, then, can be seen to embrace the thesis 
of what Cooper called 'the primacy of metaphor', described in chapter 2, whereby 
metaphorical processes are seen as the normal mode of human thought, and this is reflected 
in human languages. In the primacy account, a particular chair, say, is not a chair in some 
fixed and absolute sense, it is merely described as a chair because of its similarity with 
some preconceived notion of the 'ideal' chair - in descriptional analogy, this similarity is 
indicated by the existence of an analogy with definitive entities . 
7.3.2 Coverage of metaphor 
As pointed out above, descriptional analogy is unusual among theories of metaphor in 
considering metaphor to operate on a very low level in linguistic processing. This low level 
pervasiveness of metaphor and the corresponding prevalence of analogy in linguistic matters, 
fits in very well with the observation that metaphor seems to occur at all levels of discourse, 
from the simplest nominal reference, through predications and sentences to entire books. 
The theory of descriptional analogy goes much further than the interaction theory in 
describing how metaphors can be interpreted by relating them to previously known 
metaphors, or rather analogies. These analogies may have been encountered in the current 
discourse (in which case we are dealing with extended metaphor) or they may be drawn 
from general knowledge (in which case we are dealing with systematic metaphor). 
Descriptional analogy however, in common with the interaction theory, does not say very 
much about how a metaphor can be interpreted from scratch, that is, without reference to 
prior knowledge of some appropriate analogy. In such cases the only mechanism available 
seems to be that of abstraction. The abstraction process, though useful, is in itself rather 
unreliable and it should be controlled by a mechanism which makes use of deep semantic 
and pragmatic knowledge.8 Nevertheless, such metaphors are potentially the precursors of 
extended metaphors and even (on a longer time scale) systematic metaphors - they involve 
the same analogical_ mechanisms and so can be seen to operate within the framework of 
descriptional analogy. This is clearly an area suitable for further research. 
Poetic metaphors are often held up by philosophers as evidence that there is something 
deeply mysterious and holistic about metaphor, that is lost in any attempt at literal 
In MINT, literal and metaphorical i-links are treated alike, except when it comes to deciding which descriptions pass on as output 
Pragmatic and semantic notions such as 'salience' and 'importance' are typical in attempts to provide such 
a mechanism, but they seem a bit simplistic. 
There are some treatments of analogy, such as the Structure Mapping Theory [Gentner 89]. [Falkenhainer et al. 89], and the computational system ACME [Holyoak and Thagard 89), which attempt 
to deduce analogies from chiefly synlactic knowledge. These, however, appear to be heavily dependent on fortuitous choice of syntactic representations, and in particular the characteristic syntactic structures arising from semantic relationships, such as cause and effect. 
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paraphrase (for example [Davidson 78)). Descriptional analogy should not be seen as 
incompatible with this view, as one of its basic premises is that metaphorical descriptions 
are perfectly valid as descriptions, and it is the analogies underlying them that carry the 
holistic message. It is only when a literal paraphrase is required, for example by a poetically 
unappreciative computer application, that it is necessary to resort to pulling the metaphor 
apan, thereby losing some of the effect of the original wording. Descriptional analogy per se 
does not deny the possibility of 'perlocutionary' effects, but its implementation in MINT 
does not cater for this, as it insists on producing a literal paraphrase, and on top of that, its 
semantic representations are rather shallow so that many of the rich semantic associations 
that otherwise might be generated are simply not represented. 
7 .3.3 Lexical semantics 
Descriptional analogy is a theory about lexical semantics. The knowledge handled by the 
theory lies very close to surface language, and this is due to the emphasis on definitive 
entities, which have a habit of being strongly associated with English words via their 
intrinsic descriptions - relationships between definitive entities mirror the relationships 
between words in a way that closely resembles the conventional lexicographical practice of 
defining words in tenns of other words. The most notable difference between the approach 
of descriptional analogy and that of dictionary writers is the distinction made between core 
senses of words and derived senses. 
Early on in this thesis it was proposed that a significant number of metaphorical word senses 
could be deduced from a knowledge of the core senses of words and a knowleqge of the 
core analogies underlying systematic metaphors. Descriptional analogy has lived up to this 
early promise in that such metaphorical word senses can be derived from core senses and 
core analogies 'on the fly'. There is no reason at all why these metaphorical senses should 
not be remembered for later reference, effectively 'fleshing out' the initially skeletal 
dictionary (indeed a mechanism for doing just this in the MINT system would be easy to 
implement, as outlined previously). 
7.3.4 Other tropes 
A number of observations can be made on just what sort of phenomena can be addressed by 
the theory of descriptional analogy. For example, does descriptional analogy have anything 
to say about the various tropes discussed in chapter 2, and does descriptional analogy shed 
any light on the problem of classifying tropes? 
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Simile 
Simile is a trope that is often seen as either profoundly different from metaphor or 
profoundly similar. It was seen in chapter 2 that metaphors can often, if not always 
concisely, be rewritten as similes, and indeed th.is is the thesis of the comparison theory of 
metaphor in its various forms. Descriptional analogy too sees a (complex) similarity, or 
analogy, as being behind a metaphor, and so on a semantic level similes and metaphors 
appear indistinguishable. There seems to be little semantic difference between 
(19) Sally is a block of ice 
(20) Sally is like a block of ice, 
except, perhaps that (20) seems to include an additional assertion that Sally is not literally a 
block of ice. There is however an obvious syntactic difference, in that the latter contains a 
prepositional phrase, and furthermore there would seem to be a pragmatic difference in that 
the metaphor seems somehow more forceful, it has a greater perlocutionary effect. 
This observation would suggest that descriptional analogy could interpret similes as 
'explicitly labelled' metaphors. 
Idiom 
Many examples of idiom can be seen to be based on metaphor, and indeed on systematic 
metaphor, for example, the idioms 
(21) through the roof 
(22) over the moon 
are manifestations of the MORE IS up and HAPPY IS UP metaphors respectively. 
It is characteristic of idioms that they are not compositional, in that their full meaning 
cannot be deduced solely from their constituent words, but the application of systematic 
metaphorical interpretation would seem to offer a very real chance of recovering a partial 
meaning, and so descriptional analogy would apply.9 
Irony, hyperbole, litotes, and negation 
Descriptional analogy does not say much about these phenomena, but it can be seen that all 
of them may occur in conjunction with, or 'on top' of, metaphor. All these phenomena can 
be seen to modify a basic substrate of meaning, and it sometimes happens that this substrate 
There has been some computational research by Uri Zemik along the lines of interpreting idioms as 
metaphors. See [Zemik 87] . 
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needs to be detennined by metaphorical interpretation. Examples would be, respectively, 
(23) Like hell the value of my house is rising! 
(24) The housing market has completely collapsed! 
(25) Stock prices fell a bit on 'Black Monday' . 
(26) The crime rate is not falling. 
The moral of these examples would seem to be that metaphorical processing is involved at 
an early stage of linguistic processing, perhaps in association with conventional word sense 
disambiguation (which is still required to deal with homonymy). This is again consistent 
with the philosophy behind descriptional analogy. 
7 .3.5 Metonymy 
Metonymy is a trope that has sometimes been included under the title of metaphor, 
Aristotle's definition of metaphor as "giving a thing a name that belongs to something else", 
for example, definitely includes metonymy. Descriptional analogy, however, asserts that 
metaphorical language is the result of perceived similarities between sources and targets, and 
metonymy manifestly does not arise out of similarity. For example, calling the Washington 
administration 'Washington' does not rely on any similarity between the city and the 
administration, it simply relies on their association.10 
Metonymy, however, shares some interesting properties with metaphor, and in particular, 
systematic patterns of metonymy can be identified analogous to the systematic patterns of 
metaphor addressed by descriptional analogy. Some examples are CONTROLLER FOR 
CONTROLLED, as in 
(27) Bush invaded Panama 
and PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT, as in 
(28) The orchestra played Vivaldi. 
These patterns of metonymy are discussed in some detail in [Lakoff and Johnson 80] and 
are handled computationally in Dan Fass's Meta5 program [Fass 86a, 86b, 88a]. 
Another parallel with metaphor, and a feature that is particularly significant in descriptional 
analogy, is that metonymy seems to be a great deal more pervasive in language than is 
immediately apparent Metonymy too has both striking fonns, and fonns that pass 
completely unnoticed in conversation. For example, names can be seen as being used in a 
NAME FOR PERSON metonymy: when the word 'John' is used, it can be interpreted as 'the 
person whose name is John'. James Pustejovsky has developed the notion of 'logical 
metonymy' to explain certain common phenomena in lexical semantics [Pustejovsky 89] and 
10 See, for example, [Fass 88b]. 
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Jerry Hobbs finds it useful to assume the existence of metonymy in the input to his 
T ACITUS system [Hobbs and Martin 87]. It would appear that metaphor and metonymy 
interpretation should occur in the same phase of processing, i.e., prior to considerations of 
irony, hyperbole, negation, etc. It would be a very interesting topic for research to attempt 
an integrated, low level treatment of metaphor and metonymy. 
7.4 Conclusions 
This thesis has argued that, far from being a bizarre aberration of language, metaphor should 
be seen as extremely common and a fundamental part of the linguistic process, both 
synchronically in the utterance of new metaphors and diachronically in word sense 
formation. Indeed the distinction between literal and metaphorical utterances should not be 
seen as an absolute distinction, but rather as a relative phenomenon, dependent upon the 
tastes of a hearer. In the context of a natural language processing system, however, where 
there can be a strong notion of well-formedness imposed by what is meaningful to some 
computer application, the distinction between literal and metaphorical becomes clear cut, and 
it becomes a necessity to be able to detect and interpret metaphorical utterances. 
The problems involved in interpreting some metaphors can be severe, and large amounts of 
deep semantic and pragmatic knowledge would be called for. It is possible, however, to 
discern large scale patterns in metaphorical language, where many established and novel 
metaphors are seen to be extensions of a number of 'core' metaphors - this is the 
phenomenon of 'systematic' metaphor. It has been argued that systematic metaphor is likely 
to be well represented in the input to practical natural language processing systems, and that 
storing core metaphors as dictionary-like entries would enable the interpretation of such 
input. This interpretation might fall short of perfection, but would nevertheless be useful. 
The theory of descriptional analogy developed here explains how metaphors arise from 
perceived analogies and how such analogies can be seen to operate at a very low level in 
linguistic representation. It is successful in accounting fo r many empirical observations of 
metaphor and is consistent with the so-called primacy theory, in which all linguistic 
expression is seen as metaphorical. The theory represents a significant improvement on 
previous theories, which have generally considered metaphors only in isolation. The 
consideration of metaphors in the context of other metaphors and analogies is what enables 
descriptional analogy to explain the phenomena of extended and systematic; metaphor. 
The MINT system was devised as an implementation of the principles of descriptional 
analogy, having at its heart the DREP representation formalism, which represents semantic 
knowledge exclusively as a network of analogies, an approach which brings with it some 
real advantages over more conventional semantic networks. The system represents a single 
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'core' sense for each word and attempts to process polysemous senses of words as instances 
of systematic metaphor. MINT successfully produces literal paraphrases of many examples 
of systematic metaphor, both established and novel, and can handle literal input using 
precisely the same mechanisms. This is a significant demonstration of the power of 
descriptional analogy in giving an integrated account of both literal and metaphorical 
language, and also of the effectiveness with which systematic metaphor can be handled 
corn putationall y. 
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Appendix A: Glossary 
c-entity 
A 'conversational entity' - any mental object that .can be talked about. 
dead metaphor 
See metaphor. 
domain 
An informal subject area. 
established metaphor 
A less pejorative term for 'dead metaphor' . See metaphor. 
extended metaphor 
See metaphor. 
Grice's maxims of conversation 
These four maxims are said to govern cooperative conversation: 
Quality - be truthful 
Quantity - say no more or less than required 
Relevance - be relevant 
Manner - be perspicuous. 
hyperbole 
Hyperbole is overstatement, as in 
(l) For the millionth time, stop exaggerating' 
(2) Dick is a genius (when Dick is merely clever) 
idiom 
Idiom is the use of a group of words with an accepted meaning which is not readily 
understood in terms of the meanings of the individual words. Many idioms have their roots 
in metaphor. 
(3) He kicked the bucket 
(4) They buried the hatchet 
(5) It was over the top 
irony 
Irony is saying one thing and meaning the opposite, for example 
(6) Thanks a lot ( said after being offered no help) 
(7) But he plays so well! (said of a bad chess player) 
literal 
Teclmically (in this thesis), an utterance is literal (with respect to a dictionary) if it is well-
Al 
fanned and its dictionary meaning is the meaning intended by the speaker. 
litotes 
Litotes is understatement as in 
(8) That didn't go too badly ( after winning a match) (9) GEC has a few pounds to spare. 
metaphor 
A figure of speech whereby one c-entity (the 'target') is described as if it were another (the 
'source'), and this description is justified by some perceived similarity, or analogy (the 
'underlying analogy'), between the two. 'Metaphor' is the general phenomenon, whereas 'a 
metaphor' is an actual piece of text or utterance. In general, there may be more than one 
source and target in a metaphor. 
When a metaphor becomes sufficiently familiar to appear in dictionaries it is called a ' dead' 
or 'established' metaphor. This is in contrast to 'novel' metaphors, which are generally 
unfamiliar (the distinction between established and novel metaphors is not clear-cut). 
The phenomenon of 'extended metaphor' occurs when the analogy underlying one metaphor 
is re-used and elaborated in subsequent metaphors in the same discourse or text. The 
phenomenon of ' systematic metaphor' is seen to rely on a common analogy underlying 
many individual metaphors which may come from entirely separate texts. Each such pattern 
of metaphors is called 'a systematic metaphor', and these are given mnemonic labels 
conventionally written in capitals. Examples of systematic metaphors are given in Appendix 
B. A metaphor that can be seen to come under the umbrella of one of these systematic 
metaphors is called a 'manifestation' of that systematic metaphor. The common analogy 
underlying the manifestations of a systematic metaphor is called its 'core analogy'. 
metonymy 
Metonymy is the reference to some c-entity by some related c-entity, as in 
(10) Washington is angry with the Kremlin (the respective administrations) (11) John played Mozart (Mozart's music) (12) England beat Australia in the third test (the respective cricket teams) (13) Reagan invaded Grenada (Reagan's troops) 
What distinguishes metonymy from metaphor is that the former does not indicate any 
similarity or comparison between the two c-entities, it merely uses one c-entity as a label for 
the other. 
novel metaphor 
See metaphor. 
simile 
The explicit comparison of two c-entities, typically involving the words 'like ' or 'as': 
(14) Education is like shepherding, 
(15) The proposed extension to the National Gallery is like a monstrous carbuncle on the face of a much loved friend , 
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(16) John is cunning as a fox. 
source 
A c-entity involved in a metaphor (or analogy). See metaphor. 
source domain 
The domain of the sources of a metaphor (or analogy). 
target 
A c-entity involved in a metaphor (or analogy). See metaphor. 
target domain 
The domain of the targets of a metaphor (or analogy). 
systematic metaphor 
See metaphor. 
trope 
A 'figure of speech', such as simile, metaphor, metonymy, idiom, hyperbole, litotes, irony. 
well-formed 
Technically (in this thesis), an utterance is semantically well-formed (with respect to some 
dictionary) if it is possible that words are being used in their dictionary senses. 
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Appendix B: Some Examples of Systematic Metaphors 
These examples have been collected from a number of sources, the one deserving special 
mention being Metaphors we live by [Lakoff and Johnson 80] where many more examples 
can be found. 
(1) MORE IS UP: 
Population is up I down I rising I falling I soaring I plummeting 
High fidelity, low resolution, peak performance 
A steep temperature gradient 
Prices have fallen through the floor 
Harry raised his bid 
House prices have risen out of reach of the first time buyer. 
(2) TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT: 
In the following weeks .. . 
In the preceding days ... 1 
The time will come ... 
The time has arrived 
The hours passed I crept I crawled I dragged I sped I whizzed by. 
(3) THE MIND IS A BRITTI.E OBJECT: 
Her ego is very fragile. 
You have to handle him with care. 
He broke under cross-examination. 
The experience shattered him. 
Queen Victoria was made of iron. 
(4) UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING 
IDEAS ARE LlGHT SOURCES 
DISCOURSE IS A LlGHT MEDIUM: 
I see what you're saying. 
It looks different from my point of view. 
Now I've got the picture. 
Let me point something out to you. 
That was a brilliant remark. 
He is blind to the blinding truth. 
The argument is clear. 
It is arguable whether 'preceding' should be considered primarily as a temporal word or a spatial word. 
'Bef9Te ' is a word that is similarly ambiguous. 
Bl 
The discussion was opaque. 
(5) ARGUMEJIT IS WAR: 
Your claims are indefensible. 
He attacked every weak point in my argument. 
His criticisms were right on target. 
I demolished his argument. 
I've never won an argument with him. 
You disagree? Okay, shoot! 
If you use that strategy, he '11 wipe you out. 
He shot down all of my arguments. 
(6) AN ARGUMENT IS A CONTAlNER: 
Your argument is full of holes. 
It has no content. 
There are some good ideas in that argument. 
(7) AN ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY: 
We set out to show ... 
So far, we have ... 
We proceed step-by-step. 
Are you with me? 
We 're going round in circles. 
We shall return to this point later. 
We are now in a position to see that... 
I'm lost! 
(8) AN ARGUMENT IS A BUILDING: 
A well structured argument. 
Little supporting evidence. 
His argument collapsed. 
(9) The Conduit Metaphor: [Reddy 79] 
IDEAS ARE OBJECTS 
LINGU1STIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAlNERS 
COMMUNICATION IS SENDING: 
Try to get your thoughts across better. 
You still haven't given me any idea of what you mean. 
He has accepted my argument. 
Whenever you have a good idea practise capturing it in words. 
Try to pack more thoughts into fewer words. 
The sentence was filled with emotion. 
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Your words are hollow - you don't mean them. 
(10) A PROBLEM IS A SOLID OBJECT: 
a hard problem 
a soft problem 
to scratch the surface of a problem 
to get into this problem 
hidden deep within the problem ... 2 
on the surface it looks easy 
an impenetrable problem 
to open up a problem 
(11) METAPHORS ARE LIVING 11-!INGS: 
dead I live metaphors 
dead metaphors can show signs of life 
to make a metaphor is to murder it3 
this is just the corpse of a metaphor 
a fossilized metaphor 
2 c.f. UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING 
[Davidson 78] p. 32. 
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Appendix C: Some Examples of MINT's Processing 
This appendix gives examples of MINT's processing of input metaphors. These examples 
are divided into illustrations of six systematic metaphors, i although there are some that 
involve more than one at a time. The systematic metaphors and their manifestations 
processed are as follows [italics indicate the words used metaphorically]: 
MORE IS UP: 
The price of eggs is Low 
The temperature is rising 
The crime rate is soaring 
The price of petrol is up 
The price of gold is higher than the price of eggs 
THE MIND IS A BRfITLE OBJECT: etc. 
John destroyed Bill 
Bill was shattered 
Bill was a broken man 
John felt down 
John's spirits rose 
John's spirits sank 
John was depressed 
John is a cold person 
ARGUMENT IS WAR: 
John attacked Bill's theory 
John shot down Bill's argument 
Bill's argument is strong 
John's theory is flimsy 
INFECTING IS GIVING: 
John gave Mary a virus 
Mary caught a cold from John 
Mary has flu 
John is a carrier of AIDS 
TOUCHJNG IS GIVING: 
John gave Mary a kiss 
Mary sold John a kiss 
John gave Mary a smack 
Mary took a smack from John 
The conduit metaphor: 
Bill put the idea into a letter 
The poem was full of emotion 
The essay was crammed with ideas 
Mary poured her sorrow into a letter 
John gave Bill an idea 
Bill got his argument across to John . 
In each case, the input is supplied to MINT in logical form (as described in chapter 6) and 
MINT produces a number of interpretations (collections of logical forms) until one is found 
which is acceptable to the user - this is usually the first one. 
Many of these, however, are complex associations of more than one analogy. 
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The processing undertaken by MINT is summarized in the following fonn: 
sentence: 
(input sentence) 
s ko lemized indefinite logical form: 
( indefinite conjuncts) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
(definite conjuncts) 
e voked-concepts: 
list of evoked concepts for first interpretation 
literal f o rm: 
list of literal logical forms for first interpretation 
[English gloss of interpretation) 
Interpretation acceptable? NO 
evoked-concepts : 
list of evoked concepts for second interpretation 
literal form: 
list of literal logical forms for second interpretation 
[English gloss of interpretation) 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
Summaries of inputs are separated by rows of = signs, a double row indicating the start of a 
new 'discourse', a single row indicating a continuation of the same 'discourse' .2 
2 A 'discourse' generally consists of an input to set up some discourse entities followed by a metaphorical 
input making use of these entities. 
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1. MORE IS UP 
The MORE IS up metaphor is probably the simplest in fonn used by MINT, but the most 
useful, in that it frequently crops up in manifestations of other systematic metaphors. The 
core analogy, as represented in the network, is shown in figure 1. A rough summary of this 
analogy is 'a quantity can . be described as a physical object (that goes up and down), 
provided its height is interpreted as the quantity itself'. 
Figure 1: MORE IS VP 
This analogy is used in conjunction with other knowledge in the network, such as the fact 
that a low object has little height and a high object has great height (these are seen as the 
core senses of 'low' and 'high'). 
The predicates LITTLE and GREAT are assumed to apply literally to quantities, as are 
LESSER and GREATER. The simple event semantics employed in some of these examples is 
that events can lead to 'consequent' states, and conversely states result from 'antecedent' 
events. Other predicates should be self-explanatory. 
sentence: 
(the price of eggs is low) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: 
( (LOW "sk-anonl" "sk-anon2") (STATE "sk-anon2") ) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
((PRICE "sk-anonl") (OF "sk - anonl" "eggs" PRICE)) 
evoked-concepts: 
"priceO" 
literal form: 
(STATE "stateO") 
(OF "priceO" "eggs" PRICE) 
(LITTLE "priceO" "stateO") 
[The price of eggs is little] 
I nte r pretation acceptable? YES 
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sentence: 
(a temperature) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: ( (TEMPERATURE " sk-anonl") ) 
skolemized definite logical form : 
NIL 
evoked-concepts : 
literal form: 
(TEMPERATURE "temperatureO") 
[This sets up a referent for next example] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
sentence: 
(the temperature is rising) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: ((RISE "sk-anonl" "sk-anon2") (EVENT "sk-anon2")) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
((TEMPERATURE "sk-anonl")) 
evoked-concepts: 
"conseq-stateO" 
literal form: 
(EVENT "eventO") 
(OF "conseq-stateO" "eventO" CONSEQUENT-ST) (INCREASED "temperatureO" "conseq-stateO") (INCREASE "=dummy=" "temperatureO" "eventO") 
[The temperature is increasing / is increased] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
sentence : 
(the crime rate is soaring) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: ( (SOAR -"sk-anonl" "sk-anon2") (EVENT "sk-anon2")) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
( (RATE "sk-anonl") (OF "sk-anonl" "crime" RATE)) 
evoked-concepts: 
"conseq-stateO" "rateO" 
literal form : 
(EVENT "eventO'~) 
(OF "conseq-stateO" "eventO" CONSEQUENT-ST) (RAPID "eventO") 
(OF "rateO" "crime" RATE) 
(GREAT "rateO" "conseq-stateO") 
(INCREASE "=dummy=" "rateO" "eventO") (INCREASED "rateO" "conseq-stateO") 
[The crime rate is increasing rapidly to a great level). 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
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sentence: 
(the price of petrol is up) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: ((UP "sk-anonl" "sk-anon2") (STATE "sk-anon2")) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
( (PRICE "sk-anonl") (OF "sk-anonl" "petrol" PRI CE)) 
evoked-concepts: 
"anteced-eventO" "priceO" 
literal form: 
(STATE "stateO") 
(OF "anteced-eventO" "stateO" ANTECEDENT-EV) (OF "priceO" "petrol" PRICE) 
(INCREASED "priceO" "stateO") 
(INCREASE " =durruny =" "priceO" "anteced-eventO") 
[The price of petrol is increased 
(a result of a prior increasing event)] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
sentence: 
(the price of gold is higher than the price of eggs) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: ( (HIGHER "sk-anonl" "sk- anon2" "sk-anon3") (STATE "sk-anon3") ) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
( (PRICE "sk-anonl") (OF "sk-anonl" "gold" PRICE) (PRICE "sk-anon2") (OF "sk-anon2" "eggs" PRICE)) 
evoked-concepts: 
"pricel" "priceO" 
literal form : 
(STATE "stateO") 
(OF "pricel" "gold" PRICE) 
(OF "priceO" "eggs" PRICE) 
(LESSER "priceO" "pricel" "stateO") (GI<EATER "price!" "priceO" "stateO") 
[The price of gold is greater than the price of eggs] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
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2. THE MIND IS A BRITTLE OBJECT etc . 
The examples in this section are based around the group of coherent systematic metaphors 
THE MIND IS A BRTITLE OBJECT 
HAPPY IS UP 
FRIENDLINESS IS W ARMfH 
These analogies underlying these metaphors are represented as a single metaphorical i-link in 
DREP as shown in figure 2. 
ph-i ntegrity height temperature brightness 
t t t t· ego confidence happiness friendliness intelligence 
Figure 2: THE MJND IS A BRTITLE OBJECT etc. 
Most of these examples have (at least) two possible interpretations, since they can be 
interpreted literally as well as metaphorically. The heuristics employed in MINT favour the 
literal interpretations and so the first interpretation must be rejected before the desired 
metaphorical interpretation is found. 
The predicates used in these examples are self-explanatory, but a point to mention is that 
' spirits' and 'confidence' are treated as exact synonyms, as are 'happiness' and 'joy' . 
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sentence: 
(John destroyed Bill) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: 
( (DESTROY "John" "Bill" "sk-anonl") (EVENT "sk-anonl")) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
NIL 
evoked-concepts: 
"physob-integrityO" "conseq-stateO" 
literal form: 
(EVENT "eventO") 
(OF "conseq-stateO" "eventO" CONSEQUENT-ST) (DESTROY "John" "Bill" "eventO") 
(DESTROYED "Bill" "conseq-stateO") 
(PHYSOB "Bill") 
(OF "physob-integrityO" "Bill" P-INTEGRITY) 
[John physically destroyed Bill (consequence: Bill is destroyed)] 
Interpretation acceptable? NO 
evoked-concepts: 
"confidenceO" "conseq-stateO" 
literal form: 
(EVENT "eventO") 
(OF "conseq-stateO" "eventO" CONSEQUENT-ST) (REDUCED-TO-NOTHING "confidenceO" "conseq-stateO") (REDUCE-TO-NOTHING "John" "confidenceO" "eventO") (OF "confidenceO" "Bill" SPIRITS) 
(OF "confidenceO" "Bill" CONFIDENCE) 
(CONFIDENCE "confidenceO") 
[John reduced Bill's confidence to nothing] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
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sentence: 
{Bill was shattered) 
skolernized indefinite logical form: 
{ {SHATTER "=dummy=" "Bill" "sk-anonl") (EVENT "sk-anonl")) 
skolernized definite logical form: 
NIL 
evoked-concepts: 
literal form: 
(EVENT "eventO") 
(SHATTER "=durruny=" "Bill" "eventO") 
[Bill was physically shattered] 
Interpretation acceptable ? NO 
e voked-concepts: 
"confidenceO" "conseq-stateO" 
literal form: 
(EVENT "eventO") 
(OF "conseq-stateO" " eventO" CONSEQUENT-ST) 
(REDUCED-TO-NOTHING "confidenceO" "conseq-stateO") 
(REDUCE-TO-NOTHING "=durruny=" "confidenceO" "eventO") 
{OF "confidenceO" "Bill" SPIRITS) 
{OF "confidenceO" "Bill" CONFIDENCE) 
{CONFIDENCE "confidenceO") 
[Bill's confidence was reduced to nothing] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
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sentence : 
(Bill was a broken man) 
skolemized indefinite logical f o rm : 
( (BROKEN "Bill" "sk-anonl") (MAN "Bill") (STATE " sk -anon l")) 
skolemized definite logical f o rm : 
NIL 
evoked-concepts: 
"anteced-eventO" 
literal form: 
(MAN "Bill") 
(STATE "stateO") 
(OF "anteced-eventO" "stateO" ANTECEDENT-EV) 
(BROKEN "Bill" "stateO") 
(BREAK "=dummy=" "Bill" "anteced-event O") 
[Bill was physically broken] 
Interpretation acceptable? NO 
evoked-concepts: 
"confidenceO" "anteced-eventO" 
literal form: 
(MAN "Bill") 
(STATE "stateO") 
(OF "anteced-eventO" "stateO" ANTECEDENT-EV) 
(REDUCED-TO-NOTHING "confidenceO" "stateO") 
(REDUCE-TO-NOTHING "=dummy=" "confidenceO" "anteced-eventO") (OF "confidenceO" "Bill" SPIRITS) 
(OF "confidenceO" "Bill" CONFIDENCE) 
(CONFIDENCE "confidenceO") 
[Bill's confidence was reduced to nothing] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
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sentence: 
(John felt down) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: 
( (DOWN "John" "sk-anonl") (STATE "sk-anonl ")) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
NIL 
evoked-concepts: 
"anteced-eventO" 
literal form: 
(STATE "stateO") 
(OF "anteced-eventO" "stateO" ANTECEDENT-EV) 
(DOWN "John" "stateO") 
(FALL "John" "anteced-eventO") 
[Bill was physically down (the result of a fall)] 
Interpretation acceptable? NO 
evoked- concepts: 
"happinessO" "anteced-eventO" 
literal form: 
(STATE "stateO") 
(OF "anteced-eventO" "stateO" ANTECEDENT-EV) 
(DECREASED "happinessO" "stateO") . 
(DECREASE "happinessO" "anteced-eventO") 
(OF "happinessO" "John" HAPPINESS) 
(OF "happinessO" "John" JOY) 
(HAPPINESS "happinessO") 
[Bill's happiness was decreased] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
sentence: 
(John's spirits rose) 
skolemized indefinite logical form : 
((RISE "sk-anonl" "sk-anon2") (EVENT "sk-anon2")) 
skolemlzed definite logical form: 
((OF "sk-anonl" "John" SPIRITS)) 
evoked-concepts : 
"conseq-stateO" "confidenceO" 
literal form: 
(EVENT "eventO") 
(OF "confidenceO" - "John" SPIRITS) 
(OF "confidenceO" "John " CONFIDENCE) 
(OF "conseq-stateO" "eventO" CONSEQUENT-ST) 
(INCREASE "=dummy=" "confidenceO" "eventO") 
(INCREASED "confidenceO" "conseq-stateO") 
[John's confidence was increased] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
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sentence: 
(John's spirits sank) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: ((SINK "sk-anonl" "sk-anon2") (EVENT "sk-anon2")) 
skolemized definite logical form: ( (OF "sk-anonl" "John" SPIRITS)) 
evoked-concepts: 
"conseq-stateO" "confidenceO" 
literal form: 
(EVENT "eventO") 
(OF "confidenceO" "John" SPIRITS) (OF "confidenceO" "John" CONFIDENCE) (OF "conseq-stateO" "eventO" CONSEQUENT-ST) (DECREASED "confidenceO" "conseq-stateO") (DECREASE "confidenceO" "eventO") 
[John's confidence was decreased] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
sentence: 
(John was depressed) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: ( (DEPRESSED "John" "sk-anonl") (STATE "sk-anonl")) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
NIL 
evoked-concepts: 
literal form: 
(STATE "stateO") 
(DEPRESSED "John" "stateO") 
[John was physically depressed] 
Interpretation acceptable? NO 
evoked-concepts : 
"happinessO" "anteced-eventO" 
literal form: 
(STATE "stateO") 
(OF "anteced-eventO " " stateO" ANTECEDENT-EV) (DECREASED "happinessO" "stateO") (DECREASE "happinessO" "anteced-eventO") (OF "happinessO" "John" HAPPINESS) (OF "happinessO" "-John" JOY) 
(HAPPINESS "happinessO " ) 
[John's happiness was decreased] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
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sentence: 
(John is a cold person) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: 
((COLD "John" "sk-anonl") (STATE "sk-anonl")) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
NIL 
evoked- concepts: 
"temperatureO" 
literal form: 
(STATE "stateO") 
(COLD "John" "stateO") 
[John was physically cold] 
Interpretation acceptable? NO 
evoked-concepts: 
"friendlinessO " 
literal form: 
(STATE "stateO") 
(LITTLE "friendlinessO" "stateO") 
(FRIENDLINESS "friendlinessO") 
[John was unfriendly] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
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3. ARGU:MENT IS WAR 
The DREP representation of the analogy underlying the ARGUME.i"\'T IS WAR systematic 
metaphor is shown in figure 3. Note that there are three associated analogies here: A~ 
ARGUMENT IS A STRATEGIC OBJECT (a strategic object is an object of defence or attack in the 
military sense), CONVINCINGJ\css rs STRENGTH; INTEGRITY (a convincing argument is a strong / 
sound argument), and CRITICISM IS ATIACK. 
straterc-obj structure integrity strength attack-ev attack -ag at tac k- pat 
* * 
* t ""- .t( * t t t * -\( 7 argument argument convincingness criticize-ev cr it icize-ag cr it icize-pat 
Figure 3: ARGUMENT IS w AR 
Strictly speaking, the last of these ought to be redundant, as 'attack' could be defined as 
'attempt to destroy a strategic object ' , in which case the other two analogies could be used 
to interpret an attack on an argument as an attempt to reduce the convincingness of the 
argument (i.e., a criticism of the argument). Unfortunately, MThTT cannot yet handle 
constructions such as 'to attempt to ' so the more direct third analogy is employed. This third 
analogy is, in effect, defining a polysemous sense for 'attack', linking it to the ARGD1E;\1 rs 
WAR core analogy - this is exactly the way in which MINT could cache useful polysemous 
senses. 
sentence: 
(John attacked Bill ' s theory) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: 
( (ATTACK "John" "sk-anonl" "sk-anon2") (EVENT "sk-anon2")) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
((THEORY "sk-anonl") (OF "sk-anonl" "Bill" THEORY)) 
e voked- concepts: 
"theoryO " 
literal form: 
(EVENT "eventO") 
(OF "theo ryO" "Bill " THEORY) 
(CRITICIZE "John " "theory O" "eventO " ) 
[John criticized Bill's theory] 
Interpreta tion a c ceptable? YES 
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sentence : 
(John shot down Bill's argument) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: 
((SHOOT-DOWN "John" "sk-anonl" "sk-anon2") (EVENT "sk-anon2")) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
( (ARGUMENT "sk-anonl") (OF "sk-anonl" ','Bill" ARGUMENT)) 
evoked-concepts: 
"conseq-stateO" "convincingnessO" "argument O" 
literal form : 
(EVENT "eventO") 
(OF "conseq-stateO" "eventO" CONSEQUENT-ST) (REDUCED-TO-NOTHING "convincingnessO" "conseq-stateO") (REDUCE - TO-NOTHING "John" "convincingnessO" "eventO") (CRITICIZE "John" "argumentO" "eventO") 
(OF " argumentO" "Bill" ARGUMENT) 
(ARGUMENT "argument O") 
(OF "convincingnessO" "argumentO" CONVINCINGNESS) 
[John criticized Bill's theory, 
reducing its convincingness to nothing] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
sentence: 
(Bill's argument is strong) 
skolemized indefinite logical form : ( (STRONG "sk-anonl" "sk-anon2") (STATE "sk-anon2")) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
((ARGUMENT "sk-anonl") (OF "sk-anonl" "Bill" ARGUMENT)) 
evoked-concepts: 
"convincingnessO" "argumentO" 
literal form: 
(STATE "stateO") 
(GREAT "convincingnessO" "stateO") 
(OF "argumentO" "Bill" ARGUMENT) 
(ARGUMENT "argumentO") 
(OF "convincingnessO" "argumentO" CONVINCINGNESS) 
[Bill 's argwnent is convincing] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
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sentence: 
(John's theory is flimsy) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: 
( (FLIMSY "sk-anonl" "sk-anon2") (STATE "sk-anon2")) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
((THEORY "sk-anonl") (OF "sk- anonl" "John'.' THEORY)) 
evoked-concepts: 
"convincingnessO" "theoryO" 
literal form: 
(STATE "stateO") 
(LITTLE "convincingnessO" "stateO") 
(OF "theoryO" "John" ARGUMENT) 
(ARGUMENT "theoryO") 
(OF "convincingnessO" "theoryO" CONVINCINGNESS) 
[John's theory is unconvincing] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
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4. INFECTING IS GIVING 
The two associated d-links behind MINT's processing of P,,HCTTI\G IS GIVI\'G are shown in 
figure 4. A disease is seen as a physical object whose transfer is interpreted as infection and 
whose possession is interpreted as a state of being infected. 
ph ysob transfer-ev transfer-from transfer-to tr ansfer-pat 
. t * • t t t t d isease infect-ev infect-a g infect-pat infect-with 
Figure 4: INFECTJNG IS GIVING 
sentence: 
(John gave Mary a virus) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: 
possess-st 
t • 
infec ted-St 
{ (GIVE "John" "Mary" "sk-anonl" "sk-anon2") {VIRUS "sk-anonl") {EVENT "sk-anon2") ) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
NIL 
evoked-concepts: 
"conseq-stateO" 
literal form: 
{VIRUS "virusO") 
{EVENT "eventO") 
{OF '.'conseq-stateO" "eventO" CONSEQUENT-ST) {INFECT "John" "Mary" "eventO") 
{INFECTED-WITH "virusO" "Mary" "conseq-stateO") 
[John infected Mary with a virus] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
C16 
sentence: 
(Mary caught a cold from John) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: 
( (CATCH "Mary" " sk-anonl " "sk-anon2 ") (COLD "sk-anonl") 
(FROM "John" "sk-anon2") (EVENT "sk-anon 2")) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
NIL 
evoked- concepts: 
"con seq-stateO" 
literal form: 
(COLD "coldO") 
(EVENT "eventO") 
(OF "conseq-stateO" "eventO" CONSEQUENT-ST) 
(INFECT "John" "Mary" "eventO") 
(INFECTED-WITH "coldO" "Mary" "conseq-state O") 
[John infected Mary with a cold] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
sentence: 
(Mary has flu) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: 
( (HAVE "Mary" "flu" "sk-anonl") (STATE "sk-anonl")) 
skolemized definite logical form : 
NIL 
evoked- concepts : 
"anteced- eventO" 
literal form: 
(STATE "stateO") 
(OF "anteced-ev entO " "stateO" ANTECEDENT-EV) 
(INFECTED-WITH "flu" "Mary" "stateO") 
(INFECT " =dummy=" "Mary" "anteced-eventO") 
[Mary is infected with flu] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
sentence : 
(John is a carrier of AIDS) 
s ko lemized indefinite logical form : 
( (CARRIER "John")· (OF "John" "AIDS" CARRIER)) 
skolemized definite logical form : 
NIL 
evoked-concepts: 
literal form: 
(CARRIER "John") 
(INFECTED-WITH "AIDS " "John" " =dummy= ") 
[John is infected with AIDS] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
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5. TOUCHING IS GIVING 
Figure 5 shows MINT's representation of TOLCHC\G IS GIVC\G. Here, any event of touching, 
such as a kiss, punch, smack, tap, is seen as an object which is 'given' to the patient of the 
event 
p:r ===== g~rat glag 
touch-ev touch-ev touch-ag 
Figure 5: TOUCHL'\G IS GI\T\G 
sentence: 
(John aave Mary a kiss) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: 
g;,r 
touch-pat 
( (GIVE "John" "Mary" "sk-anonl" "sk-anon2") (KISS "sk-anonl") 
(EVENT "sk-anon2")) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
NIL 
evoked-concepts: 
literal form: 
(EVENT "eventO") 
(KISS "kissO") 
(KISS "John" "Mary" "ki ssO ") 
(TOUCH "John" "Mary" "kissO") 
[John kissed Mary] 
Interpretat ion acceptable? YES 
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sentence: 
(Mary sold John a kiss) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: 
( (SELL "Mary" "John" "sk-anonl" "sk-anon2") (KISS "sk-anonl") 
(EVENT "sk-anon2") ) 
skolemized definite logical form : 
NIL 
e voked-concepts : 
literal form: 
(EVENT "eventO") 
(KISS "kissO") 
(KISS "Mary" "John" "kissO") 
(TOUCH "Mary" "John" "kissO") 
[Mary kissed John] 
I nterpretation acceptable? YES 
sentence: 
(John gave Mary a smack) 
skolemized indefinite l ogical form: 
( (GIVE "John" "Mary" "sk-anonl" "sk-anon2 ") 
(SMACK "sk-anonl") (EVENT "sk-anon2")) 
skolemized definite l ogica l form : 
NIL 
evoked-concepts: 
literal form: 
(EVENT "eventO") 
(SMACK "smackO") 
(SMACK "John" "Mary" "smackO") 
(TOUCH "John" "Mary" "smackO"f 
[John smacked Mary] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
sentence: 
(Mary took a smack from J ohn) 
skolemized indefinite logical form : 
( (TAKE "Mary" "sk-anonl" "sk-anon2") (SMACK "sk-anonl ") 
(EVENT "sk-anon2") (FROM "John" " sk-anon2 " )) 
skolemized definite logical form : 
NIL 
evoked-concepts : 
literal form: 
(EVENT "event O") 
(SMACK "smackO") 
(SMACK "John" "Mary" "smackO") 
(TOUCH " John" "Mary" "smackO") 
[John smacked Mary] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
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6. The conduit metaphor [Reddy 79] 
This complex systematic metaphor is represented as a group of seven associated analogies 
corresponding to simpler systematic metaphors. Most of these analogies refer to the complex 
communication 'frame' 3 which has slots for communicate-ev (the overall event of 
communicating), communicate-ag (the speaker or author), communicate-pat (the meaning 
which is communicated), communicate-to (the hearer or reader), message (the unerance or 
text), express-ev (the act of utterance or writing), and understand-ev (the act of 
comprehension of the meaning in the message). 
The individual d-links represent the lower level systematic metaphors TO \1EA-'\ IS TO C0\1Ar--
(where the message 'means' the meaning), TO EXPRESS IS TO PCT I\'TO (the communicator 
'puts' his meaning into the message), TO UJ\TIERSTA-'\'D IS TO EXTRACT (extract the meaning 
from the message), and COMM1.J1'.1CATION IS MO\T\'G (the meaning is moved from the speaker 
to the hearer in the message). Finally, there is an analogy describing the 'density' of 
meaning in a message as the 'fullness' of the message. 4 
physob veh icle contain·st contain-er conta in-pat conta in-content container content 
* t * =·t·= . t t t t * ·H· = 
meaning message mean-st message communica te-12at mea nina-d ens it~ ~ mean ing-density 
extract-ev extract·ag extract-pat extract-from put-ev put-ag put-pat put- into 
-
* t t t t * - * t t t t * = 
und e rstand -ev communicate-to communicate-12at message express-ev coriimunicate-ag communicate-12at message 
move-ev move-ag move-vehicle move-pat move-from move-to 
* t t t t t t * 
commun1cate-ev communicate-ag message commun icate-12at communicate-ag commun icate-to 
Figure 6: The conduit metaphor 
Because of the complexity of the semantics used in these examples, there are two predicates 
which need some explanation: 
MEANING-PART is used in preference to MEANING to emphasize that only a part of the 
meaning of a message is given. M. SAI1P LE expresses the relation that a particular meaning 
is a 'sample' of some mass term, such as emotion (analogous, say to a sample of butter, or 
of gold). 
See chapter 5 for an explanation of the frame interpretation of DREP. 
see Appendix B for a greater range of examples showing how these metaphors are used. 
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sentence: 
(an ide_tl 
skolemized indefinite logical form: 
((IDEA "sk-anonl")) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
NIL 
evoked-concepts: 
literal form: 
(IDEA "ideaO") 
[This just sets up a referent] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
sentence: 
(Bill put the idea into a letter) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: 
( (PUT "Bill" "sk-anonl" "sk-anon2") (EVENT "sk-anon2") (INTO "sk-anon3" "sk-anon2") (LETTER "sk-anon3")) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
((IDEA "sk-anonl")) 
evoked- concepts: 
literal form : 
(EVENT "eventO"} 
(LETTER "letterO") 
(MESSAGE "letterO"} 
(OF "Bill" "letterO" AUTHOR) 
(OF " ideaO" "letterO" MEANING-PART} 
(COMMUNICATE "Bill" "ideaO " "=dummy="} 
(EXPRESS-IN "Bill" "ideaO" "letterO" "eventO"} (EXPRESS "Bill" "ideaO" "eventO"} 
[Bill expressed (and communicated) the idea in a lener (a message). 
Bill was the author of the lener] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
sentence: 
(a poem) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: 
((POEM "sk-anonl"}) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
NIL 
evoked-concepts: 
literal form: 
(POEM "poemO") 
[This just sets up a referent] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
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sentence: 
(The poem was full of emotion) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: 
( (FULL "sk-anonl" " sk-anon2") (STATE "sk-anon2") (OF "emotion" "sk-anon2")) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
((POEM "sk-anonl")) 
evoked-concepts: 
"meaning-densityO" "anteced-eventO" "meaning-sampleO" 
literal form : 
(STATE "stateO") 
(OF "anteced-eventO" "stateO" ANTECEDENT-EV) (MAXIMAL "meaning-densityO" "stateO") (OF "meaning-sampleO" "emotion" M. SAMPLE) 
(MESSAGE "poemO" ) 
(OF "meaning- densityO" "poemO" MEANING-DENSITY) (OF "meaning-sampleO " "poemO" MEANING-PART) (EXPRESS-IN "=dummy=" "meaning-sampleO" "poemO" "anteced-eventO") (EXPRESS " =dummy= " "meaning-sampleO" "anteced-eventO") 
[Emotion was expressed in the poem and 
the 'meaning density' of the poem was maximal] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
sentence: 
(an essay) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: 
( (ESSAY " sk-anonl ") ) 
skolemized definite logical form : 
NIL 
evoked-concepts: 
literal form : 
(ESSAY "essayO") 
[This just sets up a referent] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
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sentence : 
(the essay was crammed with ideas) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: 
( (CRAMMED "sk-anonl" "sk-anon2") (STATE "sk-anon2") (WITH "ideas" "sk-anon2")) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
( (ESSAY "sk-anonl ") ) 
-------------------------------------- ·----- ·-------- -------
evoked-concepts : 
"meaning-densityO" "anteced-eventO" "meaning-sampleO" 
literal form: 
(STATE "stateO") 
(OF "anteced-eventO" "stateO" ANTECEDENT-EV) 
(MAXIMAL "meaning-densityO" "stateO") 
(OF "meaning-sampleO" "ideas" M. SAMPLE) 
(MESSAGE "essayO") 
(OF "meaning-densityO" "essayO" MEANING-DENSITY) 
(OF "meaning-sampleO" "essayO" MEANING-PART) 
(EXPRESS-IN "=dummy=" "meaning-sampleO" "essayO" "anteced-eventO") (EXPRESS "=dummy=" "meaning-sampleO" "anteced- eventO") 
[Ideas were expressed in the essay and 
the 'meaning density' of the essay was maximal] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
sentence: 
(Mary poured her sorrow into a letter) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: 
( (POUR "Mary" "sk-anonl" "sk-anon2") (EVENT "sk -anon2") (INTO "sk-anon3" "sk-anon2") (LETTER "sk-anon3")) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
( (OF "sk-anonl" "Mary" SORROW)) 
evoked-concepts: 
"sorrowO" 
literal form: 
(EVENT "eventO") 
(OF "sorrowO" "Mary" SORROW) 
(LETTER "letterO") 
(MESSAGE "letterO") 
(OF "Mary" "letterO" AUTHOR) 
(OF "sorrowO" "letterO" MEANING-PART) 
(EXPRESS-IN "Mary" "sorrowO" "letterO" "eventO") 
(EXPRESS "Mary" "sorrowO" "eventO") 
(COMMUNICATE "Mary" "sorrowO" "=dummy=") 
[Mary expressed (and communicated) her sorrow in a letter] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
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sentence: 
(John gave Bill an idea) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: 
( (GIVE "John" "Bill" "sk-anonl" "sk-anon2") 
(EVENT "sk-anon2" ) ( IDEA "sk-anonl")) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
NIL 
evoked-concepts: 
"conseq-stateO" 
literal form: 
(IDEA "ideaO") 
(EVENT "eventO") 
(OF "conseq-stateO" "eventO" CONSEQUENT-ST) 
(EXPRESS "John" "ideaO" "=dummy=") 
(COMMUNICATE-TO "John" "Bill" "eventO") 
(COMMUNICATE "John" "ideaO" "eventO") 
[John communicated an idea to Bill] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
sentence: 
(Bill got his argument across to John) 
skolemized indefinite logical form: 
((GET "Bill" "sk-anonl" "sk-anon2") (EVENT "sk-anon2") (ACROSS "=dummy=" "sk-anon2") (TO "John" "sk-anon2")) 
skolemized definite logical form: 
((OF "sk-anonl" "Bill" ARGUMENT)) 
evoked-concepts: 
"argumentO" 
literal form: 
(EVENT "eventO") 
(OF "argumentO" "Bill" ARGUMENT) 
(EXPRESS "Bill" "argumentO" " =dummy=") 
(COMMUNICATE "Bill" "argumentO" "eventO") 
(COMMUNICATE-TO "Bill" "John" "eventO") 
[John communicated his argument to Bill] 
Interpretation acceptable? YES 
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